



# Opportunities or risks for civic education in electoral democracies? Evidence from Nigeria

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## ARTICLE INFO

### Keywords:

Civic education  
Youth  
Nigeria  
Democracy  
Political participation

## ABSTRACT

Drawing on theory and evidence from Western societies, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa implement civic education at school to foster political knowledge, engagement, as well as pro-democratic attitudes and behaviour. Yet instead of increasing participation as in established Western democracies, research focusing on adults in African electoral democracies suggests that citizens with higher socio-economic status, more knowledge, and adherence to democratic norms, are more likely to retreat from institutionalized politics given their increased awareness of the flawed nature of the political regimes they live in, where corruption, clientelism, electoral violence, and human rights abuses are still prevalent. In this paper, we use an original large-scale survey of secondary school students in Lagos state, Nigeria, and demonstrate by means of multilevel regression and Latent Class Analysis (LCA) how some, but not all of these tendencies are also present among adolescents, with optimistic implications for civic education on the continent.

## 1. Introduction

Studies have shown that civic education can increase knowledge of how the government works and how to participate in the political process (Geboers et al., 2013; Finkel et al., 2021; Niemi and Junn, 1996). Improved knowledge of the democratic functioning of the state has also been found to positively relate to political engagement, democratic values, institutional trust, and, ultimately, political participation (Cohen and Chaffee, 2013; Galston, 2001; Quintelier, 2015; Schulz et al., 2010; Schulz et al., 2018; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Civic education would, moreover, act as an equalizer and close a persistent ‘participation gap’ as citizens with higher socio-economic status (SES) are found to participate more than those with lower SES (e.g., Dalton, 2017; Gallego, 2007; Stolle and Hooghe, 2011).

Empirical evidence supporting the implementation of school-based civic education mostly stems from Western democracies, however. In contrast, relatively few studies have been devoted to school-based civic education in African settings, where democratic institutions survive along strong presidents, clientelism, and the use of state resources for political legitimization. This in spite of a substantial number of Sub-Saharan African countries having introduced, revised and/or

strengthened civic education in their school curricula following the third wave of democratization in the 1990s to foster democratic regime development.

This lack of scholarship forms an important gap given recent research with adults indicating that positive relations between political knowledge, engagement, democratic values, institutional trust, and participation may not hold in African settings. Indeed, African citizens with higher SES, political awareness, and democratic values would not be *more* likely to vote as is the case in Western democracies, but *less* likely (Croke et al., 2016; Nathan, 2018), indicating a ‘reverse participation gap’. Arguably, these citizens are more aware of the imperfections of their political regime and consequently less trusting of politics (see Finkel and Lim, 2021). Outside of the continent, including in Bulgaria and Colombia, higher civic knowledge has been found to correlate negatively with institutional trust and participation among secondary school students too (Blaskó et al., 2019; Lauglo, 2013; Torney-Purta et al., 2004).

The above suggests that the effects of school-based civic education may be highly dependent on regime type. The authoritative V-Dem project identifies four types of political regimes: liberal democracies, electoral democracies, electoral authoritarian countries, and closed

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autocracies (Lührmann et al., 2017). Positive relations between civic education, political knowledge, engagement, democratic values, trust, and participation have been found in liberal democracies, where free and fair elections are in place and individual liberties protected. In electoral democracies, multiparty competition is undermined through corruption and the use of clientelism, and individual liberties are only weakly protected. The democratic credentials of electoral autocracies are even weaker, with high incumbent control over political life. Hence the positive relations found in liberal democracies may not be present in such contexts.

These patterns indicate that African governments that implement civic education but fall short of the liberal democracy criteria may face a conundrum: by fostering political knowledge, future generations may well become more democratically minded, but risk no longer showing up at the ballot box out of disillusionment with the democratic state of their country. Most African regimes are electoral democracies or autocracies, hence this potential risk is highly relevant for current civic education policies.

To explore whether civic education in Africa could be more of a risk than an opportunity, this paper examines the relations between Nigerian secondary school students' political knowledge, engagement, democratic attitudes, institutional trust, and intended political participation (i.e., voting, but also protesting, joining a party, campaigning, contacting a politician), accounting for SES. Nigeria transitioned from military rule to multiparty democracy in 1999 but continues to be considered as only an electoral democracy by V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2024). A compulsory and examinable subject since 2009, all students study civic education throughout their primary and secondary schooling.

Drawing on an original large-scale survey among final year secondary school students (16 years old on average) in Lagos state, Nigeria, we find that adolescents from higher SES backgrounds are not more likely to participate politically as in liberal democracies. In contrast, we rather find evidence of a 'reverse participation gap', with high SES adolescents being more likely to disengage from politics. More fundamentally, we find that high levels of knowledge and democratic values—key objectives of civic education programmes—are positively related with voting, contacting of politicians, and protesting, but negatively related to party membership and campaigning. Knowledgeable and democratically minded adolescents clearly reject activities related to political parties, which are commonly associated with corruption and violence in Nigeria, while not retreating from other forms of participation including most notably voting. An important subgroup of youths with lower SES and lower levels of knowledge and democratic values nonetheless feels inclined to participate in party activities, likely *because of* the clientelist offers they make. These results suggest that, in electoral democracies too, civic education should be considered an opportunity, rather than a risk, by steering youths toward pro-democratic behaviour through fostering knowledge and democratic norms.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section we further discuss the relevant literature on youth political socialization and political participation, before deriving our hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the case of Nigeria. Section 4 explains the data used and the methodology. Section 5 presents our findings. Section 6 concludes.

## 2. Civic education and political participation: theory and expectations

Political socialization during adolescence ('the impressionable years') has been found to be influential for citizens' active participation in political affairs in adult life (Neundorff and Smets, 2017; Obradović and Masten, 2007), whether institutionalized (e.g. voting, party membership, contacting politicians) or non-institutionalized (e.g. protesting, petitioning) participation (e.g., Stolle and Hooghe, 2011). Since such active participation is generally taken as a sign of healthy democratic behaviour, scholars have investigated how democratic citizenship and participation can be cultivated. Oftentimes, schools are proposed as the

ideal place to enhance students' awareness of civic rights and responsibilities, and knowledge of the functioning of national institutions through the inclusion of civic education programmes. Schools could even foster students' skills and attitudes to contribute to a changing social order, which according to Tawil (2013) constitutes the difference between 'civic education' and 'citizenship education' (see also Ghebru and Lloyd, 2020).

In Western, liberal democracies, studies have found that civic education can increase knowledge, engagement, democratic norms, and institutional trust (Blaskó et al., 2019; Campbell and Niemi, 2016; Cohen and Chaffee, 2013; Geboers et al., 2013; Galston, 2001; Niemi and Junn, 1996). This is particularly the case in schools with an open classroom climate (Quintelier and Hooghe, 2013; Sigauke, 2012). Knowledge of the political system, political interest, and adherence to democratic values are in turn positively associated with political participation (e.g. Bengtsson and Christensen, 2016; Oser, 2022). Institutional (political) trust is also positively associated with participation, but specifically institutional participation, as it can be negatively associated with non-institutional participation (e.g. Bäck and Christensen, 2016; Hooghe and Marien, 2013). Not all studies are as optimistic about civic education programmes, however, with some arguing that the impact of such programmes is negligible (e.g., Manning and Edwards, 2014).

Besides schooling, caregivers and, to a lesser extent, peers play a key role in shaping youths' political participation (Jennings, 1996; Quintelier, 2015). Parents' SES, including parental education and income levels, is regarded as highly influential. Results from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) show, for instance, that in a large number of countries higher SES was associated not only with political knowledge, but also with increased political engagement and levels of institutional trust among adolescents (Schulz et al., 2010; 2018). Fundamentally, parents' SES has also been found to positively correlate with a range of political participation (intentions) (Levy and Akiva, 2019; Schulz et al., 2018). Thus, high SES does not only predict political participation among adults (e.g., Dalton, 2017; Gallego, 2007; Stolle and Hooghe, 2011), commonly known as the 'participation gap', but also among younger generations (e.g., Gaby, 2017; Kim and Lim, 2019). Promisingly, civic education can help narrow the participation gap between high and low SES backgrounds in society, at least in Western liberal democracies (Neundorff et al., 2016; Sohl and Arensmeier, 2015).

Empirical evidence on electoral democracies and electoral autocracies in Africa has at times corroborated the above patterns. Larreguy and Marshall (2017), for example, find that education expansion in Nigeria increased citizens' political engagement, probability to vote, as well as their involvement in community associations, suggesting that higher SES has the same effect as in liberal democracies. More generally, education in and of itself has been found to foster civic attitudes in electoral democracies/autocracies (Evans and Rose, 2012). Yet, whereas Zimbabweans who had enjoyed the benefits of educational expansion in the 1980s were more politically engaged, more supportive of democracy, and more likely to criticize the government and support opposition parties, Croke and colleagues (2016) found that they were actually less likely to vote, contact politicians or attend community meetings. Non-institutional participation such as protesting was not negatively affected. They argued that more educated citizens are more critical and aware of the shortcomings of the regime, as Zimbabwe is an electoral autocracy, and hence retreat from institutional politics.

Similarly, upon observing that middle class citizens with higher education and income levels were less likely to participate in elections in Ghana, an electoral democracy, Nathan (2018) argued that more critical and democratic citizens retreat from politics, rejecting the predominantly clientelistic linkages to voters that parties in many parts of Africa typically rely on (see also Arnot et al., 2018 who draw similar conclusions for the Ghanaian context). This can imply that political participation is for many citizens from lower socio-economic backgrounds

related to private benefits rather than democratic preferences.

Studies on civic education programmes also indicate that positive associations between SES, knowledge, engagement, democratic attitudes, trust, and political participation, may not hold in countries where democracy has not yet taken root. Exceptionally, [Finkel and Ernst \(2005\)](#) showed how a school-based civic education programme in South Africa (a liberal democracy at the time but turned electoral democracy in 2013) did increase political knowledge as well as approval of political participation, but negatively affected institutional trust. In the electoral authoritarian context of the Democratic Republic of Congo, [Finkel and Lim \(2021\)](#) demonstrated that participation in an adult civic education programme resulted in higher knowledge of decentralization (the topic of the intervention) and stronger adherence to general democratic norms such as supporting the rights of individuals to criticize government, but also to less satisfaction with democracy in the country. In addition, they found that the intervention did not encourage electoral participation but did seem to support political engagement and non-electoral participation including community action, protest, and the redress of personal injustices or grievances. Earlier, [Bratton et al. \(1999\)](#) also found that participants of an adult civic education intervention in Zambia (an electoral democracy) had higher distrust in political institutions, even though it did not lead to cynicism and lower rates of political participation.

Whereas scholarship in Africa has mostly focused on adults, schools are the most convenient settings in African countries to engage in civic education ([Arnot et al., 2018](#)). Notwithstanding, few studies have focused on the effectiveness of civic education in Africa and its particularities. Some authors clearly expect beneficial effects of civic education in these contexts as well. A study examining students' knowledge of, attitudes towards, and participation levels in citizenship issues in Zimbabwe prior to the implementation of a civic education programme in schools showed that over three quarters do not trust political parties ([Sigauke, 2012](#)). Civic education was argued as important to build such trust. [Arnot et al. \(2018\)](#) are more sceptical in their review of Ghana's civic educational curricula over time and suggest that its ambitious goals can only be met if its agenda is coupled to major social reforms addressing socio-economic inequality and political exclusion. This aligns with the view that the workings of civic education may be dependent on the political context and regime itself.

Finally, several studies on students in electoral democracies outside of Africa support the view that civic education can make adolescents distrustful of politicians and disillusioned about how democracy works in their country, thereby decreasing their intent to participate. ICCS findings, for example, indicate that adolescents whose parents were more educated were more trustful in liberal democracies, but the pattern was reversed in electoral democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America ([Schulz et al., 2018](#), p.137; see also [Ugur-Cinar et al., 2020](#)).

In general, these studies warn us that, like elsewhere, African students with higher SES, and more political knowledge and democratic values in electoral democracies/autocracies can rather be inclined to have a critical stance towards politics and retreat from institutionalized political participation. This raises important questions with respect to the intended objectives of citizenship education and thus its inclusion in educational curricula in Africa. We thus aim to examine the relationships between students' SES, political knowledge, engagement, democratic values, institutional trust, and political participation in the context of Africa's most populous electoral democracy that has been experimenting with civic education since 2009.

We draw on the above literature to formulate our expectations. Ultimately, we are interested in students' political participation intentions, both institutionalized (voting, party membership, campaigning, contacting politicians) and non-institutionalized (protesting). However, we first examine the relations between civic education's key objectives, political knowledge and democratic values, as well as the closely related variables of engagement and trust, which have all been found to impact intent to participate. These variables are themselves determined by fixed

(e.g., adolescents' exposure to Nigeria's electoral democratic context as well as the compulsory subject of civic education) and varying (e.g., students' SES and their parents' political engagement) background variables, and are thus considered as intermediate variables in a broader causal chain influencing youths' anticipated future political behaviour.

Taken together, in line with [Croke and colleagues \(2016\)](#) and [Nathan \(2018\)](#), we expect that adolescents from higher SES backgrounds are less likely to participate in institutional politics *because* these students have higher levels of knowledge, higher levels of engagement, stronger democratic norms, but lower levels of institutional trust; partially *because* they have parents with higher political engagement. We expect no negative effect on non-institutionalized participation in the form of protesting.

Further, irrespective of the expected effect of SES, we hypothesize positive relations between knowledge, democratic values, and engagement but negative relations between these variables and institutional trust in line with insights from [Finkel and Lim \(2021\)](#) and [Schulz et al. \(2018\)](#). Knowledge, democratic norms and engagement are in turn expected to have a negative relation with institutional participation and no relation or a positive relation with non-institutionalized participation. Institutional trust is expected to have a positive relation with institutional participation, but a negative relation or no relation with non-institutionalized participation. [Table 1](#) captures the expected relations between the variables.

### 3. Civic education in Nigeria

Nigeria became a multiparty presidential democracy in 1999, after years of military rule. While this transition gave an important boost to the country's democratic credentials, democracy remains flawed ([Freedom House, 2023](#)). Though incumbent turnover was achieved in 2015, Nigeria continues to experience high levels of political corruption, unfree and unfair elections characterized by vote buying and violence, and disregard for the rule of law. In 2019, the year we conducted this study, Nigeria was classified as an electoral democracy by V-Dem ([Coppedge et al., 2024](#)).

As the most populous African country, Nigeria has a considerable youth population ([World Population Prospects, 2019](#)). This has also raised interest in youths' political participation. On the one hand, the country has seen clear examples of youths' pro-democratic political behaviour. The 2020 #End SARS movement against police brutality was a clear challenge to weak rule of law in the country, for example. Unfortunately, the protests were violently repressed. On the other hand, scholars and policymakers have also raised concern about how (male) youths are adopted into clientelistic political networks that can lead to participation in electoral violence ([Iwilede, 2014](#); [Meagher, 2007](#)).

Given its status as only an electoral democracy and its considerable youth population, interest in civic education has increased in Nigeria, as in other African countries since the 1990s. Nigeria had already included elements of civic education in the national curriculum since the 1970s ([Idowu, 2015](#); [Oluniyi, 2011](#)), but since the 2009 reform, 'Civic Education' has become a subject on its own ([Obiagu, 2019](#)). It is taught at primary and secondary levels as a compulsory and examinable subject, both in public and private schools. The curriculum and several textbooks were consulted by the authors for this study. An analysis of the syllabi shows that, among others, students learn about Nigerian independence, the structures of the state (federal and subnational state governments, judiciary, legislatures), civic rights including the right to vote, and political parties (see Appendix for an overview of the four books consulted and in how many schools they were used). It is important to mention that civic education does not take the form of propaganda as was the case with some past state-led educational activities in authoritarian African countries (e.g. Ghana's Young Pioneers, [Arnot et al., 2018](#); or Political Education under the Derg regime, [Ghebru and Lloyd, 2020](#)).

The introduction of civic education in Nigeria has generally been welcomed (e.g. [Oluniyi, 2011](#)), but its implementation has also been met

**Table 1**  
Hypothesized relations between variables.

	SES	Parental political engagement	Political knowledge	Political engagement	Democratic norms	Institutional trust
Parental political engagement	Positive					
Political knowledge	Positive	Positive				
Political engagement	Positive	Positive	Positive			
Democratic norms	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive		
Institutional trust	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	
Institutional participation	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative	Positive
Non-institutional participation	No effect/ Positive	No effect/ Positive	No effect/ Positive	No effect/ Positive	No effect/ Positive	No effect/ Negative

with criticism. A key criticism has been that course learning objectives tend to remain knowledge-based, and that large classes promote the use of teacher-centred pedagogy that inhibits the learning of democratic skills (e.g. debate, active listening) through discussion, role-play, and reflection (Biamba et al., 2021; Idowu's, 2015; Obiagu, 2019). Open classroom climates, which have been regarded as especially useful to cultivate democratic norms and skills (Quintelier and Hooghe, 2013; Sigauke, 2012), are largely absent. Because of this knowledge-based approach, this paper consistently speaks of civic, instead of citizenship, education in accordance with the distinction by Tawil (2013). Similar criticisms have emerged with regard to civic education in other African countries (Arnot et al., 2018; Ghebru and Lloyd, 2020; Kuppens and Langer, 2018).

For our analyses, we recognize the limits of Nigeria's knowledge-based curriculum. Nevertheless, civic education theory's foundational assumption is that stronger knowledge of and familiarity with the political system can support political engagement, democratic norms, institutional trust, and participation, and thus the limits of the curriculum do not undermine our approach. In addition, it is still possible that civic education in Nigeria influences engagement, norms, trust, and participation not solely through knowledge itself. While not in depth, the curriculum also discusses issues such as corruption and clientelism, overcoming political apathy, and national unity, for instance, which may foster democratic values.

#### 4. Data and methods

##### 4.1. Sampling methodology and data

The current study focuses on Lagos state. Although Lagos state is the wealthiest of Nigeria's 36 states, the same democratic flaws described above are present there (e.g. Agbiboa, 2018; Demarest and Langer, 2019). Lagos state has an estimated population of 15 million (World Urbanization Prospects, 2019). This includes Lagos City but also secondary towns (e.g., Badagry town and Epe town) and rural localities that form the eastern and western outskirts of the state (see Fig. 1). While the Yoruba ethnic group are indigenous to Lagos, the state has seen substantial in-migration as Nigeria's former administrative capital and current economic heart. As a result, the state is ethnically and religiously diverse.

Out of Lagos state's twenty Local Government Areas (LGAs), we purposively selected six urban (richer) and three rural (poorer) LGAs to ensure variation in terms of Socio-Economic Status (SES) and to include LGAs of each of the six educational districts. The selected LGAs are: Agege, Ajeromi/Ifelodun, Badagry, Epe, Ikeja, Ikorodu, Lagos Island, Lagos Mainland, and Oshodi/Isolo. Badagry, Epe, and Ikorodu are the rural LGAs. Within each LGA, two public and two private senior secondary schools were randomly selected from lists provided by the State Ministry of Education.

The lists for the public schools were very accurate and consistent over time in contrast to the list of private schools which contained numerous errors. Similarly, while all randomly selected public schools consented to participate, a number of randomly sampled private schools

did not want to participate, could not be reached, or was found ineligible as they did not offer final year secondary education. These schools were replaced by another randomly selected school. Three private schools, two in Ikorodu and one in Badagry, had to be replaced with a nearby private school (not randomly sampled) because the initially selected school was not found/eligible on arrival. To ensure variation in gender, we only allowed one out of two public schools and one out of two private schools per LGA to be either a boys-only or girls-only school. Of the 36 schools, two were boys-only and four were girls-only. Most schools did not have a specific religious denomination. The sample contained only one Catholic, and one Islamic school.

In each school, we invited all final year secondary school students to voluntarily participate. Public schools have more students than private schools, hence they are overrepresented in the sample. While not representative, sampling proportionate to size was found to be impossible as the Ministry of Education was not able to procure us with data on the number of students registered per LGA and per school. Importantly, our data and analyses do nonetheless allow us to investigate variations between students, particularly according to SES.

Nearly all secondary school students present on the day of the survey administration participated (response rate of 73 % and 78 % for private and public schools respectively). Most nonresponse was due to pupils' absence from school on the day of the survey administration. Some students were taking external examinations, for example. The total sample size is 3118. Most students in our sample were around 16 years old, though it also included younger students, especially in private schools. 60 % of the students were girls as we sampled more girls-only schools. The majority lived in urban areas. Most students belonged to the Yoruba ethnic group.

##### 4.2. Variables

The questionnaire was designed by the research team to capture variation in political knowledge, engagement, democratic attitudes, institutional trust and political participation within the context of Lagos, Nigeria. Partially drawing on questions from the Afrobarometer project and ICCS, it was a self-administered, English-language pencil-and-paper survey. Piloted in one public and one private school (about 30 students each), group discussions afterwards led to refinements in question phrasing and answer scales.<sup>3</sup> The final questionnaire was administered to students on one specific day and time in the period September–October 2019 as chosen by the school authorities. Pilot school data are not included in the final sample.

##### 4.3. Participation variables

For our political participation outcome variables, we use five

<sup>3</sup> For example, we initially tried to use Likert scales asking students for ratings between 0 and 10 for some questions, but this led to confusion (only 0 and 10 were generally filled in). The answer scales implemented in the final survey are shorter (4–5 answer options) and only use word labels.





Fig. 1. Lagos state, Nigeria.

indicators of *intended future political participation*, each measured on a four-point scale going from not likely to very likely: (1) vote in a Nigerian election, (2) become a member of a political party in Nigeria, (3) help a politician or party during an election campaign, (4) contacting a member of government, and (5) participate in a peaceful protest against policies they think are not right. The first four items can be considered institutional political participation, while the last one constitutes non-institutionalized participation.

We treat the variables as continuous with higher scores indicating higher intent to participate, but we also conduct robustness checks with binary versions. All participation forms are positively related to each other ( $\rho$  range = 0.3–0.5,  $p < 0.001$ ), but we model them separately to distinguish between institutional and non-institutional participation.

#### 4.4. Intermediate variables

In Section 3, we developed expectations of how knowledge, engagement, democratic norms, and institutional trust related to each other as well as to political participation. For our *political knowledge* variable, we count the number of correct answers to eight multiple choice questions, including the name of the first president, the name of the current president, the name of the current governor of Lagos, the political party of both the president and Lagos governor (as one question as it is the same party), the year of independence, the official voting age, the institution responsible for making laws, and the location of the presidential office. The questions are closely aligned to the civic education curriculum (see Table A1 in Appendix). We standardize the knowledge variable to fit the scaling method of our PCA predictors (mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1) and render regression coefficients comparable. The variable is skewed as students generally scored well.

Our political knowledge question focusing on factual knowledge is in line with the conceptualizations of knowledge adopted in earlier studies (e.g. Niemi and Junn, 1996) and in current studies on adult civic education in weak democracies (Finkel and Lim, 2021). It deviates from ICCS' current conceptualizations of civic knowledge, which now focus on 'civic awareness' by asking, for example, why education is a human right and why a minister caught speeding must pay a fine (Schulz et al., 2018, pp.41–70). Our focus on factual knowledge is more suited to the Nigerian knowledge-based curriculum but has its limits in terms of depth of the measurement and variation.

Support for *democratic norms* is measured by the first component score of a PCA of several agree-disagree statements (Eigenvalue=1.868): (1) one person in power means more stability, (2) politicians should give jobs to family, (3) politicians should pay people to vote, (4) people should vote for their own ethnic group. Higher values indicate that students reject authoritarian and clientelist values more.

For *institutional trust*, we use the first component following PCA of the survey questions measuring the extent to which students trust the president, the Lagos government, the army, the police, and political parties (Eigenvalue=2.847).

*Students' political engagement* represents the component score after a PCA of students' interest in politics, their frequency of talking about

politics with friends, and their frequency of consulting television, radio, newspaper, and internet for political information (Eigenvalue= 2.348).

#### 4.5. Background variables

Our theoretical expectations also focus on key background factors that could influence students' participation and our intermediate variables. These include in the first place *socio-economic status (SES)*, which is the first component of a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on parental educational levels, private versus public schooling, the number of books at home, whether they have ever lacked food, and whether they have a computer/tablet at home (Eigenvalue=2.023). Higher values indicate higher status. In addition, *parental political engagement* is the first component of a PCA on parents' political interest, hearing and talking about politics at home, and whether parents have a party preference (Eigenvalue=1.477).

Although we did not formulate explicit expectations, we also consider youth's participation in a *youth group* as another potential socialization driver besides parents and schools (Quintelier, 2015) to further pin down the effect of civic education in Nigeria in some of our models. Although African youths would participate less in civic associations than older generations, research based on Afrobarometer data shows that those who are members tend to be more likely to vote (Resnick and Casale, 2014). We use an ordinal variable with no membership as the reference category and two dummies for 'yes, but more than a year ago' and 'yes, within the last year' (Schulz et al., 2018). Finally, we also make use of age, gender, rural area, and ethnic group as potential relevant background variables. Table A2 in Appendix provides the descriptive statistics.

### 5. Analyses

#### 5.1. Bivariate and regression analyses

We first test for the presence of the expected relations contained in Table 1 by means of bivariate and multiple regression coefficients.<sup>4</sup> Multiple regression coefficients capture the relation between the main variables of interest, controlled for the basic, exogenous socio-demographic background variables of age, gender, urban area, and ethnicity. Apart from our participation variables, all variables are standardized for comparability. The regression coefficients depict what happens to the dependent variable when the predictor in the relation increases with one standard deviation. Table 2 contains the results. We make use of a 95 % confidence level to evaluate significance. Assumptions have been tested and were found to be met.

Our findings are to some extent, but certainly not fully in line with the theoretical expectations that higher SES and higher levels of political knowledge, engagement and democratic norms are associated with lower institutional trust and citizens' retreat from institutionalized

<sup>4</sup> While more intuitive, Pearson correlation coefficients are not used here given that their use is not compatible with the multilevel structure of the data.

**Table 2**

Bivariate and multiple regression coefficients for the relations between main variables.

Outcome variables	Predictor variables					
	SES	Parental political engagement	Political knowledge	Political engagement	Democratic norms	Institutional trust
Parental political engagement	0.117***/ 0.117***					
Political knowledge	0.101***/ 0.055*	0.122***/ 0.109***				
Political engagement	0.119***/ 0.131***	0.410***/ 0.411***	0.078***/ 0.083***			
Democratic norms	0.018/ −0.008	0.051**/ 0.043**	0.236***/ 0.216***	−0.044*/ −0.039*		
Institutional trust	0.043/ 0.056*	0.167***/ 0.173***	−0.032/ −0.024	0.171***/ 0.158***	−0.029/ −0.021	
Vote	−0.035/ −0.040	0.179***/ 0.174***	0.069***/ 0.077***	0.167***/ 0.166***	0.069***/ 0.077***	0.221***/ 0.230***
Party member	−0.015/ 0.007	0.204***/ 0.206***	−0.076***/ −0.064**	0.267***/ 0.258***	−0.124***/ −0.109***	0.279***/ 0.276***
Campaign	−0.022/ 0.002	0.165***/ 0.166***	−0.129***/ −0.109***	0.224***/ 0.221***	−0.207***/ −0.188***	0.267***/ 0.265***
Contact	−0.026/ −0.023	0.183***/ 0.180***	0.031/ 0.044*	0.188***/ 0.188***	0.010/ 0.012	0.177***/ 0.184***
Protest	−0.076*/ −0.072**	0.136***/ 0.132***	0.054*/ 0.060**	0.142***/ 0.142***	0.048*/ 0.053*	0.113***/ 0.118***

Results from multilevel linear regression models with students at level 1 and schools at level 2 via Stata 18 xtmixed. Numbers represent the bivariate/multiple regression coefficients. Multiple regression coefficients are controlled for age, gender, urban area, and ethnicity.

\*  $p < 0.05$ \*\*  $p < 0.01$ \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ 

politics (see Table 1). Looking specifically at the relations between SES and our other variables, we do find that students from higher SES backgrounds have more politically engaged parents, more knowledge, and more political engagement themselves. They do not have higher democratic norms, however, or lower institutional trust. The relation between SES and institutionalized participation is not significant in these analyses, indicating the presence of neither a ‘participation gap’ as found in liberal democracies, nor a ‘reverse participation gap’ as found in electoral democracies and autocracies. Surprisingly, we find that high SES students have significantly lower intentions to participate in protests, which is contrary to what we expected, and even going against existing findings across regime contexts.

Parental political engagement has positive and significant relations with our intermediate variables as well as our outcome variables. The same applies to political engagement itself. These findings are in line with scholarship on liberal democracies rather than electoral democracies and autocracies, where higher engagement has been argued to lead to lower institutionalized participation. An important drawback of the engagement variables is that we do not know which media messages are consumed or which types of narratives are engaged in. This could explain why engagement has a positive relation with political knowledge but a negative one with democratic norms, while the expectation in scholarship on liberal democracies and electoral democracies/autocracies would be that they are all positively related.

The most interesting findings concern our political knowledge and democratic norms variables, both of which constitute the core goals of civic education. First, political knowledge and democratic norms are strongly related, suggesting that knowledge can foster democratic norms, but also that both could be the product of civic education in Nigeria independently from each other. Second, the negative coefficients between knowledge and institutional trust, and democratic norms and institutional trust are not significant, refuting our expectation. The overall absence of a relation is interesting, however, as prior research in liberal democracies generally finds positive and significant relations (Galston, 2001). Most notable are the differential effects of knowledge and democratic norms on political participation. While the relation between voting, contacting and protesting is positive, the relation with party membership and campaigning is negative. Interestingly, the differential effects are not found across the institutional versus

non-institutional divide. While knowledge and democratic norms are positively related with protesting as non-institutionalized participation, voting and contacting are not rejected as forms of institutionalized participation. Party-based activities are, however, clearly rejected by more knowledgeable and democratic youths. Finally, turning to institutional trust, we find a positive relation with all our participation variables, including protesting. While we expected positive relations with institutional participation, we expected a negative relation for protesting. Nevertheless, the relation between institutional trust and protest participation is the weakest.

Next, we regress all our predictor variables on our participation variables to allow us to account for the correlations between the predictors and estimate their separate effects on participation. For these analyses we include all intermediate variables (knowledge, engagement, values and trust) as well as our background variables (SES, parental engagement, youth group membership, age, gender, urban area, ethnicity). By including SES, parental engagement, and youth groups in the models as main socialization determinants outside of schools (Quintelier, 2015), we aim to more precisely estimate the effects of knowledge, engagement, values, and trust as products of civic education in Nigeria rather than other socialization agents.

Table 3 provides the results. The findings from our above analyses are largely supported. Political knowledge and democratic norms continue to have negative effects on party membership and campaigning. Positive relations with voting, contacting, and protesting have disappeared for knowledge, while democratic norms no longer have a positive relation with contacting. Relations between (parental) engagement and institutional participation on the one hand and our participation variables on the other hand remain positive. Interestingly, accounting for other predictor variables (in particular (parental) engagement) does suggest the presence of a reverse participation gap as students with higher SES are significantly less likely to vote, contact politicians, and protest. For all analyses effect sizes are very small, with partial eta squared estimates generally lower than 0.01 (see Table A3 in Appendix).

Partial support for our expectations, and in particular the differential effects we found for our independent variables depending on the form of participation predicted, lead us to hypothesize that there exist distinct youth participation types. Hence, we continue with Latent Class Analysis

**Table 3**  
Multilevel linear regression analyses: determinants of political participation.

Model	Vote	Party member	Campaign	Contact	Protest
Political knowledge	0.040	−0.065*	−0.099***	0.027	0.006
Political engagement	0.088***	0.187***	0.139***	0.088***	0.093***
Democratic values	0.068**	−0.077**	−0.145***	0.016	0.074**
Institutional trust	0.205***	0.209***	0.200***	0.148***	0.096***
SES	−0.081***	−0.043	−0.024	−0.066**	−0.128***
Parental political engagement	0.104***	0.111***	0.093***	0.112***	0.086***
Youth group (Ref.=No)	0.031	0.039	−0.010	0.055	0.076
Yes, more than 1 year ago	0.059	0.086	0.066	0.139**	0.161**
Yes, within past year					
Age	0.013	0.035	0.033	0.006	0.006
Female	0.042	0.046	0.017	0.067	0.128**
Urban	−0.054	−0.169	−0.100	−0.090	−0.135**
Ethnicity (Yoruba =Ref.)	0.039	0.082	0.072	−0.007	0.112
Igbo	−0.014	0.053	−0.069	−0.085	0.028
Other					
Constant	1.722***	1.174**	1.301***	1.610***	1.745***
Level 1 N	2083	2078	2084	2075	2076
Level 2 N	36	36	36	36	36
Level 1 R2	0.108	0.140	0.130	0.075	0.071
Level 2 R2	0.280	0.440	0.335	0.204	0.373
ICC	0.012	0.002	0.005	0.006	< 0.001

Multilevel linear models with unstandardized regression coefficients via Stata 18 xtmixed. Snijders and Boskers R2 measures calculated with the mlt package (Moehring and Schmidt, 2013).

\* p < 0.05

\*\* p < 0.01

\*\*\* p < 0.001

(LCA), combined with regression analysis to examine our findings more in depth.

### 5.2. Latent class analysis

Latent class analysis can be used to establish different respondent political participation profiles and investigate which attitudes correlate with which class. In line with regression-based studies, LCA studies on participation profiles in liberal democracies generally find that citizens with higher education levels, higher institutional trust, and higher sense of civic duty are more active participants across a range of political activities (e.g. Jeroense and Spierings, 2023; Oser, 2022).

We perform LCA on our youth sample and retain a model identifying three participation classes. The three-class model provides highly similar results when using the participation variables as continuous and when using binary versions.<sup>5</sup> We report the linear results here.

Table 4 shows how each class scores on average for the five participation intent questions. The variables range from 0 to 3 with higher scores indicating stronger participation intent. We can clearly identify 3 distinct classes. The group we term *disengaged* youths have low values for each participation item. *Party activists* have high scores across all participation items. *Non-party activists* have high scores for protesting,

<sup>5</sup> Four-class models have somewhat lower AIC and BIC scores, but estimates are less stable, while the fourth identified class is similar to the party activist class with slightly lower scores. Given this lack of distinction we opt for the three-class model.

**Table 4**  
Participation classes.

	Disengaged	Party activist	Non-party activist
Vote	0.83	2.43	2.21
Party Member	0.32	2.02	1.10
Campaign	0.23	2.36	0.56
Contact	0.49	2.31	1.84
Protest	0.77	2.31	1.96
% in sample	13 %	44 %	42 %

Latent Class Analysis via Stata 18 gsem.

voting and contacting, but clearly reject party membership and campaigning as participation forms. In line with findings in Tables 2 and 3, we find that key group differences emerge with regard to attitudes toward party-affiliated participation.

We then conduct fractional multinomial logistic regression to identify which determinants predict membership to the identified classes.<sup>6</sup> Results are presented in Table 5 (Table A4 in Appendix provides effect size measures in terms of probabilities). Assumptions hold. Table 5 demonstrates notable differences between the three classes. Starting with the disengaged class, LCA results do further indicate evidence for the ‘reverse participation gap’ students within this group are more likely to have higher SES backgrounds compared to both party and non-party activists. Disengaged groups are also less politically engaged and trusting than party activists, and show less engagement, adherence to democratic values, and trust than non-party activists. Political knowledge does not appear to be an important distinguishing factor between dis-

**Table 5**  
Fractional multinomial regression results for participation class.

	Disengaged vs Party activist	Disengaged vs Non-party activist	Non-party activist vs Party activist
Political knowledge	0.053	−0.060	0.113*
Political engagement	−0.452***	−0.232**	−0.220***
Democratic values	−0.004	−0.307***	0.303***
Institutional trust	−0.811***	−0.501***	−0.310***
SES	0.284***	0.275***	0.008
Parental political engagement	−0.360***	−0.204**	−0.156**
Youth group (Ref.=No)	−0.157	−0.139	−0.018
Yes, more than 1 year ago	−0.455**	−0.323*	−0.132
Yes, within past year			
Age	−0.041	−0.015	−0.056
Female	−0.225	−0.187	−0.038
Urban	0.516**	0.246	0.270*
Ethnicity (Yoruba =Ref.)	−0.306	−0.253	−0.054
Igbo	0.078	−0.015	0.093
Other			
Constant	−1.052	−1.299	0.247
N	2091	2091	2091

Fractional multinomial logit model with logistic regression coefficients via Stata 18 fmllogit (Buis, 2008). Standard errors clustered on schools.

\* p < 0.05

\*\* p < 0.01

\*\*\* p < 0.001

<sup>6</sup> Ordinary multinomial regression can result in biased estimates. Fractional multinomial regression which uses the probabilities of belonging to the class instead of class membership addresses this concern (Vermunt, 2010).

engaged adolescents and party as well as non-party activists.

Party and non-party activists cannot be distinguished from each other based on SES but do have other determinants. Youths rejecting political parties clearly are more knowledgeable and democratic than party activists. These youths also have less institutional trust, as we originally hypothesized.

## 6. Discussion and conclusion

In this paper we investigated whether civic education constitutes a risk, rather than an opportunity, in democracies in Africa that fall short of being established, liberal democracies. Based on combined insights from school-based civic education in Western liberal democracies and adult civic education in Africa, we investigated whether adolescents with higher SES, political knowledge, political engagement, and democratic values were more likely to be distrustful of the political system and retreat from institutionalized politics, like their peers in Eastern and Central Europe, and their elders on the continent. Our findings based on multilevel regression and latent class analyses on an original survey with secondary school students in Lagos state, Nigeria, only partly support this prior scholarship.

First, we find that students from higher SES backgrounds have higher levels of knowledge and engagement on average, but do not appear to hold stronger democratic values or institutional trust. Accounting for engagement, which positively affects all forms of participation, these adolescents are less likely to anticipate participating in the future in voting, becoming a party member, campaigning, contacting politicians, or protesting. Accordingly, our LCA suggests that these adolescents are more likely to belong to a disengaged class of youths. Overall, these findings would support the expected presence of a 'reverse participation gap'. Nevertheless, as this gap cannot be explained by democratic values or trust, we theorize that high SES adolescents may rather have lower participation intentions due to being less economically reliant on the state and, consequently, seeing less need to interact with the state for their well-being. Low status youths in contrast may see such a need, either out of clientelistic reasons or from the perspective that change is needed for good governance and development.

Second, while we expected that there would be important differences between institutionalized (voting, party membership, campaigning, contacting politicians) and non-institutionalized participation (protesting), empirical differences lay elsewhere. Indeed, we found that political knowledge and democratic values were positively related to voting, contacting, and protesting, but negatively related to party membership and campaigning. More knowledgeable and democratically minded students rejected political parties, arguably due to their clientelistic nature, but not activities less directly focused on parties like voting and contacting politicians. These findings are in line with recent research on youths in Nigeria which shows that rather than political apathy, a substantial share of youths remains committed to political participation (Davis and Turnbull, 2024). Less knowledgeable and democratically minded students had the strongest intentions to engage in all forms of political participation. Yet we do not consider these higher participation intentions as demonstrative of pro-democratic behaviour as youths attracted to party activism may be motivated by clientelistic reasons and such motivations may also influence their intentions to vote (e.g. vote selling), contact politicians (e.g. personal favours), and protest (e.g. mobilized by their party).

As civic education primarily intends to provide people with the knowledge and democratic values necessary to engage in a country's political system and support the democratic process, our findings indicate that civic education should still be perceived as an opportunity, including in electoral democracies such as Nigeria. Retreat mechanisms occur but are mainly related to political parties, likely because certain youths' reject their corrupt and violent strategies. Although expanding knowledge and democratic values among young (and adult) populations can lead to distrust in parties, trust in these theoretically important

institutions connecting citizens to government systems could be reestablished if this rejection eventually encourages parties to change in more pro-democratic ways.

Overall, results are encouraging for further expansion of civic education in African settings. Whereas many civic education curricula in Africa tend to be knowledge-based, as in Nigeria, positive relations between factual knowledge and pro-democratic behaviour suggest that regardless of the weaknesses of these curricula, they can still have positive effects. Nevertheless, democratic values appear to have a stronger relation with behaviour, and while knowledge-based curricula can still impart values, further efforts at shaping such values through student-centred pedagogies and open classroom climates would be welcome.

Future research can draw on these findings to replicate the study in other sub-Saharan African contexts. The actual impact of specific civic education course content and learning methods can be further investigated through experimental research. In addition, longitudinal research could investigate whether youth attitudes and behaviours persist over time.

## Ethics approval

Ethics Review Committee of the Social Sciences of the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Universiteit Leiden, 21 June 2019.

## CRediT authorship contribution statement

**Line Kuppens:** Writing – review & editing, Methodology, Formal analysis, Conceptualization. **Leila Demarest:** Writing – original draft, Supervision, Resources, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Funding acquisition, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization.

## Disclosure statement

The authors report there are no competing interests to declare.

## Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr. Faustino Babatunde Adeshina and Dr. Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi for their research assistance during field work in Lagos.

## Appendix A. Supporting information

Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at [doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2025.103316](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2025.103316).

## Data availability statement

Dataset and syntax will be made openly available with Harvard Dataverse upon acceptance of the paper.

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