Cosmopolitan Education and the Creation of Value

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ABSTRACT

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In recent decades, the idea of cosmopolitanism has enjoyed renewed interest and rapid development across disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences. Theoretical developments in the foundations of *cosmopolitan education*, however, remain in their nascent stages. In this investigation, I address the question of the nature and dynamics of values in cosmopolitan perspective and develop a philosophical account of *value creation* as central to cosmopolitan education.

The conclusion of this investigation is that in a world increasingly interconnected and intensely impermanent, in societies pluralistic and marked by political tension, shifting cultural practices, and emerging technologies, we need more than an education that fosters openness, tolerance, and global perspectives. We need to cultivate the capacity to transform the self and the normative terrains we inhabit in light of the constraints of actual conditions and the demands of ideals.

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Dedication

To momma. And to *Sensei*.

Chapter I: A generous ambition

I.1. Home and World

It's February 2012 and I arrive in Buenos Aires to spend one year writing a thesis on cosmopolitan education. Growing up in a working class, industrial town outside the city, taking the bus downtown was always a great adventure. The cosmopolitan capital, the "Latin American Paris," with its tourists, fashion, and Friday night lights was a place of promise, a gateway out to the world. This time, however, the cab ride from the airport is a journey back home to the comforts of familiar ways of life. It is my first time to *live* in my native city, not just visit, in more than ten years. With time, the relationship of "home" to "world" has grown ambiguous, and the places and images anchored to these concepts have become interchangeable. New York City was once the symbol of a globalized, wide, wide world; with time, returning to my apartment on Central Park West after visiting my parents in Buenos Aires started to feel like homecoming—sometimes there is no greater culture shock than going back to the house where one grew up.

Numbed by the long cab ride and tired from an even longer flight, I ponder on the fluid nature of "home" and "world." I think about the cosmopolitan idea of being at home anywhere in the world and get a vivid sense of the paradox at work. How to conceive of a home coextensive with the world, a home without boundaries, which, consequently, you can never leave and to which you can never return? Or, conversely, cast in David Hansen's terms, what does it mean to inhabit the world in a "condition of always leaving and always remaining at home"? (Hansen, 2010b, p. 160). I look out the cab window and see an advertisement for an exhibition called "Cosmopolis: Borges and Buenos Aires" on the side of a bus. The ad features a quote by the nation's beloved writer: "Being cosmopolitan does not mean being indifferent to a country and

sensitive to others. It means the generous ambition to be sensitive to all countries and all times, the desire for eternity, the desire to have been many" (Borges, 1999, p. 326)[1]. Borges is right, I think, cosmopolitanism entails a generous, even impossibly generous, ambition of wanting to have been many.[2] As a genuine paradox, however, the impossibility of the idea is not mere nonsense; it is not an empty fantasy or a consolation for the pains of life. There is something about the *pathos* of this generous ambition that is worth pursuing.

The pathos of cosmopolitanism is the urge to go beyond the limited perspective of one's own time and place. Its paradox is that this is never fully attainable; the world for which the cosmopolitan longs is a receding horizon. Notice Borge's perspicacious choice of verbal tense: the desire to *have been* many (*haber sido* muchos), rather than to *become* many. With this, Borges captures the heart of the cosmopolitan paradox: the ambition is *not* to leave behind one's roots in order to commune with other, also rootless "citizens of nowhere." Cosmopolitanism does not want to create normatively neutral spaces, airport-like zones sterilized of any commitments local roots. The ambition, rather, is to meet the other in intimate communion *without* leaving one's roots behind. The cosmopolitan ambition is for me to have not only *my* roots, but *also yours*, to have not only *my* past and *my* history, but *yours too*, and thus meet you in fraternity and understanding.

This cosmopolitan ambition is insatiable. But regulative ideals never require attainment to do their work (unattainability, in fact, is their work). The urge to go beyond particular cultural

1 My translation. "Ser cosmopolita no significa ser indiferente a un país y ser sensible a otros. Significa la generosa ambición de ser sensibles a todos los países y todas las épocas, el deseo de eternidad, el deseo de haber sido muchos." Jorge Luis Borges delivered these words at the UNESCO Headquarters in Paris in 1979, in an address in honor to Victoria Ocampo the year of her passing.

2 The passage quoted in the advertisement omitted a clause in the last sentence: "que ha llevado a la teoría de la transmigración de las almas (which has led to the theory of the transmigration of souls)." I appreciate the connection between the impossible desire of wanting to have been many, and the equally impossible desire to transcend death.

perspectives can motivate and guide appropriate moral, cultural, or political responses to the world. The "generous ambition to be sensitive to all countries and all times" (Borges, 1999, p. 326), as an insatiable ambition like "the desire for eternity" (ibid.), puts us in the position of understanding that the kind of intimate connection of sensitivity and familiarity we have with a home, we cannot have it with "all countries and all times" (ibid.). It also puts us in the position to recognize that perhaps there is something mythical about the place of our birth and the culture of our parents as a "home" that we can inhabit without tension, without any sense of alienation, in a completely fulfilling sense of belonging. This generous ambition puts us in the humble position of recognizing that both home and world exist in a space between the complete comfort of familiarity and the straining alienation of the strange. It helps us see that being at home in the world is about learning how to adjust to these conditions.

The cab parks in front of my parents' apartment building; they are waiting for me on the sidewalk. I'm back home, to a familiar world. My favorite dish is waiting at the kitchen table and the extra room in the apartment is set up as my bedroom again, just like it was in 2001 and in 1978. It is all very familiar and quite uncomfortable and, in a sense, strange. I have changed, home has changed, and the world, as usual, keeps changing. Even when coming back home, I will have to find a way to adjust to new conditions, just like I had to do the first time I went abroad. Just like we all do every time we enter a situation where values are at stake, and there are demands to respond in certain ways for which we are not entirely prepared, and we have no choice but to face uncertainty with courage, improvise, and be creative. From personal experience and as the conclusion of my readings in cosmopolitan education scholarship, my sense is that this need to adjust to constantly shifting conditions is deeper and more general than a mere symptom of international travel. It points to a basic feature of the experience of being in

the world, a feature that under current conditions of rapid social change and global interconnectedness has become more salient.

I.2. The Challenge of Creating Lives of Meaning and Value

The phenomenon of interlocking transformations in political, economic, cultural, technological, and environmental dimensions of societies across the world known as globalization is marked by intensified interconnectedness and impermanence. These conditions exert tremendous pressure on traditionally reliable sources of values. Ideals of moral life and salvation offered by many religious traditions are challenged by the development of science; economic structures that supported many traditional and even characteristically modern ways of life get eroded by global market forces. Relatively bounded and homogeneous communities with clear norms, hierarchies, and pathways to success lose stability in the encounter with difference. The challenge of making a home in the world, of creating lives of meaning and value in cultural contexts of vertiginous change is widespread. A central task for education in the 21st century, I claim, is to prepare young people to live in a world of normative instability and this pertains to the experiences of young people in general, not just to those like me who left their native land or live in multicultural societies.

In response to these challenges, advocates of education reform hold high the values of creativity, collaboration, independence, and intelligent adaptability to change. The nowadays popular idea of "21st Century Skills," for example, recommends "creativity and innovation," "critical thinking and problem solving," "communication and collaboration," "self-direction," "independence," "adaptability to change," "flexibility," and "open-mindedness." In such discourses we also find frequent references to disciplinary skills instrumental to the above

mentioned values. The list includes management skills, financial and entrepreneurial literacy, technology skills, language skills, and more.[3]

Our world is changing fast and reform in the goals and methods of education has become a necessity. For many these days, lists of skills like the one above constitute the bread and butter of a vision of education. These skills are relevant and important today, and they have a rightful place in a vision of education for the 21st century. There is, however, something problematic with a thoroughly instrumental vision of education, that is, with a vision of education that develops from a narrowly focused conversation on skills without much serious debate about the ends and purposes for which skills are to be cultivated. The problem is that once the question of purpose is left out of the conversation it is up for grabs (presumably up for business leaders, or whoever holds power and influence, to decide). However, in reality, the question of purpose is left out because it is assumed to be settled. The background assumption is, in general, that the goals are economic global competitiveness for the nation and financial and professional success for the individual. The implication is that the factors that constitute our human condition in an era of globalization—interconnectedness, cultural diversity, plurality of value, information richness, social acceleration, etc.—are problems to be solved and resources to be managed. And this perspective on our current historical condition is blind to the depth of the challenge globalization poses on individuals and communities to create lives of meaning and value.

What is missing, I contend, is a vision of a world as interconnected and impermanent that is not only a field of obstacles and opportunities to advance one's personal or national interests,

3 This list is from what is called "21st century skills" (2012). These values, which much research has come to endorse as relevant for the demands of industry and life today are by no means universally accepted. In the US, for example, talk of skills for the future intersects a debate on education reform features a deeply polarized landscape of normative language with language of "democratic citizenship," "equality," and "inclusion," on one side, and calls for "accountability," "standards," and "back to the basics," on the other.

but also a source of values and meaning in itself. This distinction is important for us today because we perceive our human condition as undergoing a shift. Even when we recognize that interconnectedness and change have to some degree always been the nature of our political and social lives, we also witness that the pervasiveness and intensity of interconnectedness and the speed of change have increased dramatically in recent centuries, and more so in recent decades. A relatively stable background of practices, institutions, technologies, skills and ways of life cannot be assumed anymore, at least not in the way it could be assumed just a few generations ago.

In chapters two and three I develop the concepts of impermanence and interconnectedness. I consider both impermanence and interconnectedness as ontological categories, as general features of experience. The core development of this view is carried out in chapter three by means of a discussion of Ikeda's interpretation of the principle of the three perceptions and a reading of Dewey's ideas of contextualism and transactional realism. I also articulate important nuances of these concepts in chapter two through a discussion of contemporary theories of cosmopolitan education, especially the work of David Hansen, Kwame Appiah, and Sharon Todd, for whom impermanence and interconnectedness figure prominently in the pictures of the world constitutive of their philosophies.

At the same time, I consider impermanence and interconnectedness in relation to contingent conditions of globalization and how a special sense of these concepts emerges under such conditions. The sense of interconnectedness that is contingent to conditions of globalization, I call *intensified* interconnectedness. This is the sense of interconnectedness that emerges from conditions like the fate of the natural environment being entangled with practices of production and consumption of people around the world, for example, or from the

development in recent decades of new technologies that enable unprecedentedly fast and efficient communication across geographical distances. Similarly, *intensified* impermanence refers to the sense of impermanence that marks conditions of globalization. By this I mean the phenomenon of rapid change that results from transformations in political, economic, cultural, technological, and environmental dimensions of societies across the world. Societies that for centuries relied on traditional and relatively stable economic systems face tremendous pressure to change practices of production and consumption to meet the demands of global markets; the vertiginous development of scientific knowledge puts pressure on traditional ways of life to recast its beliefs and values in light new empirical evidence. Phenomena like these are relatively recent, and they are examples of the *intensified* impermanence that characterize our times of globalization. I use the terms *intensified interconnectedness* and *intensified impermanence*, then, as key terms to refer to relatively recent, contingent conditions characteristic of our times of globalization, while the terms *impermanence* and *interconnectedness,* when unqualified, refer to the ontological concepts.

I.3. Cosmopolitanism as Framing

This treatise features an investigation on the nature of a particular way of being in and responding to the world, an *orientation* towards the world, and how that orientation can be cultivated through education. I call this orientation *value creative adjustment*. The idea is that the nature and dynamics of values in the world is such that in our efforts to adjust to the demands of the world we undergo a process of self-transformation that is, at the same time, a process of value creation. I arrive at a fairly developed articulation of the concept by the end of the fourth

chapter. Along the way, the inquiry takes us through a winding road of conceptual development and analysis that set up the framing for the investigation.

The task of this project is to recast the concept of cosmopolitan education. It is an ambitious task. However, the contours of the concept that make up our final destination are, as it turns out, no radical departure from meanings that are common currency in the literature. If the task were an isolated attempt at conceptual redefinition, then the modesty of the outcome would be, at least to my temperament, somewhat disappointing, albeit significant. But the task here goes beyond an isolated redefinition of the concept of cosmopolitan education; it links it up with a constellation of concepts: interconnectedness, impermanence, continuity, emergence, transaction, context, adjustment, normative terrains, value creation. Some concepts are borrowed; others are here developed to different levels of detail. It is in the network of concepts that the significance of the project lies. In the approach I take to this inquiry, it is the questions of the ongoing conversation on cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan education that provide the framing.

Cosmopolitanism is the idea that we should regard ourselves as citizens of the world and all humans as belonging to a single moral community. It encompasses the notion that it is possible to embrace the accomplishments of humanity as our shared inheritance and create meaningful lives rooted in more than one culture. The ongoing conversation on cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan education emphasizes the importance of learning from one another across differences, and underscores the idea that we have a moral imperative to work together and respond to challenges of global scope that pose real risks to all.

In recent years, we witnessed an intense proliferation of research on cosmopolitanism with varying foci across a wide-range of topics developed within a number of disciplines

across the humanities and the social sciences, as well as through interdisciplinary contexts (Hansen 2010b). I approach the complexity of contemporary philosophical debates on cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan education by means of a fourfold taxonomy of the field of educational philosophy. In chapter two, I introduce four theories: *cosmopolitan universalism*, *agonistic cosmopolitanism*, *rooted cosmopolitanism*, and *educational cosmopolitanism*. Within the fourfold taxonomy of kinds of theories on cosmopolitan education, I locate the ideas here presented as contiguous and, in some important ways, building on David Hansen's educational cosmopolitanism. The defining feature of the central concept of my cosmopolitanism, *value creative adjustment,* is a two-way openness: the individual open to the world and the world open to the individual. In value creative adjustment both self and world are transformed and values are created in the process. All the relevant elements of this picture of the dynamics of self, world, and education are more or less explicitly operative in Hansen's educational cosmopolitanism. The emphasis for Hansen, however, is in *learning,* in how individuals and communities respond creatively to the challenges of the world and in the process they change. The account of cosmopolitan education I present here places the emphasis on how in the process, the *world changes*. In particular, how the world in its normative dimension, as a world of values, gets transformed.

I.4. Individuals, Communities, and Encounters

The renewed interest in cosmopolitanism of recent years must be read in the context of other ideas competing for overlapping spaces of social, moral and political meaning. *Liberalism*, as cosmopolitanism, has deep historical roots and branches extending in diverging directions. Its core value is a commitment to liberty, and the instrumental significance of the idea is to protect individuals from their own oppressive communities.

Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of thinkers, mainly in the Unites States, articulated a critique of liberal theory, focusing on Rawls' universalistic conception of justice formulated in his *Theory of Justice* (1971) as main target. They claimed that justice and other moral, intellectual, and aesthetic values are rooted in community and to pretend this can be transcended is misguided and can actually lead to he erosion of the social fabric of communities and values. This view that aims at the revival of the importance of community in ethics, morality, and politics is termed *communitarianism*. Koczanowicz (2010), offers a succinct description of the communitarian position as calling for "a kind of community of shared values to achieve a consensus which is at the core of liberal democracy" without which "liberal democracy is exposed to the risk of being merely a legal form without supporters and emotional appeal" (p. 143-144). Cosmopolitanism, in its most recent incarnation, is a response to communitarianism (Waks, 2009a).

Cosmopolitanism inherits from liberalism the value that individual human beings share much beyond the culture and communities to which they belong, and that part of what they share is a moral status qua individual human beings, something that is captured in the idea of human dignity and the language of human rights. I should mention that, as scholars in the field insist, cosmopolitanism is not synonymous with the liberal ideology that many identify with globalization: neoliberalism (see Hansen 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Hansen et al, 2009; Mignolo, 2010; Papastephanou, 2005; Pieterse, 2006). Neoliberals privilege a kind of individualism that turns a blind eye to questions like the value of tradition and our moral responsibility towards vulnerable communities. These are values that communitarians insisted on and cosmopolitans take seriously. In this sense, too, cosmopolitanism constitutes a

genuine response to communitarianism: not merely arguing against its limitations, but learning its lessons.

It is worth noting here the idea of multiculturalism, which advances a vision of society as constellation of cultures embodied in communities. Multiculturalism is designed to protect vulnerable cultures from the threat of domination by powerful cultures. It constitutes a response to liberalism in that it values, with communitarianism, the primacy of culture in moral and political life. The essential difference between multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism is that the former is grounded on a view of cultures as self contained, stable wholes, while the latter regards cultures as porous and dynamic. Both multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, at least in their contemporary expressions, embrace a commitment to pluralism in culture. While multiculturalism emphasizes the protection of cultural integrity from external influence, cosmopolitanism underscores cultural exchange and interconnectedness.

Liberalism is concerned with personal liberty, communitarianism and multiculturalism engage questions of community and cultural integrity, and cosmopolitanism, in Hansen's words, "illuminates how persons and communities at the proliferating cultural crossroads of our time can dwell in productive tension with one another" (2010b, p. 163). The stereotype of cosmopolitans as politically aloof, anti-patriotic, and culturally detached fits within a modernist framework marked by "antinomies such as engagement versus estrangement, patriotism versus universalism, sentiment versus detached reason" (Gregoriou, 2004, p. 257). But contemporary debates operate within a framework of "a dialectic that resolves such antinomies" (Gregoriou, 2004, p. 257). Contemporary cosmopolitanisms recognize the value of particular cultures and local commitments; they value diversity. At the

same time, they appreciate the urgent need to work together across differences. Reviewing scholarship on the liberal versus communitarian debate on citizenship education in liberal democratic societies, Bredo (2007) concludes that "there is no essential conflict between the values associated with individual autonomy and community" (p. 452) and that "[scholars are] critical of polarized ways of thinking based on reified or essentialized conceptions of individuals and communities" (p. 453). Put differently, the cosmopolitan orientation steers clear from the extremes of reifying the individual and romanticizing the community, it seeks to dissolve the dualistic antinomies from which such extremes grow, and charts a path guided by the ideals of extending our moral commitments beyond the local and learning from one another.

I.5. Da Capo: Brief Historical Background.

On February 13, 1994, the *New York Times* published an editorial titled *The Unpatriotic Academy*, in which the author, philosopher and public intellectual Richard Rorty, issued a call to the American political and intellectual left to embrace the value of patriotism, warning that the main alternative would be a wholesale degeneration into a "politics of difference" rich in criticism, but poor in engagement. A few months later, in the *Boston Review* issue of October/November, Martha Nussbaum published "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," partly in response to Rorty (see Nussbaum 2002a). In this "powerful cosmopolitan intervention," as Leonard Waks (2009a, p. 592) describes it, Nussbaum "unapologetically reaffirmed a liberal universalist theory of justice and blasted all ethnic, national, and religious loyalties as morally arbitrary" (ibid). This intervention, Waks tells us, opened the curtains for the act when "cosmopolitanism takes center stage." (ibid)

Nussbaum, as the fellow cosmopolitans that joined her since, does not only address contemporary liberal, communitarian and multicultural perspectives on citizenship, justice, and education. In her response to current challenges, Nussbaum engages the history of cosmopolitan ideas, from Tagore to Kant, from Marcus Aurelius to Diogenes. It is especially this return to the founding spirit of cosmopolitanism in the figure of Diogenes that I want to highlight here.

The history of cosmopolitanism is long and convoluted (Hansen 2010a). As Hansen (2010b) points out, cosmopolitan-oriented ideas have manifested in ancient and modern philosophical traditions the world over. However, the formal articulation of the concept can be traced back to the figure of Diogenes (c.390-323 BCE), the Cynic philosopher, in Ancient Greece. Diogenes marks a starting point for a tradition that runs through the Roman Stoics, including Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, and the Enlightenment cosmopolitan thinkers, especially Immanuel Kant (see Nussbaum, 1997b, 2002a; see also Donald, 2007; Egéa-kuehne, 2003; Gunesch, 2004; Holowchak, 2009; Jollimore and Barrios, 2006; Papastephanou, 2002, 2005). It is in the context of the continuum of this tradition where this project is located as well.

Some scholars in the field of philosophy of education return specifically to Diogenes as a source of inspiration and point of departure for their own versions of cosmopolitanism. Appiah (2008a), for example, synthesizes his conception of cosmopolitanism in three points, three ideas taken from Diogenes. They are: "(1) we don't need a single world government, but (2) we must care for the fate of all human beings, inside and outside our own societies, and (3) we have much to gain from conversation with one another across differences" (p. 87). A fourth idea that Appiah takes from Diogenes is the value of dialogue (pp. 86-87). In citing

the famed remark by Diogenes, who when asked about his place of origin he answered, "I am a citizen of the world"—*kosmo politês* (see Hansen 2009, 2010a; Roth & Burbules, 2011), scholars in the field refer to the sense of the cosmopolitan captured in Appiah's three points. At that basic level there is broad agreement.

In an essay tracing the connections between Stoic cosmopolitanism and Kant, Martha Nussbaum (1997b) makes reference to Diogenes' famous declaration of world citizenship and interprets it as a refusal to be defined in terms of citizenship to a polis (see also Gregoriou, 2004; Hansen, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Hansen et al, 2009; Papastephanou, 2002, 2011). For Diogenes and the Cynics in general, Nussbaum tells us, attributes like nationality, rank, and gender are "secondary and morally irrelevant" (p. 5). What matters is our affiliation with a rational and moral humanity. She further cites Diogenes in his description of the life of the world citizen as "a kind of exile…from the comfort of local truths, from the warm nestling feeling of local loyalties, from the absorbing drama of pride in oneself and one's own" (p. 11). Just as with Appiah, the aspects of the figure of Diogenes that Nussbaum emphasizes become the mark of her own brand of cosmopolitanism.

Hansen (2010a, 2010c) makes reference to Diogenes in relation to the idea of liberation from "close-mindedness and dogmatism" (2010a, p. 4), but also warns that the figure of Diogenes should not be understood as a blueprint for conduct (2010a, p. 5). Hansen (2010c) believes that in its voluntary distancing from everyday cultural affairs, "Diogenes' cosmopolitanism is profoundly incomplete" (2010c, p. 6). "[I]nhabitability *in* rather than *outside* cultural life," he concludes, "[is] a crucial criterion for a viable cosmopolitanism" (ibid). Hansen does not deny the value of critical distance, but he thinks it must be accompanied by a spirit of gratitude and engagement with tradition. He dubs

cosmopolitanism, then, in terms of "leaving and remaining at home" (2010c, 2010b) and as "reflective openness to the new, combined with reflective loyalty to the known" (2010a, p. 6, see also Hansen, 2010b, 2010c; Hansen et al, 2009). A salient quality of Hansen's characterization of the cosmopolitan orientation is his dynamic conception of world inhabitance, which stands in contrast to conceptions of the individual's place in communities based on inflexible notions of "identity," or even "citizenship" (see Hansen, 2011; see also Strand, 2010a, especially p. 104). This project locates itself within the lineage of this cosmopolitan tradition.

I.6. The Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism

The landscape of scholarship in cosmopolitanism and education displays rich conceptual and disciplinary diversity (Hansen, 2010b). "There are no precise set of normative claims that unify all cosmopolitan positions," writes Victoria Costa (2005, p. 258), and many in the field agree (see, for example, Gunesch, 2004; Hansen, 2010b; Strand, 2010a). To signify the great variety of perspectives proliferating in cosmopolitan research, Hansen (2010b) offers a list of qualifiers found attached to the term: "from 'actually existing' and 'rooted' cosmopolitanism to 'discrepant,' 'environmental,' 'layered,' 'realistic,' 'aesthetic,' 'embedded,' 'postcolonial,' 'situated,' 'banal,' 'abject,' and 'vernacular' cosmopolitanism" (p. 152) adding the further qualifiers of "'strong' and 'weak,' 'thick' and 'thin,' or 'strict' and 'moderate.'" (ibid)

Cosmopolitanism, then, has come to be understood as coming in many strands[4] (Costa, 2005; Hansen, 2009; Mignolo, 2010; Todd, 2010), a constellation of perspectives connected by key values and principles. In politics, education, ethics and cultural studies, a number of ideas characterize this cosmopolitan trend of our times. Todd (2010) lists: "peaceful co-existence, global harmony, world citizenship, universal human rights, and forms of hybrid belonging" (p. 15) and regards the ideas of universal human rights and intercultural understanding as particularly central to debates in cosmopolitanism and education.

Hansen (2010b) claims that the concept of cosmopolitanism is likely to remain "essentially contested" (see Gallie, 1956). While some scholars worry about the use of the concept with lack of precision, others celebrate the prospect that cosmopolitanism develops as a polyphonic concept. Hansen, for example, remarks: "To me the unsettled quality of the concept cosmopolitanism feels invitational and true to life" (2010b, p. 152), and "the plasticity of the concept reveals its analytic strength and potential" (2011, p. 66).

4 Diverging perspectives are in part accountable by the fact that research in cosmopolitan studies has developed through a number of disciplines and interdisciplinary approaches (Hansen, 2008, p. 206), incorporating the heritage and conceptual language of many different intellectual traditions. For example, contemporary philosophers writing on cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan themes figure prominently across the educational philosophical literature. These include, most notably, Martha Nussbaum (1997a, 1997b, 2002a), Kwame A. Appiah (2005, 2006, 2008a), Samuel Scheffler (2001), Jacques Derrida (2000, 2001), Seyla Benhabib (2006), Jeremy Waldron (1995, 2000, 2003), and Pauline Kleingeld (1999, 2003, 2006). Writers in related fields like literary scholars Bruce Robbins (1992, 1999, 2003, see also Cheah & Robbins, 1998), sociologist Ulrich Beck (2000, 2002, 2004a, 2004b, 2006, see also Beck & Sznaider, 2006) and political theorist David Held (1993, 1995, 1997, 2002, see also Held et al, 1999) are also featured widely. Particular authors in the field also bring voices of different traditions to bear on the legacy of cosmopolitanism. Some scholars (e.g. Koczanowicz, 2010; Mignolo, 2000, 2010; Popkewits 2006, 2007; Todd, 2010; Waghid and Smeyers, 2010) share a particular interest in questioning what they perceive as a problematic legacy of modernism in the language of cosmopolitanism and enlist the resources of critiques of modernity featuring thinkers like Chantal Mouffe (2005), Jacques Derrida (2000, 2001), Michel Foucault (1972, 1980, 1994a, 1994b, 2001, 2005), and Steven Toulmin (1990). Hansen (2009), as a different example, nests his "educational cosmopolitanism," within "the tradition of philosophy as 'the art of living' or 'the care of the self,'" which includes "Socrates…Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, …Erasmus and Michel de Montaigne…Immanuel Kant, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Michel Foucault" (p. 207). Some authors draw from literature (Hansen, 2008; Jollimore and Barrios, 2006), others from anthropology and history (Hansen, 2010c; Hansen et al, 2009; Popkewitz, 2007; Popkewitz et al, 2006), and many, as one would expect for this topic, draw from political philosophy (Banks, 2008; Donald, 2007; Golmohamad, 2009; Gunesch, 2004; Kiwan, 2005; Kodelja, 2011; Rizvi, 2011; Strand, 2010b; Todd, 2010).

I.7. Globalization and Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is an old idea attuned to current circumstances. As Anderson (1998) notes, cosmopolitanism has re-appeared periodically throughout history, and in each reincarnation it emerged as a response to contemporary challenges. In our time, the conditions to which cosmopolitanism responds fall under the heading of "globalization." Papastephanou (2005) describes globalization as "an empirical phenomenon that has been primarily felt as a structural transformation of the world economic system operating in a complex dialectics with time and space compression effected by advances in technology and communication" (p. 534). In an earlier articulation, she puts it thus: "[Globalization] signifies an empirical phenomenon whereas [cosmopolitanism] denotes an ideal" (Papastephanou, 2002, p. 75). Cosmopolitanism is an orientation articulated as a response to the pressure conditions of globalization exerts on the lives of people (Costa, 2005; Hansen 2010a, 2010b; Papastephanou, 2011; Rönnström, 2011). Hansen (2010b) offers a favorite quote by Bob White (2002) that eloquently captures this distinction: "unlike 'globalization' or 'modernity,' cosmopolitanism is not something that happens to people, it is something that people do." (p. 681)

A picture of the globalized world as marked by intensified impermanence and interconnectedness is a central aspect of this project, and I devote chapters two and three to develop it. In chapter two I draw some of the ethical and moral implications of living in a world where local actions have effects far away and where values, institutions, and even culture and nature change fast. I show how the idea that we live in a world impermanent and interconnected is common sense and intuitive in a straightforward way. At the same time, I argue, from the perspective of the normative demands of this reality, we often fail to see it.

In chapter three, I develop an account of impermanence and interconnectedness to serve as theoretical grounds of value creative adjustment, which I develop in chapter four. For this, I rely on Daisaku Ikeda[5] and John Dewey. From Ikeda, I use his reading of the Mahayana Buddhist principle of the three perceptions. The history of this principle dates back to the work of Nagarjuna, founder of the Maddhyamika tradition, and it offers a powerful account of impermanence and interconnectedness as ontological categories of experience. Before Nagarjuna, Buddhist epistemology relied on a dualism of delusion and enlightenment. On the one hand, we have a deluded perspective clouded by conceptual schemes that prevents us from seeing the true nature of reality. On the other hand, we have an enlightened perspective that transcends the limitations of language and conceptual thinking and reveals the human potential for Buddhahood. Nagarjuna, rejected this dualism and proposed that both perspectives are equally valid and valuable aspects of our ways of

5 Daisaku Ikeda is a Japanese Buddhist leader and thinker who has written extensively on various philosophical subjects including education and cosmopolitanism. Ikeda writes from within the tradition of Soka, or value-creation, education. Soka education refers to the tradition in educational ideas and practices established by Japanese educator Tsunesaburo Makiguchi (1871-1944), continued by his chief disciple Josei Toda (1900-1958) and, in turn, developed by Daisaku Ikeda (1928-) into a school system ranging from kindergarten to postgraduate levels and further into what is known as the Soka education movement (Gebert and Joffee, 2007). The text that inaugurates this tradition is Makiguchi's *The System of Value-Creating Pedagogy* (Soka Kyouikugaku Taikei). Originally projected to span for twelve volumes, Makiguchi's *Pedagogy* only consists of four published volumes, constituting an incomplete, provisional articulation of his educational philosophy (Bethel, 1994; Shiohara, 2005). Ikeda, as founder of the Soka Schools System, is the main spokesperson for Soka education today. Ikeda's novel interpretation of Makiguchi's ideas has attracted renewed interest in the philosophy of Soka education in recent decades. Even though Ikeda's philosophy is characterized by its continuity with the ideas of his mentors, it is in many ways unique and original. At the heart of Soka education lies the concept of value creation, which in Ikeda figures prominently in his philosophy of cosmopolitan education. The idea of world citizenship has been part of Ikeda's writings since very early in his career. References to the ideas East-West dialogue and world peace have figured in his writings for decades. However, the idea of education for global citizenship took center stage decisively in Ikeda's educational thought with the development of a distinctive philosophical approach known as "Buddhist Humanism," which began to emerge in his writings from the 1980s and early 1990s. Two short essays articulate a vision of cosmopolitan education most explicitly: "Education Toward Global Citizenship," an address delivered at Teachers College, Columbia University in June 1996, and "The University of the 21st Century: Cradle of World Citizens," an essay written for the occasion of the first undergraduate commencement ceremony of Soka University of America in May 2005. Here I rely on Ikeda's interpretation of Soka education for which he draws on Buddhist ontology to provide an account of the interconnectedness and impermanence of life and a corresponding conception of values. His interpretation of Soka education is explicitly cosmopolitan, and there is an emerging field of scholarship on Soka education and Ikeda featuring some work on cosmopolitan education (Obelleiro, 2012; Obelleiro, 2013; Goulah, 2012; Goulah & Ito, 2012; Sharma, 2011). Nothing, however, that addresses the specific question of value creation from a philosophical perspective.

perceiving the world. He described a first perception mediated by conceptual thinking as what enables us to perceive the world in its actuality, and a second perception that is non-conceptual as what reveals the world in its potentiality. He introduced a third perception that is the integration of the first two. Ikeda reads the three perceptions as revealing the world in its impermanence (actuality), interconnectedness (potentiality), and the integration of both.

I support the Buddhist view of impermanence and interconnectedness offered by Ikeda with Dewey's concepts of contextualism and transactional realism. Dewey's contextualism helps me overcome the idea that meanings, including values, can tbe completely divorced from the contextual situations where they find origin and roots. The impermanence and interconnectedness of meanings and values is based on their necessary grounding in context. Transactional realism, for its part, helps me establish the notion that values, institutions, cultures, individuals, and communities are not originally self-standing entities that enter into relation with one another, but are originally in transaction, and their individuating character emerges from the transactions themselves. Impermanence and interconnectedness are basic features of experience, not a special phenomenon occasioned by the contingencies of globalization.

I complement this picture of the world as impermanent and interconnected with a naturalism about values that establishes the ontological continuity of values and nature. The world, then, is not only impermanent and interconnected, but also value-laden. The implication is that values, as part of the world, are also subject to the dynamics of impermanence and interconnectedness: they emerge and die off, gain strength and lose traction, and most importantly for the project of cosmopolitan education, they are medium and outcome of our engagements with the world and one another.

I.8. Cosmopolitanism and Global Citizenship

Cosmopolitanism, as a number of commentators have noted, is not the same as global citizenship. Scholarship, however, has not settled the conceptual boundaries between the terms in any definitive way. Some authors reject the term "global citizenship" for its conceptual connection with the idea of world government, making sure first to distinguish it from "cosmopolitanism" and avoid throwing the baby with the bath water (see Hansen, 2011, who also proposes the alternative "inhabitant of the world"). Others prefer to preserve the expression "global citizenship" as synonym of "cosmopolitan" or as a related but not conflicting concept, honoring the etymology of the term (see Appiah, 2008a; Golmohamad, 2009; Gunesch, 2004; Nussbaum, 2002a; Sharma, 2011). In their case, they simply disassociate both "world citizenship" and "cosmopolitanism" from the idea of a required world government. These writers claim that humans can inhabit the world in cosmopolitan modes presumably under a variety of socio-political arrangements, while recognizing that certain conditions are more conducive to the cosmopolitan ideal than others —many cosmopolitan writers favor democratic form of governance broadly conceived (Appiah, 2006, 2008a; Hansen, 2011; Hytten, 2009; Koczanowicz, 2010; Kodelja, 2011; Todd, 2010;). Appiah (2008a), for example, claims that the millennia old idea of world citizenship is now relevant in ways it was not for the Ancients who coined the term. He argues that for citizenship to be real amongst citizens there needs to be knowledge about one another and they need to be able to mutually affect each other's lives. Globalization has made this possible. And as we have seen, it is to a globalized world that contemporary forms of cosmopolitanism respond.

We could say that, as responses to conditions of globalization, cosmopolitanism and global citizenship are complementary. Global citizenship might be understood as as a set of commitments clustered around the idea of a shared life in this planet as a single moral community. These commitments come supported with skills, knowledge, and a emerging norms and institutions, what Scheffler (1992) describes as structures of responsibility. Cosmopolitanism, by contrast, is an orientation, an ethos. It can find its nest and fertile ground where global citizenship would encounter unsurmountable obstacles. As Hansen (2011) puts it, cosmopolitanism constitutes a way of inhabiting the world. And as a way of inhabitance it is marked by cultural creativity, or, as I argue, value creation. As Hansen makes clear, the emergence of structures of democratic global citizenship go hand in hand with the cultivation of a cosmopolitan orientation. Perhaps their relationship is best described as one of mutual support or interdependence. The distinction is nevertheless significant, and we can to a considerable extent meaningfully speak of cosmopolitan education as the cultivation of an orientation with moral, aesthetic, and intellectual dimensions without entering into discussion on questions of global citizenship. Similarly, we can consider matters of global citizenship in relative isolation from the question of a cosmopolitan orientation. As anthropological and sociological research shows, it is possible to identify manifestations of a cosmopolitan orientation in contexts where elements of a structure of global citizenship are generally absent (see, Hansen 2011). We can also consider the development of such structures of global citizenship—we can call it structures of *global* responsibility— independently of whether a cosmopolitan orientation flourishes.

These distinctions, of course, are meaningful theoretical lenses through which to look at the world. In practice, structures of global responsibility and a well-formed cosmopolitan orientation are mutually supportive and go hand in hand. The focus of this project is on a theory

of cosmopolitan orientation. Even when aware of the different connotations that uses of the terms "cosmopolitan" and "global citizenship" carry, I choose not to place much weight on this distinction for how I use the terms throughout the text. In their historical origin, as we saw, the terms are in fact synonymous: "global citizenship" is a literal translation of the Ancient Greek *kosmo politês,* and many of the authors who employ either of the terms do it interchangeably. Attending to the focus of this investigation, I rely primarily on the terms "cosmopolitan" and "cosmopolitanism." However, occasionally, I use the expressions "global citizen," "global citizenship," "world citizen," and "world citizenship" for stylistic reasons or for the sake of fidelity to the vocabulary of quoted texts. Whenever these terms appear, however, "citizenship" should not be interpreted in the narrow sense of denoting a particular relationship of an individual to a state, but it should be read metaphorically to mean a way of being in the world.

I.9. Embracing the World, Messy and Unfathomable.

The world is a messy place. If we are to extend our sense of moral community beyond the local, as cosmopolitans claim we should, we must come to terms with the world's unfathomable complexity and internal tensions. We must come to terms with structures of responsibility to which it is difficult to respond. A moral community that encompasses all of humanity, for example, will include individuals, communities and ways of life that we find distasteful or offensive, but we are not entitled to reject on moral grounds. It will also include practices and traditions that we find morally or politically objectionable, but that we cannot legally prosecute. Critics claim that in attempting to embrace a world too complex and full of conflict cosmopolitanism collapses under the weight of its own lofty aspirations. In calling for a love of humanity, cosmopolitans fail to establish meaningful affective connections with any particular

community at all. In wanting to transcend the prejudices of particular cultural perspectives, cosmopolitans end up uprooted and aloof from culture. At best, they merely touch the surface, sampling its fruits here and there and ultimately degenerating into cultural parasitism (see Hansen 2009, Hansen 2010b, p. 151; Hansen, 2011, p. 73-77). The stereotypes that illustrate this negative picture of the cosmopolitan are very familiar. We recognize them from Hollywood movies and advertisements: The urbane, fashionably dressed connoisseur of the arts and cuisines from the world over, familiar with airports and metropolises and chain hotels, an unapologetically individualist, consumer of the world. Lu (2000) observes that such stereotypes are in fact misinformed about the history and current research on cosmopolitanism (see Hansen, 2011, p. 15). The truth is that most contemporary forms of cosmopolitanism employ metaphors and images that emphasize the continuity between local, traditional forms of life and global commitments. Appiah (2002, 2005, 2006), for example, argues that global moral obligations need not be in conflict with personal ethical concerns but that they stand in a relationship of interdependence (see Waks, 2009a), and in fact argues that the ideal of the global citizen is "particularly useful when we are faced with the sorts of conflicts, grounded in religious, ethnic, racial, and national identities, which pervade our world." (Appiah, 2008a, p. 85)

Throughout this work, I attempt to show that in what I call value creative adjustment we find a way to respond to the ethical and moral challenges of the world, even when the world appears messy and unfathomable, and it is impossible to reach wide agreement on matters of value in the face of conflict. We live in a world of proliferating diversity. The cosmopolitan generosity of ambition is not a matter of scale. The unfathomable normative richness of "all countries and all times" we find at the subway platform, in the inner city classroom, on our web browsers every day. The spirit of cosmopolitanism, in the end, is the spirit of *loving* the world

and creating a kind of life that makes it possible to inhabit the world meaningfully, even and especially in all its messy complexity and unfathomability.

Chapter II. Impermanence, Interconnectedness and Four Cosmopolitanisms.

II.1. Introduction.

Cosmopolitanism presupposes that we live in a world intensely impermanent and interconnected, and that cultivating an appropriate awareness of this condition must be constitutive of the cosmopolitan response to the ethical, moral, and political challenges of our age. A central task of a cosmopolitan education, then, would be to help individuals cultivate such an awareness. In many ways we already are aware of the interconnectedness, fragility, and risks that mark our condition. Our responses to the world in terms of this awareness contribute to the makeup of the world. The ways in which we know that we live in impermanence and interconnectedness can be read, however, as incomplete, distorted, failing to translate into political action, or limiting our capacity to create lives of meaning and value. We know the world is impermanent and interconnected, but in many ways we don't. I argue that this is the case because we live in a value-laden world and the challenge of awareness depends on developing a subtle understanding of the dynamics of values in all their differences and universality.

In this chapter, I provide a sketch of the picture of the world as impermanent and interconnected and consider some of the ethical, moral, and cultural challenges that characterize it. Then, I present four educational philosophical perspectives from the literature on cosmopolitanism to approach the question of how a cosmopolitan education might help individuals and communities cope with these challenges.

II. 2. Stories of a World Intensely Impermanent and Interconnected.

My grandfather Humberto was born in Cerdiñeiro, a small town on the Northeastern coast of Galicia, Spain. When he was a teenager, in the 1930s, the total population was about one hundred families. There was an elementary school with two teachers, the milk delivery man, a few people who worked at the harbor about thirty miles north, and lots of fishermen—fishing was what most people did for a living. There was also the elite: a few government officials, two families who owned arable land, and the local catholic priest.

Most of the couple of hundred people who grew up and lived there spent their lives in association with one another, doing things the same way they had been done for generations. That, of course, did not mean that the outside world did not come into their lives. The last town down the coast, about ten miles north of Cerdiñeiro, was called Finisterre, which literally means "the end of the Earth," a name given by pilgrims who walked the last hundred kilometers of El Camino de Santiago (Way of St. James).[6] Every day from the hill behind the house where Humberto grew up, you can see pilgrims walking, staff in hand, hailing from all over Europe and beyond, displaying in speech and appearance all the diversity you might find on Fifth Avenue and 58th Street in New York City (except in this case, of course, religious diversity).

The outside world snuck in in a myriad ways beyond the pilgrims as well. Cerdiñeiro's only boat mechanic used German tools, and poor fishermen got their pair of English shoes to show off at the patronage festivals. As everywhere, there were restless young people who wanted more than the small town had to offer; they went to Madrid, Geneva, and Caracas, and sometimes came back with colorful stories and different ways of seeing things. The process that

6 The Way of St. James includes paths coming from various locations all over Western Europe converging on what is known as the Northern Route stretching Westward along Northern Spain. The pilgrimage culminates in the famous cathedral of Santiago de Compostela, where tradition has it that the remains of the apostle Saint James are found. Cape Finisterre, where the town of the same name is located, is about 90 km West of Santiago de Compostela.

we call globalization was already well underway. But none of these modes of external influence was truly disruptive to the traditional life of the town. Life in Cerdiñeiro in the 1930s would strike us today as remarkably stable and traditional.

When he was in his early thirties, Humberto left town for Buenos Aires. That move was for him a drastic transition from a way of life deeply rooted in eighteenth and nineteenth century traditions, modes of production and technologies, to a life of the twentieth century. He swapped the countryside for the big city, and the fields of corn for the factory. Back in Cerdiñeiro, he was plowing the soil with a plough pulled by oxen, the same way it had been done for two hundred years. In Buenos Aires, he was now building wooden pipe systems to transport grains inside industrial food processing facilities, the way a team of engineers devised only a few decades before. By the time he retired in the early 1970s, his work had become obsolete; the technique to which he devoted his career had a life-span of five decades. In the meantime, the farming techniques exploited in Northern Spain for centuries became obsolete too and when Humberto returned to his birthplace after retirement no commercial farming was going on in Cerdiñeiro anymore. With the exception of a few small family farms that produced for consumption only, all produce came from other regions of Spain and abroad where large scale, intensive farming technologies where possible to implement. In his lifetime, Humberto saw the world change: he witnessed two world wars, the fall and rise of the Soviet block —he lived through what the late Eric Hobsbawn (1994) called the "short twentieth century"—, female suffrage in Spain and Argentina, and much more.

My grandfather's life was paradigmatic of the twentieth century, an illustration of the extraordinary degree to which, within a few decades, interconnectedness and impermanence in the world received an injection of intensity. And yet, the phenomena producing the most

dramatic transformations to our ways of life today emerged only towards the end of Humberto's life. The exponential expansion of communication, especially through the development of new technologies and the rise of global media networks (Appiah, 2008a; Egéa-kuehne, 2003; Hansen, 2009a, 2010b; Kocznacowicz, 2010; Papatephanou, 2005, 2011; Striano, 2009) contribute to social and economic change (Hansen, 2010b; Striano, 2009), and the shrinking of distances in unprecedented ways (Papastephanou, 2005, 2011). Humberto experienced many aspects of these transformations only marginally—he never had an email account—but his grandchildren and everyone of their generation they know—literally everyone—participate in this globalized world of accelerated communications.

The changes we experience in our ways of communication in the past two hundred years and, especially, in the past few decades, are so momentous that their implications for the human condition are literally unfathomable. Consider the following contrast. Almost two hundred years ago, on April 10th, 1814, Easter Day, the French troops under Marshal Soult faced the coalition troops under Marquess of Wellington in Toulouse. Almost eight thousand men perished in battle that day (Oman, 1993; Smith, 1998). Two days later, on April 12th, messengers arrived for both Soult and Wellington with the news that Emperor Napoleon I had abdicated and the war was over. The messengers had left Paris in the evening of April 7th, three days before the battle (Dilhac, 2001).[7] Had the messengers reached Toulouse in two rather than five days, eight thousand lives would have been spared. By contrast, two days is what took 98% percent of the entire world know about Lady D's death on August 31, 1997 (Gardner, 2011). And today, *Twitter* immediately broadcasts to millions around the world messages featuring from the most

7 Prof. Dilhac (2001) notes that faster communications technologies were available since 1794 in France: the optical telegraph of Claude Chappe (over 500 km/h compared to postal coach averaging 10km/g). Unfortunately, the optical telegraph live between Paris and Toulouse was not in place in 1814.

vital to the most trivial, from strategic information during natural disasters to this week's top trending hash tag: *#DontYouJustHateWhen*. In what Harmut Rosa (Rosa, 2003, Rosa & Scheuerman, 2009) calls the high-speed society, two days is perhaps enough time to not only spread information across the world, but also for people to lose interest in it and move on to the next thing. These astonishing developments are transforming our lives.

Ease and speed of communication have actually developed to the extent that the social space of our activities has come to effectively transcend geographical space. When a magnitude 9.0 (Mw) earthquake hit the Tohoku region of Japan on March 13, 2011, Junko was on her way to visit a client. From her car she witnessed buildings crumbling down and cars falling from bridges; the devastation was thorough as far as the eye could see. For several hours, cellphone signals were out and Junko had no way to contact her mother or know if she was safe. After the service was restored, phone lines quickly overloaded and only international calls went through. Junko's first communication was an incoming call from a former college classmate in Chicago. Within a few hours, friends from the US got a hold of Junko's mother, who was safe at home, and were able to convey to both mother and daughter messages of mutual assurance and relief. At that time, the ability for people to connect very explicitly go beyond the limitations imposed naturally by geographic location. This is not, however, a phenomenon occasioned by the extraordinary nature of the circumstances. Every day we send and receive emails, instant messages, share photos and videos, speak to and hear from people far away. When I call costumer service and speak to a person in India, even if geographically far away and emotionally distant, this person is practically and experientially closer to me than the neighbor in the apartment above, whose face I have never seen.

If Junko, from Fukushima, drilled a hole on the ground through the core of the Earth to the other side, she would end up a few hundred miles off the coast of Buenos Aires, where I am writing these lines sitting at a cafe downtown. She could not be geographically farther away from me in this planet, and yet, if I have a question about how to phrase a particular statement in Japanese, it is faster, easier, and more comfortable for me to ask Junko, who happens to be online on *Facebook* right now, than walk across the cafe and approach the Japanese couple sitting by the window. The communications technologies that make this possible were, for the most part, developed and implemented in a large scale during my lifetime. If I live to be ninety three like grandpa Humberto, and the course of interconnectedness and impermanence continues in its currently accelerating trend, I will presumably come to witness transformations to the human condition that even he, the man of the vertiginous 20th century, could not have conceived.

II.3. Scholarly Accounts of Intensified Impermanence and Interconnectedness.

Striano (2009) lists three phenomena characteristic of our world today that account for the conditions portrayed in our collage of narratives. That communicative proximity is so often disconnected from spatial proximity, both in extraordinary and quotidian circumstances, is a sign of the prevalence of *deterritorialization*, a term introduced by Jan Scholte (2000) to describe the conditions in which geographical location is no longer the totality of "social space" for human activities. That modes of communication, production, consumption, and more continue to change at an ever-faster rate means that we live in times of significant *social acceleration*. That connections of interdependence across all kinds of boundaries have become embedded in all our

human practices, both as result and condition for deterritorialization and social acceleration, means we live in times of deep *interconnectedness*.

The idea is that because of the modes of connectedness that new communication technologies afford us we have come to see "a structural transformation of the world economic system operating in a complex dialectic with time and space compression" (Papstephanou, 2005, p. 534) and a "transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions" (Held et al., 1999, p. 16). The implication of these transformations is "deep-seated changes in the way people live, experience, and understand social space, and these changes are having a very strong impact on social and political practices" (Striano 2009, 380). Anthony Giddens describes the process as "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (1990, p. 64). The intensification to which Giddens makes reference involves both the fact that worldwide social relations are significant dimensions of increasingly more people's lives, and the fact that "local happenings…shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (ibid) are not occasional or extraordinary, but quotidian, and often marking the beating pulse of life hour by hour, minute by minute.

We are, for better or for worse, inextricably involved in a web of trade, information and culture (Appiah, 2008a; Golmohamad, 2009; Hansen, 2009a; Koczanowicz, 2010; Papastephanou 2005, 2011; Todd, 2010; Waks, 2009a). We live in a world, scholars agree, of unprecedented and increasing awareness of interdependence (Appiah, 2008a; Bredo, 2007; Golmohamad, 2009; Hansen, 2009a, 2010b; Mignolo, 2010; Roth & Burbules, 2011; Rizvi, 2011; Strand 2010b, Striano, 2009). Intertwined with the structures of commercial, informational and cultural interdependence are the phenomena of mass migration and close proximity of

groups previously isolated from one another (Bredo, 2007; Golmohamad, 2009; Hansen, 2009a, 2010b; Mignolo, 2010; Rizvi, 2011; Strand, 2010; Todd, 2010; Waks, 2009a) and increased recognition of cultural differences (Roth & Burbules, 2011). Borders are now more porous (Banks, 2008; Rizvi, 2011) and the world is increasingly becoming a global community of nations (Holowchak, 2009).

Hytten (2009), notes that these conditions of globalization have been interpreted as both offering an opportunity for a hopeful vision of expanding wealth and international harmony as well as deepening the gap between the haves and the have-nots. Most scholars are quick to warn against overly optimistic interpretations of globalization that ignore the evils of consumerist individualism and the widespread of exploitation and greed (Hansen, 2009a, 2010b; Hytten, 2009; Kocznacowicz, 2010; Mignolo, 2010). A fact observed by some scholars is that globalization has unleashed forces that uproot established ways of life (Gregoriou, 2004; Hansen, 2010b; Todd, 2010), and this has forced the reshaping of established identities (Papastephanou, 2005). Our lives, in their political, economic, and cultural dimensions, are intertwined with processes of production, distribution and consumption of goods, services, and information that threaten to deplete the Earth's resources, while political resources remain comparatively underdeveloped (Hansen, 2009a). At the same time, the international coordination of knowledge and resources that enabled, for example, the creation and production of nuclear weapons remains unmatched by an ethic comparable in scope and penetration (Rönnström, 2011). We live in a fragile world, in conditions of fragility that we created. For cosmopolitanism, it is not only this fact of fragility that is significant, but also our awareness of it, the fact that we are concerned about our future (Rönnström, 2011; Nerland, 2010).

II.4. We know, but we don't.

Today, most if not all of us have stories to tell about living in a world shrinking and rapidly changing. Chances are that you, like me, have such stories, and some of them are deeply personal, involving family members and close friends, stories set in the context of your daily life. We live in a world deeply interconnected and impermanent, and we know that from direct experience. At the same time, we value stability and integrity. Even more than that; a measure of stability and integrity are constitutive of any sense of meaning and value. A picture of the world where impermanence is so pervasive that any sense of roots gets rendered vacuous, where interconnectedness is so absolute that any meaningful difference gets erased, would be not only undesirable, but essentially unintelligible. So the directly experienced truth that the world is intensely impermanent and interconnected must be more complex than a literal understanding of "the global village" metaphor would suggest. There is a sense in which this truth about the world is perfectly evident and uncontroversial, and there is a sense in which it stands as if behind a veil of blur.

When we regard the phenomena of social acceleration, deterritorialization, and interconnectedness that characterize our times and read them as signs that our locally rooted perspectives of the world are mere delusions, we get a picture of the world that is seriously distorted—with distortions that have real moral and political consequences. When we take these phenomena as mere threats to our traditional ways of life—ways of life regarded as embodying something essential about our nature—, we get a different, but equally pernicious distortion. Contemporary cosmopolitan theories share a resistance to both extremes and positions themselves in a middle ground. However, as we will see in this chapter, there is much theoretical diversity within that middle ground. One thing that the various forms of contemporary

cosmopolitanism share is, on the one hand, a pursuit of an account of the proper place of the impermanence and interconnectedness of the world in our normative lives and, on the other, an appreciation of the particularities of cultural traditions that frame and support meaning and value in our lives. In other words, from a cosmopolitan perspective, it is not enough to know that we are connected across distances and boundaries and that these connections affect change at multiple levels. A proper understanding of our condition of interconnectedness and impermanence would require insight into how to respond to these conditions from within particular cultural traditions and practices.

Let us consider a salient example of one way in which we understand the world as interconnected and impermanent. In 1972, world leaders in politics, business and science gathered in Stockholm for the UN Conference on Human Environment. The event, the first of its kind, set the tone and defined the agenda for international environmental politics to this day. The theme of the conference and title of the published report of its conclusions was "Only One Earth" (see Ward & Dubos, 1972). This is an expression with double significance. The world, in its geographical, biological and cultural diversity is interconnected to a degree that justifies thinking of it as a single entity. The world is *one*. At the same time, precisely because its deep interconnectedness, events have repercussions across the globe, and the result is a series of transformations in the natural environment, in culture and values, in our political structures and our economies. While some of us might afford to temporarily protect ourselves, ultimately we all will come to suffer the effects of these transformations. There is no other world to which we can escape. The world is *only* one.

Stockholm 1972 was the precursor to a number of high profile summits including Rio 1992, Rio+5 in 1997, Johannesburg 2002, Copenhagen 2009, and most recently, Rio+20 in 2012.

After four decades, the picture of the world articulated in the original conference still shines as deeply true and relevant. And yet, every time one of these high-profile events takes place the outcome is the same: confirmations of the picture of "Only One Earth" in high-flying rhetoric, accompanied by modest policy accomplishments and many disappointments. Rio+20, for example, failed to deliver substantial political solutions to all the most pressing issues in its agenda, including the oceans crisis, goals and international frameworks for sustainable development, green economy, and energy (Naidoo, 2012). While it featured leaders from 152 countries, President Obama of the Unites States, Prime Minister David Cameron of Great Britain and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany stayed home, preoccupied by domestic politics and the economic crisis in Europe. "The timing of the conference was unfortunate" declared Prof. Jeffrey Sachs of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, in reference to these noticeable absences and the diminished power of Europe to play its traditional leading role (Romero & Broder, 2012).

On the one hand, we recognize that we all are responsible for the fate of this fragile planet. In this sense, we see the failure of leaders to institute policies and business practices that effectively turn us away from our current path of manic production, consumption, and injustice, and we interpret it as a *moral* failure. Peter Singer (2004) articulates this intuition in terms of what he calls "the ethics of globalization." He shows, from the perspective of the utilitarian ethics that he is famous for upholding with admirable—or deplorable[8]— consistency, that people in rich countries are failing shamefully to meet the ethical demands that conditions of risk and suffering in the world pose (see also Singer, 2011). Speaking from the podium at Rio+20,

8 Bernard Williams reportedly said that his colleague "is always so keen to mortify himself and tell everyone how to live" (Specter, 1999).

President Mujica of Uruguay gave expression to the same intuition when he called for the need to "re-examine our way of life." The problem with "our way of life" is that it traps people into habits of consumption that not only destroys the environment, but it also cut short the possibilities of human happiness. He offered a poignant illustration:

> "My fellow workers fought hard for the 8 hour workday. And now they are making that 6 hours. But the person who works 6 hours, gets two jobs, therefore, he works longer than before. But why? Because he needs to make monthly payments for the motorcycle, the car, more and more payments, and when he's done with that, he realizes he is a rheumatic old man, like me, and his life is already over." (Mujica, 2012)[9]

Implied in his remarks is the idea that "our way of life" was designed to maximize profits for some at the cost of others and the environment. Put differently, Mujica warns us that "our way of life" embodies a lack of understanding of our interdependence, which is so deep that policy initiatives will not go very far without a transformation in culture at the same time.

What Singer and Mujica tell us is that there are certain ways of failing to understand our interconnectedness that carry momentous moral consequences. Sometimes we fail to see how certain luxuries in which we indulge are possible only at the cost of the morally indefensible suffering of others. Sometimes we fail to see that our own desires and opinions are mediated by interests that run contrary to our own self-realization. If we find Singer and Mujica admirable in their moral stances —and in the specific respect of their condemnation of greed, generally we do— it is because they embody a response to the world that is consistent with the picture of the world that we recognize as truthful and important. In other words, to really understand that the world is interconnected and impermanent, fragile and at risk, would entail a response, as articulation and conduct, consistent with it.

9 My translation.

At the same time, we understand the sentiment behind Prof. Sach's choice of words. It truly is unfortunate that it is so difficult for us to live up to the demands of an ethics of globalization, as conceived by Singer, when local problems pose their own pressing demands. We are quick to condemn the powerful for their lack of responsibility, as we should, but taking personal responsibility through our own conduct is difficult. And we can understand why President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron, and Chancellor Merkel turned their backs on Rio+20 to focus on domestic issues.[10] From this perspective, the interconnectedness and impermanence of the world cease to shine with the light of unambiguous clarity. Things, in other words, appear to be more complicated than we thought. We know we live in a world interconnected and impermanent, but we know this in different ways. Sometimes this knowledge is thick, deeply rooted in culture, and embedded in conduct; sometimes it is thin, a mere abstract idea that time and again fails to translate into concrete practices that re-shape our ways of life.

Pictures of the world as interconnected and impermanent are often designed to shed light on our collective failure in taking responsibility for the world. The implicit demand is that the proper response to the way most of us conduct ourselves should resemble the closing scene of Steven Spielberg's celebrated *Schindler's List*. The protagonist of the story is a wealthy industrialist in Nazi Germany who has been using his fortune to "buy" Jewish prisoners as factory workers and saving them from extermination. In the closing scene, as he leaves the factory greeting the hundreds of individuals whose lives he saved, Oskar Schindler starts weeping and tells Itzhak Stern, "I could have saved more...I threw away so much money. You have no idea" (Zaillian, 1993). He looks around. "This car," he says, "Why did I keep the car?

10 In Obama's case, Rio+20 took place in the midst of a presidential election campaign in the US. G.H.W. Bush did attend Rio 1992 during his re-election campaign, was criticized for it, and that contributed to his defeat against then Governor Bill Clinton.

Ten people, right there, ten more I could've got" (ibid.). He then rips the swastika from his lapel and cries out: "This pin...Two people. This is gold. Two more people. He would've given me two for it. At least one. He would've given me one. One more. One more person. A person, Stern. For this. One more. I could've gotten one more person I didn't" (ibid.). The war is over and there is no longer an opportunity or a need to "buy" people to save their lives. The horror of the equation, and the absurdity of indulging in luxuries drives Schindler to tearful regret and rage. If we were to clearly see "the infinite extent of our relations," as Thoreau (1910, p. 227) would put it, we could see our behavior is as ridiculous and unjustified as Schindler's pin. But that we continue to hold on to our pins, the picture implies, is a sign that we really fail to perceive the normative nature of our interconnectedness.

That our interconnectedness carries normative weight means that apparently innocent local acts have potentially morally significant effects in people's lives outside our immediate context. The completely local choice of driving a particular kind of car is causally connected to starvation in Bangladesh, as water levels rise because of global warming flooding low-land farming regions of the small Asian country with salty sea water, to take an example exploited by Singer (2004). For Schindler to keep the pin *means* letting a person die. The problem is that it is often difficult for us to see these morally charged causal connections. The poignancy of *Schindler's List* closing scene is that the ordinarily distanced cause and effect are brought together, placed side by side in all the concreteness of physical objects in space. The pin next to Stern, a human being. The script does not beat around the bushes with subtleties here; Schindler enunciates the connection and the comparison: "This pin...A person" (Zaillian, 1993). And the moral significance of the two contending options is heightened by the symbolic force of the two

objects: on the one hand, the swastika for evil; on the other, the human face for good, the gaze of the other, as Levinas (1979, 1981) famously puts it.[11]

Philosophers who think Schindler's pin illustrates the normative nature of our interconnectedness attempt to device images to help us close the gap between apparently innocent local acts and distant effects. Their goal is to undo what they consider a morally distorting effect produced by proximity. Perhaps the most famous example is Peter Singer's shallow pond story found in his famous essay "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" (1972). It goes like this: "If I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing" (p. 230). The shallow pond image springs from the same kind of moral intuition expressed in Schindler's anguish. Singer states it in the form of a principle: "If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it" (ibid.). Singer devotes the rest of the essay to show that even though the principle appears uncontroversial, strict adherence to it would constitute a drastic change to our moral scheme.

Peter Unger (1996) provides an update on the shallow pond principle, and update that is, as it happens, an upgrade of intensity in moral demands. Unger argues that "[t]o behave in a way that's not seriously wrong, a well-off person, like you and me, must contribute to vitally effective groups, like OXFAM and UNICEF, most of the money and property she now has, and most of what comes her way for the foreseeable future" (Unger, 1996, p. 56, in Appiah, 2006, p. 158). Undoubtedly, Singer is right when he acknowledges that the type of stringent morality he and

11 It is worth noting that Itzhak Stern was played by Sir Ben Kingsley, ineluctably associated with Academy Award winning performance as Mohandas Gandhi in the 1982 film. Kingsley is the cinematic face of Gandhi, and this could not have escaped Spielberg. The comparison, then, effectively becomes a sharp contrast between the 20th century paradigmatic symbols for good and evil: Gandhi and the Nazis.

Unger propose would constitute a radical revision of our moral scheme. If we followed their recommendations, the world would be very different. According to Unger, for example, it would be immoral to purchase tickets to the opera when you could instead save a dozen children in Africa for the same money, to which Appiah replies: "What would the world look like if people always spent their money to alleviate diarrhea in the Third World and never on a ticket to the opera...? Well, it would probably be a flat and dreary place" (2006, p. 166). Appiah's point is that values often cannot be measured by a single criteria and ordered in a strict hierarchy. Our ethical and moral lives are constituted by a dynamic plurality of values. Leonard Waks (2009a) reminds us that for Appiah, "saving the children arguments are...paradigms of moral 'mission creep'" (p. 593), as they fail to "distinguish the *ethical* from the *moral*" (ibid.). Waks describes the distinction, famously emphasized by Bernard Williams (1972, 1985), as follows:

> "Ethics directs us in the pursuit of good lives, that is, lives rich in the great multiplicity of values from friendship, aesthetic appreciation, intellectual growth, environmental conservation, religious contemplation, national service, moral virtue, and many other things. Morality is about minimal rules preventing harm and preserving the social basis for trust and security so that individuals *can* plan and live out their particular lives." (2009a, p. 593)

Waks concludes, with Appiah, that it is "a gross mistake to think that morality is always overriding" (ibid.).

Life, like the natural environment, is the kind of value to which we give priority because it is basic; it provides for the possibility of other values to flourish. But from its basic nature it does not follow that it always trumps other values. Values are not neatly organized hierarchically that way. This is plainly clear within cultural traditions and it should be more so expected across cultural differences. Consequently, it is a mistake to think that the normative interconnectedness that links our actions with the lives of people far away is structured hierarchically that way too. It

is not the case that the more basic values, the ones roughly articulated in the language of human rights, are what constitutes the fabric of our global moral obligations, while values more refined, less basic, and lower in the order of priority apply to more local contexts. Often the choice between pursuing highly refined and basic values is strictly local, it concerns our relationships with neighbors and family members.

The world of our ethical and moral lives *is* this impermanent and interconnected world of ours. The moral dimensions of the world emphasized in Stockholm's 1972 "Only One Earth," or in Singer's "One World" are certainly salient dimensions of our interconnectedness. If I cannot see that driving my SUV, going to the opera, giving the domestic economy priority over the global environment, and other choices we and our governments make do have an impact on the natural environment and the lives of children in the Third World, I am certainly failing to understand the impermanence and interconnectedness of the world. But if I see the impermanence and interconnectedness of the world *only* in terms of a few salient, basic, universal values, I fail to understand the nature of our impermanence and interconnectedness as well. We inhabit our world through the values we have inherited, modified, rejected, and created, we perceive the world through the lens of a culture, and this necessarily entails notions of what it is to live a life worth living. Perhaps I have come to gain an acute sense of the drama of life and death and the immorality of cruelty *through* my expensive taste for opera; perhaps I learned this by means of an undergraduate education in philosophy at Princeton or New York University, which is much more expensive than the opera12. I can easily understand that my actions are causally linked to the possibility of survival of another human being thousands of

12 As of January 2014, Peter Singer holds an appointment in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University, and Peter Unger is Prof. of Philosophy at New York University.

miles away as an isolated fact, and I can forego the opera and donate the money to the appropriate charity as a response to that isolated fact. But to cultivate a kind of life that is morally responsive to the interconnectedness and impermanence of the world would require much more than understanding of isolated facts and isolated responses. It would require a culture, a kind of life that makes sense and is worth living, a kind of life that frames the moral meaning of my actions in relation to the lives of people far away.

II.5. Interconnected and Impermanent Values.

The larger purpose of this project is to articulate a vision of cosmopolitan education as a response to conditions of globalization that pose serious challenges for individuals and communities to create lives of meaning and value. I approach this task from a particular perspective that entails two important assumptions. First, as already extensively discussed, my perspective is cosmopolitan. This means that the concern is with the world as the place for meaningful inhabitance (this is Hansen's expression—see, for example 2011, pp. 113-114) with a special emphasis on the extension of spheres of moral concern to the whole of humanity and intelligent, creative engagement with cultural difference.[13] Second, my perspective entails a kind of naturalism about values. People and places are interconnected across all kinds of distances and boundaries. Institutions, cultural traditions, technologies, economic systems and the natural environment change at an ever-faster pace. Values are, from the perspective adopted here, thoroughly implicated in these dynamics of interconnection and change. Values emerge, change

13 Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown (2006) define four kinds of cosmopolitanism: political, economic, moral, and cultural. There is much overlap amongst these categories and often an actual instance of cosmopolitanism in theory or practice exhibits elements of all four categories to some degree. The taxonomy is nevertheless heuristically useful and, as my description of the emphases of my cosmopolitan approach suggest, this project concerns itself primarily, but not exclusively, with question of moral and cultural cosmopolitanism.

and fade away with the rise and tide of traditions; they gain or lose force with the appearance of new technologies, with transformations in politics, the economy and the natural environment. The rest of this chapter is devoted to an exploration of four influential and representative theories of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan education with a special focus on their accounts of the dynamics of values.

II.5.a. Universality plus Difference

"[C]osmopolitanism is a double-stranded tradition," writes Appiah (2008a), "it is universality plus difference" (p. 92). Appiah deploys these criteria to identify what he calls "counter-cosmopolitans" (p. 95): "nationalists," who "reject the demand for universality in the name of the nation" (p. 94), and "fundamentalists" who "deny the legitimacy of difference" (ibid). Universality and difference can also be markers to compare amongst different kinds of cosmopolitanism. Here I consider four versions of cosmopolitanism representative of the scholarly landscape on cosmopolitanism and education from the perspective of the roles universality and difference play in each of the theories.

All cosmopolitans must value both difference and universality. Ways to embrace and hold these values, however, are many. Strict cosmopolitans, in Scheffler's (2001) sense, are unquestionably universalists; but they are the minority. Amongst moderate cosmopolitans, some happily describe their position in terms of universalism, while others employ notions of "universality" or "universal gestures" but reserve "universalism" for the strong position and tend to associate it with notions of universal human nature.

The cosmopolitan universalism exemplified in the work of Martha Nussbaum (1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 2002a, 2002b) places that which is universal at the center, giving a special weight

to the idea of human nature that serves as the basis for building a model of global community. Agonistic versions of cosmopolitanism, like Sharon Todd's (2008a, 2008b, 2010) *agonistic cosmopolitics*, regard differences as essential to our moral and political lives. They see the human condition as marked by struggles amongst different people and communities and the cosmopolitan response as a way to render these struggles creative and generative. Rooted cosmopolitans like Appiah (2006, 2008a), for their part, see local loyalties and global obligations as coexisting in our moral and political lives. They insist that values change constantly and cultures are essentially porous. They argue for emphasis on getting used to and learning from one another rather than trying to resolve conflicts by agreeing on principles. In their emphasis on difference, rooted cosmopolitans stand with agonistic cosmopolitans. Rooted cosmopolitans, however, reject the agonistic vision of political struggle as pervasive, and side with the universalists on the importance of pursuing harmony and cooperation. Finally, the educational cosmopolitanism of David Hansen (2008, 2009a, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011) highlights the unfathomable nature of human difference as a result of life in a shared world through communities in constant encounter with one another and cultures porous since inception. In this dynamic view of the human condition, generative responses to difference yield emergent and provisional universal gestures. The result is a view of cosmopolitanism as a way of inhabiting a world defined by the tensions between the local and the global, the particular and the universal.

Each one of these versions of cosmopolitanism approaches the question of the nature of the world as interconnected and impermanent from a unique angle. Precisely how universality and difference operate as functions of values, to what extent we can claim that values are universal, in what ways we can say that values are infinitely diverse, it varies across various versions of cosmopolitanism.

II.5.b. Cosmopolitan Universalism

"In general terms," Costa (2005) writes, "cosmopolitanism can be described as a form of universalism that builds on the metaphor that all human beings are 'citizens of the world'" (p. 250). She cites Pauline Kleingeld making the point that cosmopolitans agree that "all human beings share certain essential features that unite them or should unite them in a global order that transcends national borders" (1999, p. 505, in Costa, 2005, p. 250). Koczanowicz (2010) comments that "[c]osmopolitanism is one of the oldest dreams of humankind and, as such, it is connected with the idea of universalism and of the dissolution of difference into a universal whole" (p. 141). Whether through its Enlightenment connections or from its Ancient origins cosmopolitanism is closely linked with the idea of universalism. The history of the concept, however, has taken diverging paths. The contemporary strand of cosmopolitanism that most directly inherits this universalistic spirit is referred to as *cosmopolitan universalism*.

All cosmopolitans embrace the value of extending our moral obligations beyond the local community, but cosmopolitan universalists go beyond that. Nussbaum (1997b, 2002a), for example, claims that the ethic of global citizenship entails a kind of "exile," an overcoming of local attachments, even if only partially, towards a more inclusive identification with humanity as a whole. This includes a relative flattening of the landscape of our moral obligations. Nussbaum does not go as far as claiming that we should regard the welfare of strangers as having the same moral weight as the welfare of our children, relatives and close friends. However, she does think a cosmopolitan spirit demands that we pursue a course of moral growth that reduces the gap between the ways in which we care for our own and the ways in which we care for

strangers. Nussbaum depicts her conception of the individual standing in relation to community, nation, and world by means of a Stoic-inspired, organic figure of the concentric circles:

> "The Stoics stress that to be a citizen of the world one does not need to give up local identifications, which can frequently be a source of great richness in life. They suggest that we think of ourselves not as devoid of local affiliations, but as surrounded by a series of concentric circles. The first one is drawn around the self; the next takes in one's immediate family; then follows the extended family; then, in order, one's neighbors or local group, one's fellow city-dwellers, one's fellow countrymen—and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender and sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest one, that of humanity as a whole." (1997c, p.33)

Commenting on this concentric circles image, Nussbaum insists that:

> "we need not give up our special affections and identifications, whether ethnic or gender-based or religious...But we should work to make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our humanity a special attention and respect." (ibid.)

Gregoriou (2004), sees this cosmopolitan image as an example of the kind of "dialectic that resolves…antinomies" (p. 257)]. "According to this cosmopolitan figure of growth and learning," Gregoriou writes:

> "the ethical self orients itself from smaller circles of local identifications and cultural affiliations to larger circles, to reach the outer and also broadest circle of belongingness, that of 'humanity as a whole.' Considering local identifications and affiliations as a 'source of richness' in cosmopolitan life rather than the departure point for a journey of uprootedness towards the cosmopolitan self" (ibid)

Gregoriou explains that Nussbaum "articulates the dialectic in a regressive rather than linear manner" (ibid), defining the task of the global citizen as to "'draw the circles somehow toward the center,' making all human beings more like our fellow city dwellers, and so forth. In general, we should think of nobody as a stranger, as outside our sphere of concern and obligation" (Nussbaum, 1997c, p. 33, in Gregoriou, 2004, p.257). Although it is true that Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism does not set up local affiliations as against cosmopolitan obligations —one can

be both a citizen of one's nation *and* a citizen of the world— the metaphor of moral growth as expanding the "sphere of concern and obligation" (ibid) implies a directionality where the value of universality stands higher than the value of difference. With the image of "making all human beings more like our fellow city dwellers" (ibid), Nussbaum offers a picture of an imagined global community where moral partialities towards our own, fueled by emotional bonds of attachment, are moderated by a cultivated moral sense grounded in the impartiality of reason.

On the flip side of this conception of a single global moral community, Nussbaum's cosmopolitanism renders particular attachments as ethically arbitrary (Waks, 2009a). The combination of these two aspects of Nussbaum's approach strikes many critics as a failure on her part to appreciate the significance of culture and community for our moral lives (see Waks, 2009a). Commentators connect this blind spot of moral universalism with conceptions of human nature as primarily rational, which are part of many forms of moral universalism including Nussbaum's (Appiah, 2008a; Nerland, 2010; Strand 2010a). Complaints about such conceptions of universal and rational human nature are of two related kinds. On the one hand, some diagnose that a failure to see the proper place of local community and particular attachments in the moral life arises from an impoverished moral psychology that underestimates the role of passion and habit (see Appiah, 2008a; Waks, 2009a). On the other hand, some claim that the confusion and danger of universalism lies in treating principles originated in particular contexts as universal (Mignolo, 2000, 2010). Mignolo (2000, 2010), for example, goes as far as equating universalism with imperialism.

II.5.c. Agonistic Cosmopolitanism

Sharon Todd (2008a, 2008b, 2010) agrees with Appiah (2008a) on the value of both universality and difference. Her project, which she calls *agonistic cosmopolitics*, highlights conflict as fundamental aspect of the human condition and emphasizes the role of political struggle in democratic life. Of the two values that characterize cosmopolitanism, Todd is clearly more concerned about the prospects of difference. So much so, that her project features a careful purging of the language of cosmopolitanism removing certain concepts she thinks cannot be severed from a history of universalism that she thinks, intentionally or not, promotes uniformity and erases differences. For Todd, the ones to fear are not only religious or secular fundamentalists, but especially the Western powers and their liberal-democratic and universalistic ideologies designed to impose their own standards the world over and suppress political struggle by the weak under a facade of harmony and cooperation (see also Koczanowicz, 2010). Todd's project rejects the concepts of "cosmopolitanism" and "universalism" and proposes the alternatives "cosmopolitics" and a notion of "universality" based on agonistic relations.[1]

"Cosmopolitics," writes Todd, "has been used by various theorists to explore the specifically political dimensions of cosmopolitan thought beyond the rigid attachments to universalism" (2010, p. 216; see Cheah and Robbins, 1998; Derrida, 2001; Honig, 2006). "Agonistic" refers to rivalry, but it is different from "antagonistic." The latter carries connotations of hostility and enmity. The former, on the other hand, is rooted in the idea of adversaries, and its fundamental impulse is that of growing together through competition. The root of the term is the Classical Greek *agon (*ἀγών), whose literal meaning is "competition" and is associated with the Olympic Games, an enduring ideal of competitive camaraderie.[14]

14 For more on *agon* and the interdependence of friendship and rivalry see Posta (2011).

Todd's use of the term builds on Mouffe's theory of *agonistic pluralism*. This is Mouffe's critique of what she calls "the typical liberal understanding of pluralism," the idea that the many perspectives and values working in social life are reducible to a picture of the world without tensions or conflict (see Mouffe, 2005, p.10, in Todd, 2010, p. 217). Contemporary cosmopolitanisms are often agonistic in their rejection of any notion of harmony that implies the erasure of differences (see Hansen, 2010b). Todd (2010) identifies an important reason for upholding *agonism* when she asserts that the inevitability of conflict arises "out of holding different viewpoints, subject positions, and identifications, which are always amenable to change over time. For her [Mouffe], the plural nature of social life cannot thereby be 'overcome,' nor should it be" (p. 217). Todd (2010) advances a critique of contemporary cosmopolitan theory as "fail[ing] to address adequately the tensions, paradoxes and legitimate conflicts that arise from encounters across cultural differences" (2010, p. 216). When Nussbaum (1997c) insists that "we should...base our political deliberations on that interlocking commonality [of humanity], and give the circle that defines our humanity a special attention and respect" (p.33), she embodies precisely the universalistic attitude that Todd condemns. What Todd proposes, instead, is a shift from an emphasis on "promoting harmony through appeals to universal principles" to a "process of turning dissonance into legitimate forms of political struggle." (ibid)

Todd rejects universalism but retains universality as essential for political work. She recommends that universal claims be considered in "the ways they operate in specific contexts, and thus become subject to change" (2010, p. 222). She quotes Anderson (1998) on the process by which universality emerges from and is transformed in particular contexts:

> "This does not mean we should not deploy the term universal; we should in fact continuously attempt to give it fuller articulation, so as to include groups that have hitherto been excluded from its purview. One key way to forward this goal is to set different conceptions of universality and of rights in dialogue with one

> another, in order to aggravate our awareness of cultural divergence and to hone our capacity for transformative intercultural encounters. Thus emerges the call for translation." (p. 281, in Todd, 2010, p. 222)

The emphasis is that universals emerge from interaction, not that exchanges are possible only on the grounds of an underlying universality (although both can hold true and operate in dialectic tension). This is what Todd means when, paraphrasing Judith Butler (2000), she states that "all claims to universality are always already products of cultural translation" (Todd, 2010, p. 222). Universals are not only transformed in the process of communicating across cultural differences; universals originally emerged within specific conceptual and cultural contexts through "processes of articulation that continually 'translate' particular cases into abstract generalities and back again" (ibid). Todd insists that universality, as thoroughly penetrated by processes of cultural translation, entails dissonance and "the point of a cosmopolitical project is not to make the dissonance between these different articulations disappear but rather to make them audible" (p. 225) so that they bring about "new articulations of universality through agonistic relations." (p. 226)

The view of interconnectedness and impermanence advanced by the agonistic cosmopolitan is one where tension and conflict penetrate the dynamics of connections and change thoroughly. For the agonistic cosmopolitan there is no such thing as a universal human nature that connects us beyond differences. Rather, we have a picture of a world where every possible encounter with difference brings the possibility of new kinds of tension. The normative question of interconnectedness is not to transcend differences towards a unifying universal, but to reveal the creative possibilities of the tensions that invariably come with difference.

II.5.d. Rooted Cosmopolitanism

Global citizenship, Appiah (2002, 2005, 2006, 2008a) claims, is not primarily about practices and institutions based on universal values and reason, but rather, it is a matter of rich and meaningful exchange and learning from one another. Cosmopolitans, in general, espouse thin conceptions of universal moral truths, like "every human being has obligations to every other" (Appiah, 2008a, p. 96). This is what renders the moral demands from humanity in general weaker than the moral demands of one's nation, one's religion, or one's family. This is what makes it possible for cosmopolitanism to accommodate what some writers describe as multi-layered identities. The distinctive character of rooted cosmopolitanism is that it affirms the relative weight of local loyalties over universal obligations as desirable and central to ethics. By contrast, cosmopolitan universalists acknowledge the pull of local loyalties (they are not blinded by dogma), but not as something to be embraced and cultivated. Cosmopolitan universalists are rather suspicious of local loyalties as a source of passionate attachment that, more often than not, get in the way of reason and morality.

For Appiah (2008a), cosmopolitanism implies universal truth; it entails a form of universalism. He argues, however, that what distinguishes the good kind of universalism of the cosmopolitan from the bad kind of universalism of the fundamentalist—remember, one of the counter-cosmopolitans— is a commitment to pluralism and fallibilism. As for pluralism, the idea is that from a cosmopolitan perspective, universalism is bounded by a commitment to the recognition that there are many values worth living by and that one cannot live by them all. This means that, necessarily, there are worthy forms of life other than one's own. Some aspects of our ways of life can be conceived as of universal value, but not a way of life as a whole; some of our values will get to be universal, but not all of them.

As for fallibilism, the idea is that any knowledge about the world on which a cosmopolitan commitment to universal values may be grounded must be open to revision. In Appiah's own words: "our fallibilism means that, unlike the fundamentalist, we accept that our knowledge is imperfect, provisional, subject to revision in the face of new evidence" (2008a, p. 96). For Appiah, because of commitments to pluralism and fallibilism, cosmopolitanism values universality within a limited scope.

It is worth noting that Appiah makes the point of explicitly rejecting "tolerance" as the distinctive mark of universalism in cosmopolitan mode. There is plenty that fundamentalists tolerate, and much cosmopolitans do not tolerate; tolerance is not what makes the difference (2008a, p. 95). He also is quick to point out that counter-cosmopolitan forms of universalism are not the exclusive possession of religious fundamentalists. He cites the example of the Marxist ideologues like Pol-Pot, who "[i]n the name of universal humanity…wants to eradicate all religion" (p. 96). The distinction is perhaps best expressed in Appiah's own words. For cosmopolitans, "[t]o insist on universality is only to say that every human being has certain minimum entitlements—many of them expressed in the vocabulary of human rights; and that it is also the obligation of every human being to do his or her fair share in making sure that everybody gets what they are entitled to" (pp. 95-96), while, "[f]or the counter-cosmopolitans…universalism issues in uniformity" (p. 97).

Relatedly, a cosmopolitan valuation of difference would also be grounded on commitments to pluralism and fallibilism. From a pluralistic perspective, the value of difference is straightforward and apparent: Pluralism is more than mere tolerance of differences. A world in which differences would be in principle accepted but in actuality not manifest would be, for pluralists, undesirable. Pluralism not only accepts, but *requires* difference. From the point of

view of fallibilism, the value of difference is that if and when my beliefs are proven incomplete or wrong or my values inadequate or problematic in coping with new challenges, different beliefs and values become necessary resources in the process of revision and renewal of my own. Fallibilism entails that values change over time and this requires difference.

The rooted cosmopolitan perspective on the interconnectedness of the world charts a middle ground between the universalist and the agonistic. With the universalist, rooted cosmopolitans affirm the centrality of universal values for a cosmopolitan orientation, but reject the view that local loyalties are either an obstacle to be transcended or merely a starting point in a path of moral growth. The rooted cosmopolitan, as the expression suggests, regards roots in a particular cultural tradition as essential for a cosmopolitan orientation. The idea is that individual persons are such that partake in a web of relations with other persons with whom they share capacities universally. One of the essential capacities that enables human individuals to connect with one another meaningfully across differences, however, is the capacity to have deep personal interests, to find roots in a particular cultural tradition. It is the cultivation of roots rather than its transcendence that is instrumental for a cosmopolitan ethic. Personal interests and deep, meaningful roots do not need to be limited by inflexible cultural identities. For a Japanese person to have deeply cultivated roots does not equal to acquire a demeanor of friendly and polite shyness, have a taste for subtlety in flower arrangements and prefer raw fish to medium rare stake. To have roots does not mean to stick to cultural stereotypes. Roots, in fact, can be very personal, idiosyncratic, even. But to be roots they must be deep, and the particular cultural tradition into which we are born meet a number of requirements for depth that are difficult to achieve in a cultural tradition one acquires by choice: sustained engagement, deep emotional bonds (which are easily formed during childhood), readily available narratives one can easily

share with people, and more. The rooted cosmopolitan vision is one of pursuing the ethical, moral, aesthetic, political, and economic possibilities of interconnectedness, possibilities that are in many ways grounded in the human capacity to cultivate deep cultural roots. In its emphasis on the special importance of particular commitments and in its rejection of universality as uniformity, the rooted cosmopolitan stands with the agonistic cosmopolitan. The rooted cosmopolitan, however, conceives the picture of the interconnectedness of the world not as only pervaded by political struggle and conflict, but also as pregnant with possibilities for harmonious connections, dialogue and mutual learning.

Rooted cosmopolitanism assumes human possibilities are limited by the capacities we share. These limitations are the grounds of both our fallible nature, which demands the cosmopolitan commitment to fallibilism, but are also the grounds of our "certain minimum entitlements" (Appiah, 2008a, p. 95). Central to the rooted cosmopolitan picture of the impermanence of the world is the recognition and celebration of what Appiah calls "cosmopolitan contamination" (see 2006, p. 101-113). This is the embrace of hybridity that characterizes the cultural cosmopolitanism exemplified notably in the writings of Jeremy Waldron (2000, 2003), amongst others. Both Appiah and Waldron quote the very eloquent Salman Rushdie who described the novel that occasioned his fatwa "celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the Pure. Mélange, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world, and I have tried to embrace it" (1991, p. 394, in Appiah, 2006, p. 112). "A tenable cosmopolitanism," writes Appiah, "tempers a respect for difference with a respect for actual human beings" (2006, p.113), but for Appiah, it is the human individual that matters above all.

"At the heart of modern cosmopolitanism is respect for diversity of culture," Appiah writes elsewhere, "not because cultures matter in themselves, but because people matter, and culture matters to people" (2008a, p.88). In full agreement with Waldron, Appiah claims that to have a "settled community, a homogeneous system of values" (2006, p. 113) it is not necessary to have a home. "Cultural purity is an oxymoron," he adds (ibid.), and so for the rooted cosmopolitan the significance of the impermanence of the world emerges in bold relief through the hybrid nature of our cultural lives, and the human possibilities opened by the encounter with difference and the mélange through which "newness enters the world" (Rushdie, 1991, p. 394).

II.5.e. Educational Cosmopolitanism

Appiah (2008a) claims that cosmopolitanism is "universality plus difference" (p. 92), rejecting the kind of dualistic thinking that corners us into a logic of either/or. Hansen (2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011) takes it a step further and gives philosophic weight to the idea that the global *and* the local, the known *and* the new, the particular *and* the universal are not merely additions. The *and,* for Hansen, represents a space between conceptual opposites, a space of tension. The *kosmos* we inhabit is the world of this space between.[15]

The paradoxical position that cosmopolitanism adopts with respect to the uniqueness of particular, local cultural expressions, and the shared, deeply interconnected and continuous nature of humanity is captured by this idea of a space between. Hansen, in his refusal to let cosmopolitanism degenerate into the extremes of cold universalism and empty relativism, provides a powerful articulation of an intuition shared by most contemporary theorists of

15 This language of the 'in between' or the related articulation of 'balancing act' is shared by other writers in the cosmopolitan tradition. See, for example, Anderson (1998, p. 276), Clifford (1992, p. 108; 1997, p. 36), and Rabinow (1986, p. 258)

cosmopolitanism. He speaks of a cosmopolitan orientation that "weds a critical openness to the world with a critical loyalty toward the local" (2009a, p. 208), and explains that this orientation as embodied in the lived experiences of people around the world from all backgrounds "illustrate(s) what it means to dwell educationally in the world." (ibid)

Hansen distinguishes two kinds of cosmopolitan attitudes towards universals. "In some iterations," he writes, "cosmopolitanism broadcasts universals and a priori images of human nature. In others, its universal gestures are provisional and emergent from human interaction and dialogue, rather than asserted as a metaphysical foundation" (2010a, p. 2). The latter expresses Hansen's own position in which universal gestures grow out of diversity through processes of cultural creativity. In this view, dialogue and exchange in the shared process of teaching and learning to dwell educationally in the world are what makes cosmopolitanism possible, and not an idea of an underlying, shared nature. In this sense, educational cosmopolitanism is at home with the rooted cosmopolitan emphasis on learning across difference and the agonistic cosmopolitan insistence on the importance of cultural translation.

This emphasis on dwelling educationally brings us to what I consider Hansen's second most significance contribution to the question of universality and difference. I mean his placing of the question of creativity at the center of the debate. The cosmopolitan response to the conditions of the world includes encountering difference, and confronting the tensions and conflicts of the many demands of the world (Hansen 2010b). The attitude that constitutes inhabiting the between is marked by creativity (Hansen, 2010b).

This is significant for a conception of interconnectedness and impermanence. For Hansen, values, that which determines the normative qualities of connections amongst individuals and, consequently, the dynamics of communities, are constantly emerging in and

from situations of encounter. Values are dynamic that way precisely because the world is interconnected and impermanent. That Hansen presents creativity as the appropriate response to the conditions of the world is very telling about what he assumes to be the nature of such conditions. The picture of the world as interconnected and impermanent for Hansen is one of both possibilities for the old to be preserved, although not for ever, as well as the new to emerge, although never radically disconnected from the continuum of experience, never *ex nihilo*. And because this double-sided potentiality of the world is mediated in experience by human capacities and a history of cultural traditions, the proper response is creativity. In other words, the world as interconnected and impermanent is the world of the space between, a space to be inhabited creatively.

Inhabiting a world of interconnectedness and impermanence becomes, in Hansen's characterization of the cosmopolitan orientation, "the ways in which people enact in their lives, if not in so many words, reflective openness to the new fused with reflective loyalty to the known" (2011, p. 62), and this translates into creativity at three levels of culture: anthropological, "where communities reconstruct practices or ideals" (p.63); cultures of art, "in which new forms and techniques evolve" (ibid.); and at the level of individual self-cultivation.

In his chapter on creativity, Hansen writes that a distinctively cosmopolitan orientation is marked by the "ability to traverse the space between the far and the near, the general and the particular, the universal and the neighborhood" (2011, pp. 69-70). He offers a picture of cosmopolitan mindfulness of the world through accounts of the lives and work of Herodotus, Ibn Battuta, Ibn Khaldun, and Michel de Montaigne and their critical appreciation of 'this great world of ours' (Hansen, 2011, p. 66). Hansen describes them as "loyal to home, to all that gave them their start in life, to all that allows them to have a reflective standpoint in the first

place...[while] able to take seriously different perspectives, mores, and philosophies of life...they learn *from* and *with* the world they observe" (p. 70). The mark of these cultural generative exemplars, according to Hansen, was the capacity to traverse the world through the continuities between home and the new, while also appreciating genuine breaks and learning from that which is genuinely different.

Hansen calls his philosophy *educational* cosmopolitanism because he identifies in the movements that take place in learning, when enacted in certain ways, the features of a cosmopolitan orientation towards the world. When learning something new, we do not abandon wholesale our previous beliefs and understandings in exchange for a new perspective. Rather, from the place of our previously held beliefs and understandings, we open ourselves to something new. In the process we change, but the transformation takes place in continuum that allows for both personal and cultural integrity to coexists with the entrance of the new. The traversing of this space of continuity, the space between opposing points *is* the cosmopolitan orientation for Hansen. And the constant journeying that this orientation, in its dynamism, leaves room for contradictory positions to be held at once, what the logic of the excluded middle would condemn. "'You are with us *or* against us': how endless is the grim history of this expression," writes Hansen, "'You are with us *and* against us': here is a provocative adage closer to the cosmopolitan ideal. It means people do what they can to support one another as they strive to cultivate lives of meaning" (2011, p. 88).

II.6. Elements of a Cosmopolitan Education

As discussed in the introductory chapter, there is no final consensus on the meaning of cosmopolitanism. The idea comes in many strands, with many faces. With respect to education,

the picture looks no less convoluted. In 2008, Hansen concluded that "[w]ith few exceptions…scholars across the disciplines who have examined cosmopolitanism have yet to come to grips with its educational significance" (2009a, p. 206). The exceptions Hansen mentions are Gunesch (2004), Heater (2002), and Nussbaum (1997a). This diagnosis refers not only to disagreement on matters of curriculum and pedagogy, but especially to the fact that philosophical debate has remained largely within the discussion of *cosmopolitanism* and *education* and has only began to address the question of *cosmopolitan education*. Since Hansen made that statement a number of proposals have been offered, including Hansen's own (see Hansen, 2011; Todd, 2008b). But the debate on what counts as cosmopolitan education remains open.

Some educational scholars envision cosmopolitan education as a synonym for global citizenship education, conceived as an alternative to traditional, nationalist civic education (Banks, 2008; Bredo, 2007; Golmohamad, 2009; Kodelja, 2011), while others uphold it as an approach to education spanning all subjects and levels of instruction, inside an outside formal schooling (Appiah, 2008a; Hansen, 2010c, 2011; Nussbaum, 1997a; Todd, 2010). Perhaps a useful framework for considering different cosmopolitan education proposals is Scheffler's (2001) theses of cosmopolitanism about justice and cosmopolitanism about culture (Waks, 2009a). The thesis about justice states that the bounds of justice ought to extend globally; the thesis about culture states that individuals can cultivate ways of life not tied to national or ethnic communities (Waks, 2009a). In this section I explore the literature through the lens of these theses. I focus on the theories introduced above: cosmopolitan universalism, agonistic cosmopolitanism, rooted cosmopolitanism, and educational cosmopolitanism.

II.6.a. Critical Thinking, Narrative Imagination and Multicultural Humanities

The cosmopolitan universalism of Nussbaum is charged with rejecting local allegiances. In her defense, Amartya Sen (2002) appeals to the distinction between *primary* allegiance to humanity and *exclusive* allegiance to humanity. He identifies the problem critics complain about (he addresses in particular Bok, 2002) not with primary allegiance placed at the level of *humanity as a whole*, but with *exclusive* allegiance at any level. Consider how problematic it would be to hold allegiance to family exclusively, leaving close friends and fellow city dwellers outside of our moral concern, or to nation exclusively, and failing to give priority to one's child over an unknown compatriot.

A "cosmopolitan universalist education," as Leonard Waks (2009a, p. 589) refers to Nussbaum's educational project, would not entail a systematic dissolution of local allegiances. It would, however, represent a serious challenge to nationalism as the purpose of citizenship education. The anti-nationalist spirit in the cosmopolitan universalist proposal is eloquently captured by Papastephanou (2002), when she writes that "Nussbaum proposes that we turn to the educational ideal of cosmopolitanism in order to combat, at a practical-political level, the resurgent nationalisms and, at a theoretical level the ideologies that block the pathway to cross-cultural encounters." (p. 70)

Waks (2009a) describes a cosmopolitan universalist education as including a kind of global curriculum featuring literary works from around the world and presumably an education in world history. However, beyond specific curricular proposals, what is perhaps most characteristic of the project is its emphasis on two virtues: critical examination of life and the cultivation of the narrative imagination (see Nussbaum, 1997a). The idea is that what connects human beings across differences is a shared set of conditions and capacities, a shared nature.

Hope in the possibility of establishing global justice, in this view, resides in the fact that it is within our capacities to overcome the conditions that lead us to prejudice and parochialism. Critical examination of one's life is a method for cultivating our rational and moral capacities inherent in human nature. This, Papastephanou (2002) tells us, corresponds to the cognitive dimension of the cosmopolitan attitude. The other dimension is the affective, to be cultivated through narrative imagination. The idea of narrative imagination entails that even when we can posit the equality and dignity of all humans on rational, moral grounds, and even when we can successfully set up institutions that support these principles, we still will need an affective dimension to sustain our connections (this is Nussbaum's point in response to Elaine Scarry, see Nussbaum, 2002b, p. 139). Nussbaum's proposal includes the cultivation of a narrative imagination as a practice to sustain the ideal of a moral global community. "Identification with the other becomes less problematic and difficult when represented in narrative forms of expression than when taught didactically," explains Papastephanou (2002, p. 71).

The heart of the cosmopolitan universalist education project lies in the way in which the cognitive and the affective senses of belonging to a moral community of humanity are deeply interdependent. "Seeing oneself as cosmopolitan bridges elements in the Socratic examined life and the narrative imagination: the cognitive and the affective," writes Papastephanou (2002), "it encourages a re-examination of one's life through the reconstruction of the other's standpoint in one's imagination: it elevates this to the level of conscious existential choice." (p. 71)

As one would expect, an educational vision that emphasized critical examination of one's life (self examination and examination of one's values and culture) and narrative imagination — an educational vision rooted in the spirit and tradition of Stoicism— would be an education steeped in the study of the humanities. In *Cultivating Humanity,* Nussbaum in fact recommends a

program of multicultural humanities. Bredo (2007) refers to an argument by Jeremy Waldron in support of Nussbaum's cosmopolitan universalist education. Waldron argues against the idea that universalism will "rob us of our concreteness and immediacy" (McDonough and Feinberg, 2003, p. 23, in Bredo, 2007, p. 448), a notion founded on "an idealized notion of particular communities as isolated, bounded, coherent entities" (Bredo, 2007, p. 448), and insisting that in fact communities are formed "from varied peoples and cultures, such as by conquest, migration, mutual exchange, and so on" (ibid). A cosmopolitan universalist education takes the nature of culture and community as always "porous, hybrids and mix-ups" (Costa, 2005, p. 251). A curriculum rich in the multicultural humanities would enable individuals to identify with the shared history of humanity and find a sense of self that enables them to creatively imagine the different other morally. "Cultural cosmopolitanism," writes Costa in reference to the philosophies of Waldron and Nussbaum, "sees individuals as capable of having a coherent sense of self and a fulfilling life without relying exclusively on the framework provided by the culture of one single community." (2005, p. 251)

II.6.b. Agonistic Engagement, Endurance of Dissonance, and Cultural Translation

Papastephanou endorses Nussbaum's proposals for a cosmopolitan education as enthusiastically as anyone, but she warns that "[i]f there is a definable human nature in which all of us participate despite contingent differences, we are one step away from evaluating cultures on the basis of how close they are to that 'original design of humanity'" (2002, p.74), expressing a concern shared widely by scholars of cosmopolitan education. The fear is that an education based on the cultivation of cognitive and affective capacities according to a universal nature, would inevitably tend to the promotion of sameness, to the erasure of differences, even when the

original intention for such an education was to cultivate capacities for understanding and communication across differences. Arguing along these lines of the rejection of sameness, Waks (2009a) considers the vision of a *common* cosmopolitan curriculum as unlikely to ever be realized and, in any case, undesirable in many ways. Agonistic approaches to cosmopolitanism, as we have seen, are born of this concern for the pernicious tendency toward sameness perceived as inherent in universalism.

An agonistic cosmopolitan education, then, would not be based on the values of critical examination of life, universal morality and narrative imagination, but rather on the practices of agonistic engagement, endurance of dissonance and cultural translation. Sharon Todd (2010) writes that "through an 'agonistic cosmopolitics' I here argue for a more robust political understanding of what a cosmopolitan orientation to cultural difference can offer education" (p. 213). The accent is on the political. The Stoic practice of critical examination entails confronting the tensions and conflicts inherent to our moral, psychological, political and social lives. But the spirit of Stoic self-examination aims at a contemplative state of tranquility and composure to rise above the tides of tension and conflict. It is from this spirit that we get the colloquial sense of the word "stoic." From the perspective of agonistic pluralism, however, this aim is misguided. As we have learned from Sharon Todd (2010), conflict is intrinsic to a plurality of perspectives and attempts to transcend this are inevitably bound for a denial of the political. This is true of efforts to cultivate a "rational" outlook that putatively transcends differences as it is of efforts to institutionalize sameness through legislation or indoctrination. Todd (2010) describes the many competing voices of a pluralistic society as potentially causing an "unbearable dissonance" (p. 214). The agonistic cosmopolitan response, as we have seen, will not seek to silence these dissonant voices and enforce harmony. Instead, this kind of cosmopolitanism aims to foster

endurance of dissonance. “So the point of a cosmopolitical project,” Todd writes, “is not to make the dissonance between these different articulations [of universal claims] disappear but rather to make them audible” (p. 225). In cosmopolitan universalism, the attitude is to model the ideals of cooperation and harmony in one's behavior, even when such harmony might contain internal tensions; in agonistic cosmopolitics, behavior seeks to embody specific political interests, but with awareness of its interplay within a larger cosmopolitical order. The goal is for both approaches to achieve the possibility of living together in justice, peacefully, creatively, and well in this one world we share. Agonistic cosmopolitics, however, approaches the task without pretense of harmony, but simply embracing the tensions native to any political situation in a culturally diverse context and directing behavior creatively within that complexity. “I seek to highlight the ways in which such moments of antagonism actually might be understood on ‘cosmopolitical’ terms,” Todd tells us (2010, p. 214). The project of agonistic cosmopolitical education, then, constitutes an educational response to the conditions scholars like Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, and Ulrich Beck have described as “an era of the transformation of the concept of the political.” (Kocznacowics, 2010, p. 143)

For the cultivation of endurance of dissonance cultural translation becomes essential. An education that treats universal claims as always already emerging from processes of translation across cultural differences is an education that presents the dissonance of the world as inevitable. The contrary, an education that presents the world as harmonious whole, is an education that regards dissonance as anomaly. The result of the former is a tendency to respond creatively to dissonance, to politically include the groups and individuals perceived as sources of dissonance. The result of the latter is a tendency to suppress or exclude sources of dissonance; it projects a world of allies and enemies. Antagonism is inherent to the political, but as we know very well, it

can lead to violence and cruelty. In response to this, Todd proposes that we "channel social antagonism into democratically amenable forms of conflict [agonism]" (2010, p. 218). At the heart of an agonistic cosmopolitical education lies the process of channeling social antagonism into democratic agonism.

Todd works with the example of the debates over wearing Muslim forms of dress in schools. She notices that such debates often focus on "how their clothing acts as an affront to supposedly universal liberal democratic sensibilities of freedom and equality, with very little concern for how these women and girls interpret and signify freedom and equality through their adherence to religious and/or cultural tradition" (2010, p. 225). From an agonistic cosmopolitical perspective, Todd argues, the educational response to a situation like that would be to listen to the voices of Muslim girls (by no means homogeneous, by the way), to hear the "voices that refuse to sing along to a harmonious tune composed by others" (2010, p. 225-226), and this requires endurance of dissonance. She makes the point that universal claims "are always incomplete and actually depend on dissonant voices for their re-articulation" (2010, p. 227). A sustained practice of cultural translation between diverging articulations of universal claims of liberty and equality can offer a genuine education in democratic political participation.

II.6.d. Deep Personal Interests and Intercultural Contacts

Rönnström (2011) writes: "The cosmopolitan challenge in Appiah's words can be understood as an educational challenge, that is, to equip people formed in and loyal to local communities 'with ideas and institutions that will allow us to live together as the global tribe we

have become' (Appiah, 2006, p. xiii)" (p. 3). We are of this world, and yet, rooted in particular communities. This double-stranded nature of global citizenship, as conceived in the rooted cosmopolitanism of Appiah (2008a), has an important implication in terms of justice and, in turn, for education.

Rooted cosmopolitans are committed to the idea of extending our moral obligations to the whole of humanity while allowing room for special obligations to fellow members of family, groups and communities. Addressing the question of the dynamics between universal and special obligations, Waks (2009a) highlights the distinction between ethics and morality suggesting, with Appiah, that assuming morality always trumps ethics leads to a distorted picture of our moral and ethical lives. The whole point of a rooted cosmopolitanism is to confront and wrestle with the tension between ethics and morals, rather than dissolving the tension by means of a practical algorithm. This is particularly poignant in a cosmopolitan context, because under a strictly universalist conception of justice the moral demands of suffering fellow humans in the world, if taken seriously in our present conditions, would leave no room at all for the flourishing of an ethical life. That kind of logic is fertile ground for the construction of ideals, whose place ought not to be denied or minimized. However, in reality, morals do not trump ethics, and even the most committed and embattled revolutionary cannot restore justice to the world in a single stroke of heroic self-sacrifice. In reality, she must give expression to her commitments with discipline and patience, over sustained periods of time, and presumably see her life come to an end before her ideals are fully realized. A real moral commitment needs ethics to sustain a life that is meaningful and dynamic in pursuit of values. Hansen (2009a), for example, accounts for this holding of ethics and moral in tension in terms of philosophy as the art of living as

educational outlook on life and the world, which he describes as fusing moral and personal growth with the critique of social institutions (see p. 207).

One important implication emerges from the centrality of ethics to the rooted cosmopolitan project: the importance of deep personal interests (see Waks, 2009a). The way we learn to live harmoniously together in this shared world, Appiah argues, is not by means of agreement on fundamental values and principles, but by getting used to one another and sharing interests. When individuals and groups share an interest that demands specific action, they can collaborate even when their motivations differ. "It is easier in practice to agree about what should be done (for example, preventing war or environmental degradation) than about why," writes Waks (2009a, p. 594), and refers to one of Appiah's classic quotable lines: "Agreements do not wear their maxims on their sleeves" (2006, p. 84). We might not agree on values, but we can share, exchange and learn from one another and enter into each other's ethical lives. Our concerns for distant others are rooted in real relations (Waks, 2009a). It is important here to mention that for Appiah, as for Nussbaum, the narrative imagination is an essential dimension of communities and our relations with one another. "We wouldn't recognize a community as human if it had no stories, if its people had no narrative imagination" (2008b, p. 158). Sharing stories is one of the ways in which we coordinate our normative responses to the world (Appiah, 2006, 2008b).

Under a rooted cosmopolitan curriculum, then, students would be encouraged to cultivate deep personal interests, in part for the purpose of establishing meaningful points of contact with people across the globe who might share those interests, but also to have stories to tell about one's life and culture. The point is that without deep roots in a culture, in an interest, not much is

brought to the table of intercultural exchange. Waks dubs this approach "intercultural exchange education" (2009a, p. 596).

Scholars have articulated this aspect of a cosmopolitan education in terms of hospitality. The idea is that one of the prerequisites for practicing hospitality is to have a home into which one can welcome the other (Gregoriou, 2004; Hansen, 2009a). Deep roots in one culture and deep personal interests thoroughly explored and cultivated constitute such a home. In the spirit of developing the resources for hospitality, Hansen (2011) recommends a cosmopolitan curriculum grounded on the thorough learning of one cultural tradition (home), supplemented by deep understanding of one other cultural tradition (deep understanding of an other),[16] as supposed to a sampling of as many cultural perspectives as possible (a kind of Walt Disney's *It's a small world* vision of multicultural curriculum).

The rooted cosmopolitan education emphasis on intercultural exchange entails a valuing of culture, but it differs from the multiculturalist attitude of regarding culture as a value in itself. In Appiah, as in most cosmopolitan writers, we find a celebration of diversity, not only amongst individuals from different cultures sharing time and space, but also within families and individuals whose sources of cultural richness are eclectic (2008a, p. 84). However, Appiah believes that modern cosmopolitanism values diversity of culture "not because cultures matter in themselves, but because people matter, and culture matters to people" (p. 88). As explained before, he believes that diversity is important because we are fallible and we need difference to learn and grow. Diversity makes societies more resilient, more robust, and more dynamic. An implication for this instrumentalist view on culture for education would be that cultural

16 Hansen develops a conception of culture in three levels: socio-linguistic communities, communities of art or artfulness, and personal cultivation (see Hansen 2011, p. 17, p. 65, pp. 85-86)

perspectives are not to be studied as inert objects of admiration and critique, but explored as tools, means and grounds for human interaction. Accordingly, Appiah proposes the promotion of study abroad and assumes that formal education is administered by local institutions (Appiah, 2008a, Waks, 2009a).

II.6.e. A Cosmopolitan Orientation of Cultural Creativity and World Inhabitance

David Hansen's cosmopolitanism wears the mark of its origin on its nametag. He calls it "educational cosmopolitanism" because it is less concerned with the situation of the relationship of a citizen to a state in a globalized world than with the circumstances of a person *learning to inhabit the world*. Because educational cosmopolitanism is about this existential aspect of education, it focuses on the aesthetic, ethical and moral dimensions of inhabitance, including encounters with others and the dynamics of culture. Hansen's philosophical project proceeds from the task of elucidating the contours of what he calls a "cosmopolitan orientation" (Hansen et al, 2009, p. 588), toward the work of articulating a vision of education.

Waks (2009a) describes Hansen's conception of a cosmopolitan orientation as one which "spurs learners to 'reconceive and re-imagine creative possibilities' in the multicultural situation: destabilizing as well as preserving cultural genres, refashioning while conserving personal integrity (p. 596). Waks calls Hansen's project "cultural hybrid education" (ibid). I find the label somewhat misleading in that it implies that the purpose of a cosmopolitan education is to produce cultural hybrids in contrast to culturally pure forms, but that is not the end of Hansen's project. Cultural hybridity is, rather, the starting point. Hansen's insistence on cultural creativity as central to a cosmopolitan orientation is an expression of the recognition that cultural purity is

a myth, and that creativity is constitutive of learning and dwelling meaningfully in the world. In Hansen's own words:

> "A cosmopolitan orientation…positions [people] to dwell meaningfully in the tension-laden, often paradoxical realm of being both destabilizers and preservers of culture. Individuals and communities destabilize culture every time they learn something genuinely new and different. But they can preserve the beating heart and the vibrant mind of culture by being self-conscious and critical in that very process" (2009a, p. 206).

The constant mixing and mutual influence of cultures represent the conditions, not the end of an educational cosmopolitanism.

Hansen's formulation of cosmopolitanism as "reflective openness to the new, combined with reflective loyalty to the known" (2010a, p. 6) entails the recognition that local cultures already exist in a larger world that is not strange. It implies that within the local, a path to cosmopolitanism can be found, albeit germinal and nascent. And that it is in fact through the event of encounter with difference that the cosmopolitan orientation can be developed. Since this development takes place from local conditions, it emerges in unique ways in different cultural contexts. A Hansean cosmopolitan education program, then, would include a deep commitment to the local. Rather than introducing cosmopolitan values as decontextualized universals, it would constantly engage in the work of discovering and articulating cosmopolitan values already operative in the local. This is a principle that Hansen models in his writings: he develops his philosophy of cosmopolitan education by finding cosmopolitan themes and tropes in often unexpected social scientific, literary and philosophical sources.

Hansen explicitly argues that his formulation of reflective loyalty to the known combined with a reflective openness to the new does not mean one develops a cosmopolitan identity out of locally rooted identities. Considering, for example, the case of a cosmopolitan orientation that grows out of the background of a community based on Christian values. One might be tempted

to think of it as "Christian cosmopolitanism." Hansen thinks that is wrong. "[I]t can obscure matters…to qualify cosmopolitanism with national, racial, ethnic, religious and related markers," writes Hansen (2010b, p. 157). "'Western cosmopolitanism,' 'Eastern cosmopolitanism,' 'Black cosmopolitanism,' 'Hispanic cosmopolitanism,' 'Jewish cosmopolitanism,' 'Christian cosmopolitanism': these and other formulations may obfuscate a concept that aspires to do justice to the ways in which people across time and space do not fit cleanly defined boundaries" (ibid). Cosmopolitanism is not an identity, but a *way of holding an identity*. It is not simply a set of values, but a *way of holding values* (Hansen et al, 2009).

Quoting Fojas (2005), Hansen reminds us that cosmopolitanism is most meaningful in practice, in context (2010b, p. 156). This is precisely because cosmopolitanism functions as an orientation applied to particular cultures entering in contact with other cultures. As a stand-alone doctrine in the abstract it readily degenerates into universalism. If cosmopolitanism is grounded in the emerging shared values and cultures that result from the encounter with difference, it must resist sameness. At the same time, part of cosmopolitanism's appeal is its instrumental value for cooperation across differences. Sometimes diversity and harmony are in fact conflicting values and a requirement for creativity in engaging with difference is the ability to hold the values of diversity and harmony reflectively.

This reflective holding of values eludes, once again, practical algorithmic solutions. Because of this, Hansen's vision of a cosmopolitan education is intimately connected with the idea of teaching as artful practice mutually implicated with the idea of philosophy as the art of living. Hansen's educational cosmopolitanism offers a vision that fuses the idea of education, the good life, and world inhabitance into one coherent, dynamic orientation (see Hansen, 2011).

Waks (2009b) criticizes Hansen's insistence on creativity as central to cosmopolitanism. "Hansen," Waks writes, "appears to take the inherent value of examining and assessing situations and creating novel responses for granted, making him vulnerable to the charge of ethnocentrism, of uncritically accepting the values of liberal modernity" (2009b, p. 217). Waks wonders if "it is always a good thing for young people to be incessantly confronted with critical questions about their forms of life and ways of doing things" (2009b, p. 218), and points to the value of "a relatively stable background of custom and habit" (ibid) against which to address young people's daily concerns, "with questions regarding that background raised only when unavoidable" (ibid). He concludes that "Hansen does not see this as a choice on offer. The corrosive force of cultural variability is a given. Traditional groups (such as the Amish, or traditional Jews) might not agree, and we shouldn't just beg the question against them." (ibid)

But for Hansen, the cosmopolitan orientation is not a permanent condition: "[I]t is impossible to try to be open at all times to everything new, or loyal at all times to everything known. To try to be permanently open dissolves life, while trying to be permanently loyal petrifies it" (2010c, p.7). The cosmopolitan orientation functions, rather, as an artful disposition to be invoked under appropriate conditions. In this sense Hansen agrees with Waks. The difference is that Hansen believes, I think rightly, that the moments when background assumptions need to be questioned, the appropriate conditions for adopting a cosmopolitan orientation, are a much more common occurrence than Amish or traditional Jews might suppose. The double gesture of openness and loyalty does leave room for a way of life deeply rooted in tradition. What it does not offer is the option of inhabiting a tradition unreflectively. The question here, again, is what constitutes unavoidable questions about a background of customs and habits or, put differently, what counts as reflection in the ways we uphold loyalty to the

known. These are questions that in a philosophy committed to dwelling educationally in the world need to be answered in the situation of encounter with difference and cannot be determined a priori. That being said, the point of educational cosmopolitanism is the recognition that there are limits to the stability of any background of custom and habit and that young people need to learn how to cope creatively with cultural variability, even if their chosen approach to coping entails tenacious work to preserve traditional ways of life.

Chapter III. Impermanence and Interconnectedness in Normative Terrains.

III.1. Introduction

Cultivating a cosmopolitan orientation towards the world requires mindfulness and appreciation of people in distant places, of their values and ways of life, and of how our actions affect them. In times of globalization, the unfathomable complexity of the world knocks at our door on a daily basis, and we cannot avoid it. Or rather, cosmopolitans claim, we should not try to avoid it, but engage in contacts across difference, grow from them, and sometimes simply learn to endure them. The educational philosophical literature on cosmopolitanism provides an array of proposals for how education, broadly conceived, can constitute a response to the challenges of globalization, and prepare individuals and communities to make lives of meaning and value, to find a home in a world ever more intensely impermanent and interconnected.

In this chapter, I begin to sketch out my own vision of a cosmopolitan educational response to the question of world inhabitance, to borrow Hansen's suggestive rendition of the idea of cosmopolitanism (2011, pp. 113-114). At the heart of this vision lies the idea of value creation, which I will consider in detail in the next chapter. This chapter, however, continues the task of developing an account of impermanence, interconnectedness, and the nature of values in the world started in the second chapter. While in the previous chapter I approached the task through four cosmopolitan perspectives on values and education, here I consider the idea that through our responses to normative challenges we become co-creators of this value-laden world we inhabit. I deploy Daisaku Ikeda's interpretation of the Mahayana Buddhist *theory of the three perceptions*. The main insight that comes from my reading of Ikeda is that the only way to secure awareness of impermanence and interconnectedness is a self-transformative engagement with the

normative demands of the world. Then, I develop the concepts of impermanence and interconnectedness by means of John Dewey's *contextualism* and *transactional realism*. Finally, I suggest the metaphorical language of *normative terrains* as a way to crystallize this vision.

III.2. Our Responses to the World are Constitutive of the World.

When we speak of inhabiting the world, of being or becoming a citizen of the world, what do we mean by "the world," what kind of word are we referring to? The idea of world (*kosmos*) is implicit in cosmopolitanism. At a most basic level, cosmopolitanism is an orientation towards the world; it is concerned with it and with ways of dwelling meaningfully in it. Insofar as cosmopolitanism constitutes a response to globalization, it paints a picture of a world in which the facts of this condition must be accounted for. Acknowledgement of facts is constitutive of a thoughtful response. At the same time, a response to the world does more than that: it *interprets* it. We can speak, then, of a cosmopolitan world or cosmopolitan worlds (considering the many faces of cosmopolitanism discussed in the introductory chapter) as the interpretive pictures of the world that highlight the generative potential for world citizenship inherent in conditions of globalization.

When Seyla Benhabib writes that cosmopolitanism has become "one of the keywords of our times" (2006, p. 17) or when Ulrich Beck argues that "the human condition has itself become cosmopolitan" (2006, p. 2), they mean, in part, that the ideal of the global citizen has become one of the lenses through which we interpret the world. This is what a host of scholars refer to as "the cosmopolitan condition" (Beck, 2006; Beck and Szneider, 2006; Delanty, 2006; Pieterse, 2006; Strand, 2010a). As the discussions of the previous chapter should make evident, such grand-sounding language should not be read as suggesting a complete, ready-made picture of the world.

Cosmopolitans know that providing an interpretive picture of the globalized world is no easy task (Papastephanou, 2005). What is more, as we considered in the previous chapter, the real challenge of a cosmopolitan education is not to merely present a compelling picture of the human condition in times of globalization as entangled in morally charged webs of interconnected and rapid social change. The challenge is to cultivate in individuals and communities a moral, aesthetic, intellectual and political orientation to respond to these conditions creatively.

Reactions to globalization, as supposed to thoughtful responses, however, are also constitutive of the nature of our world. Many scholars refer to the recent resurgence of nationalism in many parts of the world (Kodelja, 2011; Mignolo, 2010; Rizvi, 2011) and the conflicts, violence and cultural fracturing that result (Bredo, 2007; Hansen, 2009a; Kodelja, 2011; Papastephanou, 2011) as examples of reactions to globalization. Parallel to globalizing trends and anti-globalizing reactions, some scholars note signs of what they call "cosmopolitanism from the ground" in practices and ways of life, the rise of NGOs, and organizations like the World Social Forum (Gregoriou, 2004; Hansen, 2009a, 2010b; Mignolo, 2010). Some scholars conclude that these changes constitute deep transformations of Western democracy, conceptions of sovereignty, world order, and modes of membership (Bredo, 2007; Golmohamad, 2009; Hansen, 2009a; Kocznacowicz, 2010; Papastephanou, 2005; Roth and Burbules, 2011). The cosmopolitan picture of the world refers not only to conditions of globalization, but also to the many reactions and responses embodied in ideas, practices, and institutional changes.

We could in principle conceive a picture of the world that allows for interconnectedness independent of any form of impermanence: a world where all things are connected forming a

structurally fixed whole. Within such a fixed structure, all things have their proper place determining the nature of the kinds of connections each thing has with everything else. In this picture, impermanence is allowed only at a superficial level, only as long as change does not alter the fundamental order of things. Conversely, we can imagine a picture of the world where impermanence operates independently of interconnectedness: a world where things would change constantly, but only by virtue of their internal constitution and not as a result of contacts with other things.

The universalist who regards values as immune to the constant change and cross-contamination that characterizes the natural world, embodies a version of the conception of impermanence and interconnectedness as independent characteristics of reality. The thoroughly non-cognitivist about values, who believes values are subjective and exist in a separate realm from the objective world of facts, embodies another version. The cosmopolitan view I offer here, grounded on a naturalism about values that sees interconnectedness and impermanence as thoroughly pervasive, stands in opposition to both these views. The following discussions on Ikeda and Dewey are devoted to articulating this view.

III.3. A Strong Conception of Impermanence and Interconnectedness

Impermanence means that we and our circumstances change, and with that so do the skills, habits, institutions, traditions, and values on which we rely to cope with daily challenges, make sense of our circumstances, and find meaning in our lives. If from the encounter with difference no change would result, there would be no real interconnectedness, at least not in the sense the idea carries in cosmopolitanism. By interconnectedness we do not merely mean that beings and things exist in a shared environment allowing for the possibility of contact. We mean

more; we mean that in the possibility of contact (and here I mean contact in a broad sense that includes the metaphorical, the virtual, and the imaginative as well), beings and things affect change on one another. Impermanence and interconnected are mutually implicated. From a cosmopolitan point of view, a satisfactory description of an encounter with difference must include reference to the fact that such encounters change us and, what's more, that there are ways of responding to the situation that are more creative than others.

For things to be impermanent is for each actual thing to also be potentially something else, to count actuality and potentiality as irreducible aspects of reality. Potentiality is the dimension of existence in relation to possible but unrealized connections in the world. Even the seemingly unchanging, like a true mathematical proposition, acquires an aspect of potentiality depending on context. Five plus seven is twelve; this is actually true. It is also, potentially, a reference to a passage in Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, or a good example for a lesson; or it is potentially an instrumentally valuable piece of knowledge at the grocery store. It all depends on the situation; it depends on context. The principles of impermanence and interconnectedness are central to many aspects of Buddhist philosophy including conceptions of self and self-cultivation, theories of causation, soteriology, conceptions of the relationship of humanity with nature, and more. One important articulation of impermanence, interconnectedness, and their interdependence is found in the *theory of the three perceptions*, central to Mahayana Buddhist ontology and epistemology in general, and to Ikeda's philosophy of life in particular.

The theory of the three perceptions is based on the idea that "in Buddhist philosophy…it is not considered possible to reach an understanding [of complex phenomena]…by examining them from a single fixed viewpoint" (Ikeda, 1982, p. 49). Originally developed by the founder of

the T'ien-T'ai school of Mahayana Buddhism, Chih-i (538-596),17 the theory of the three perceptions is designed as an epistemological approach based on multiple viewpoints.

Chih-i is a towering figure in Chinese Buddhism, and the doctrines of the T'ien-T'ai school (Jp. *Tendai*) constitute the religious and philosophical foundation for much of the developments in Buddhist thought in medieval Japan.18 Through his teaching of the three perceptions, Chih-i expanded the traditional Madhyamika (Middle Way) doctrine of the two truths —"mundane worldly truth" and "supreme truth"19— into what sometimes is translated as "provisional perception" (Jp. *Ketai*), "perception of the latent" (Jp. *Kūtai*), and "perception of the middle way" (Jp. *Chūtai*). In this section I introduce Ikeda's interpretation of the three perceptions and explore its significance for the picture of the world here under development.

III.3.a. Provisional Perception (Ketai)

17 Because the concepts in this theory have been developed over a period of more than two millennia in a number of Asian languages and through multiple translations that, in some cases, share surprisingly little common vocabulary, we find several designations for each concept. The theory of the three perceptions is sometimes referred to as the three truths or the threefold truth. Within that theory, each of the three elements has multiple renditions as well. What Ikeda calls "Provisional Perception" or "*ke*," is sometimes described as "worldly mundane truth," "conventional truth," "temporary existence," or "impermanence." What Ikeda feels more comfortable describing simply as "*kū*" (he is not entirely satisfied with any of the available translations), is sometimes rendered as "supreme truth," "truth of supreme meaning," "emptiness," "Void," "non-substantiality," or "nothingness." Just as Ikeda prefers to stick to the original Japanese, many authors rely on the original Sanskrit version: "Sūnyatā." The concept of the "Middle Way" is sometimes rendered "Middle Path," and Ikeda often uses the Japanese "chū." In working with sources, I try to keep the vocabulary of my commentary consistent with the quoted passages. Once the language of Ikeda is introduced, I try to use the Japanese *ke*, *kū*, and *chū* unless working around cited passages that use different language. In general, I use the different wordings for the same concept interchangeably.

18 Founders of several schools were originally trained Tendai monks, including Hōnen (1122-1212), founder of the Pure Land school; Shinran (1173-1263), founder of the True Pure Land school; Dōgen (1200-1253), founder of the Sōtō Zen school, and Nichiren (1222-1282), founder of Nichiren Buddhism, the philosophical tradition from which Ikeda writes.

19 See Nagarjuna's *Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way* (Skt. Mulamadhyamakakarika) Chapter twenty-four, verse eight: "All Buddhas depend on two truths/ In order to preach the Dharma to sentient beings./ The first is the worldly mundane truth./ The second is the truth of supreme meaning."

When we look at the world from the perspective of provisional perception, or *ketai*, we regard things in their conventional, temporary nature, what Nagarjuna (ca. 150-250), founder of the Madhyamika tradition, calls "mundane worldly truth." Candrakirti (ca. 560-640), for example, described it as "like a covering of ignorance which obscures the true nature of reality" and as "consist[ing] of that which is conceptualized and understood through the medium of language and discriminative, cognitive thought" (Swanson 1989, p. 2). Even though "supreme truth" lies beyond the realm of language and conceptualization, there is a sense in which words and concepts when employed with skill can be "expedient means," which point to the truth and lead to it. Provisional perception is the perspective of the world represented through words and concepts. It does not capture the nature of reality but it can be employed as expedient means to reveal truths that lie beyond concepts.

The conceptual representation of the world provided by *ketai* reveals things in the actuality of their physical existence. Ikeda writes, "appearance, which is equated with Provisional Perception means all things we can detect with our senses…and I include in this minute particles and the like, which we can see only with electron microscopes, as well as invisible phenomena such as sound waves" (1982, 51). To put it simple, *ke* in *ketai* refers to the physical world.20

The character *ke*, in *ketai* can be translated as "the provisional," "temporary existence," or "impermanence." Buddhism characterizes physical phenomena with an emphasis on the dynamic and transitory nature of reality: "In Buddhist thinking, all these things are temporary or

20 Naturalism, a philosophical tradition that has enjoyed a considerable revival in the last few decades, considers the entirety of existence without remainders to be encompassed within what we call the physical. Some versions of naturalism interpret the physical as that which is accounted for by the natural sciences. Other forms of naturalism regard the physical as encompassing all of experience, even experiences of what has traditionally been considered as not physical, like the experience of values. When Ikeda describes the domain of *ke* as that of the physical world, he means the physical in the broader sense that encompasses all of experience. I interpret Ikeda's position as naturalistic in this sense.

transitory, and they are constantly undergoing change, being brought together or dispersed by causes and conditions" (Ikeda, 1982, p. 51). Our lives, as grounded in the physicality of the human body, also exist in a state of constant change: "Buddhism emphasizes the continuous change going on in human life, pointing out that our perceptible lives on earth are constantly undergoing birth, maturation, destruction, and latency…'all is in flux and there is no permanence'" (Ikeda, 1982, p. 51). The impermanence of the world is ubiquitous: "the more deeply we go into the physical aspects of the cosmos, the more convincing the evidence of unceasing change and flux everywhere" (ibid., p. 53).

Swanson (1989) clarifies the connection between "conventional" and "temporary existence:" "Our phenomenal world has temporary reality in the sense of an integrated, co-arising, interdependent relationship of causes and conditions. This is called 'conventional' existence" (p. 5). When we regard the world through conceptual representation, we see things in their actuality, which Buddhism regards as defined by impermanence. The moral import of this insistence on the impermanence of all things is the idea that we cannot escape this condition. Ikeda raises the normative question about impermanence, "how do we cope with the world around us? Do we flee from it? Do we challenge it?" (1982, p. 51), and immediately answers: "Fleeing does not accord with Buddhism, for it implies that the truth of impermanence is somehow repugnant" (1982, p. 51). "Actually," he adds, "the realization of the constantly changing nature of all things is the key to true happiness, for it means that no matter how bad a situation is, it will change. No misfortune is permanent; no evil insuperable" (1982, p. 51). From this perspective, happiness is constitutive of the wisdom to understand this principle of impermanence; such understanding entails the capacity to respond to it creatively.

Ikeda, like Dewey, as we will see, does not indulge in sentimentalist celebration of change. Quite to the contrary, in fact, his writings exhibit an acute sensitivity to the sufferings associated with the impermanence of the human condition. The Buddhist tradition is especially notorious for its dramatic portrayal of impermanence. As is well known, Buddhism places great emphasis on mindfulness of the present moment, and for this the tradition relies on an identification of the inconceivably fleeting with the unfathomably eternal. This comes with two implications working in opposite directions. On the one hand, life's continuum persists through death; on the other hand, death takes place at every single instant, through the continuum of life. And this idea of dying at every moment is the crux of the drama of impermanence in Buddhism. Ikeda writes: "Will death, which inevitably comes to each of us, be a time of dignity and honor? Or will we end in pitiful demise? This is completely reliant on how we live our lives right now, today. In that sense, the moment of death truly exists in the present" (2003, p. 104). The logic of the eternity of time contained in every single moment, as shown in Ikeda's words, establishes a tight connection between two perfectly commonsensical notions as the impermanence of the present moment and the fact of death, and presents them together, in full make up and costume, ready for drama. The impermanence of life plays the part of death as function immanent to every moment. Values, as impermanent as anything in the world, also perish at every moment.

But besides the figurative sense of death in every moment, the literal instant of death is of momentous significance. Even if we do not believe in the continuation of individual, consciously subjective life after death, we tend to consider the final moment significant perhaps as a testament of character and happiness, as consummation of flourishing or failure thereof. But in

the Buddhist tradition, the moment of death is supremely significant.[21] It is important to understand just how much dramatic force is packed into the fleeting instant. And the intended effect of insisting on such high stakes at every instant is to inspire resolve in our responses to the normative demands of the world. A quotation by Nichiren that Ikeda cites often expresses this eloquently: "When you concentrate the exertions of one hundred millions aeons in a single life-moment, the three inherent properties of the Buddha will become manifest in your every thought and act" (in Ikeda, 1996, p.159). The significance of the impermanence of the moment is that it is logically connected to the creative potential inherent in it. At each instant we die, in a sense, and as life continues, we are born anew at every moment, in a sense. Nichiren's insistence that, with the proper orientation to the world ("efforts"), we born a kind of self that was not there before, a self different from the one that perished a moment prior ("the three inherent properties of the Buddha") points to the connection between impermanence and creative potential.

Ikeda writes: "The Great Commentary on the Abhidharma says that there are 'sixty-five moments in a single snap of the fingers;' a moment in Buddhism, therefore, is almost

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21 Other schools of Buddhism make an even bigger deal about the moment of death. Consider the Pure Land school medieval teachers who instructed soldiers to chant Amida's name in the battle field. Quite an impressive sight that must have been! Consider this quote by Genshin (942-1017), also a Pure Land master: "Child of the Buddha, do you realize that now is your last thought? This single reflection [on the Buddha] at death outweighs the karmic acts of a hundred years. If this instant should pass you by, rebirth [in *samsāra*] will be unavoidable. Now is the time. Reflect on the Buddha single-mindedly, and, and you will surely be born on a seven-jeweled lotus pedestal in the pond of eight virtues in the subtle and wondrous Pure Land of Utmost Bliss in the west." (in Stone 2009, p. 61).

Stone writes: "Although Buddhism in general has held that the last moment of consciousness can influence one's postmortem fate, in the Pure Land tradition, 'right mindfulness at the last moment' (*rinjū shōnen*) was deemed the essential prerequisite to experiencing the *raigō*—[the Buddha] Amitābha's descent, together with his holy retinue, to welcome practitioners at the time of their death and escort them to his Pure Land." (2004, p. 77)

The Lotus Sutra school of Buddhism in general, and Ikeda's own interpretation in particular reject the magical/ritual significance of the moment of death featured in Genshin's words. For Ikeda, the moment of death is significant not because one's intentionality at that one moment can determine fate after death alone, but because the moment of death is the culmination of one's life in the sense that the moral and spiritual condition of life at that moment is the result of one's actions throughout life, as the quote above from Ikeda 2003, p. 104 clearly shows.

inconceivably brief" (2003, p. 109).[22] The Abhidharma and the entire Buddhist canon are filled with paradoxical descriptions of the unconceivable. Such language is double-edged. On the one hand, it offers a form of significant meaning; we have now the *concept* of an instant. But it does this with the wink of an eye, a touch of irony: the concept is presented as inconceivable or 'almost inconceivabl(e)" (ibid.). This is a pointer back to the ineffable, non-conceptual or pre-conceptual quality of experience.

That things are impermanent and thoroughly interconnected is, strictly speaking, beyond our conceptual capacities, but it points beyond the conceivable in a particular direction, and that is significant. Ikeda writes, for example, "Because eternity is an unbroken string of moments—and because each moment is considered the condensation of an entire lifetime—our condition of life at each moment is of supreme importance as it determines the overall course of our lives" (2003, p.109). This is inconceivable. A moment determines the overall course of our lives; which moment? Each one of them. And if two moments pull in different directions? Well, perhaps that tension would be internal to each moment, what else could it mean that "each moment is considered the condensation of an entire lifetime?" (ibid.). But would not that mean that the direction of causation goes the other way around, that the course of our lives determines each moment, as their content? In the end, as we work through the apparent contradictions in the argument (as we seek to dissolve the internal tensions with some interpretive charity mediating), we are likely to end up with the uninteresting conclusion that the course of our lives, our past experiences and our expectations and anticipations of the future shape the quality of the present moment while the succession of present moments shapes the course of our lives. But this is

22 For an insightful commentary on the Abhidharma's concept of momentariness, see Westerhoff, 2010 p. 119, and *passim*.

presented as pointing beyond the triviality of that observation towards the mystery of the creative powers of action in the present moment. Ultimately, Ikeda's interpretation of the Buddhist concepts of impermanence and interconnectedness leads to the conclusion that we come to properly attain mindfulness of the world by means of engaging its normative demands, and this is a kind of action that is self-transformative and ongoing.

III.3.b. Perception of the Latent (Kūtai)

The other side of *ke* is *kū*. In the Madhyamika tradition, it is often called "emptiness," "nothingness," "Void," "non-substantiality," or, in the original Sanskrit, "*sūnyatā*." Ikeda describes *kū* as "the nature and spirit of all things—what is sometimes called *noumenon*" (1982, p. 54). Perhaps concerned about inviting the usual mistake of equating "spirit" with the notion of "soul," Ikeda adds, "[*k*]*ū* is not simply the spirit of human beings. It is the character and essence of all things." The clarification, incidentally, speaks to the history of the concept of *kū*. The idea of non-substantiality as an ontological concept developed as an extension of the concept of *anatman* or no-self, that is, the idea of the non-substantiality of the self. It was not until Nagarjuna that what originally applied only to the self was conceived of as a general feature of existence. The origin of the concept of *kū* is significant for the sense in which it represents the *nature* and *spirit* of things: consider the possibility of an aspect of any thing that is to that thing what "self" is for the human individual. That is the sense of *kū* as the *nature* of a thing. For example, diamond and coal are both made of carbon atoms, but their molecular structures make them drastically different. "*Kū*," Ikeda explains, "is the fundamental nature making diamonds diamonds and coal coal" (1982, p. 55). The nature of diamond and coal lies in the internal relations of their molecular structures, as well as how it relates to other things in the world. In

other words, singularity comes from the complexity of relations internal and external to a thing. What makes a diamond what it is and not something else is, in part, the way it relates to other things in the world, like the fact that it is highly resistant to scratching, that it relates to our vision by means of certain qualities of transparency and brilliance, and that it possesses an extraordinary exchange value, etc. Similarly, our biological endowments are composed of the same basic elements, but the complexity of each individual life and its relations make each of us unique and what constitutes our nature, in the sense of *kū*.

Since our nature, in this sense, is partly constituted relationally, it refers to potentiality. Ikeda writes: "Perhaps the best way to understand this interpretation [of *kū* as potentiality] is to consider that nothing exists except in relation to everything else, which is to say, the totality of the cosmos" (1982, p. 26). The latent potential of an individual resides in unrealized interactions with its surroundings. For Buddhism, it is this aspect of potentiality that constitutes what we understand as the nature of a thing. This is precisely the insight on the dynamics of actuality and potentiality contained in Dewey's notion of transaction, explored later in this chapter.

In Buddhism, the principle that logically connects *kū* with the notion of potential is the principle of *dependent origination* (Jp. *engi*). As mentioned in the introductory chapter, in the *Education Toward Global Citizenship,* Ikeda offers a description of cosmopolitanism in terms of the wisdom to perceive the "interconnectedness" (Jp. *soukansei*) of life. In a later articulation of the same principle, however, in his foreword to Nel Noddings' *Educating Citizens for Global Awareness*, he defines "the ability to perceive the interdependence of all life" as "the wisdom of dependent origination" (2005, p. xi). Wisdom of dependent origination is central to Ikeda's vision of cosmopolitanism because, for Ikeda, our interconnectedness is ontologically primordial, and the concept of an "individual" is derivative, the result of analysis. Or, if we mean

"an individual" in the normative sense of the locus of value creativity and dignity, the individual is an accomplishment of self-formation and refinement in which environmental and social dimension are central. In Buddhism, the emphasis on the interrelatedness of all things is as strong as it gets. In Ikeda's words, this "all-encompassing interrelatedness … forms the core of the Buddhist worldview" (2010, p. 113).

The import of the principle of dependent origination for Ikeda's conception of global citizenship is the centrality of this double-sided nature of our moral lives. On the one hand, what we are depends on our relationships with others; at the same time, our relationships with others depend on our moral character, our well-established moral habits. The wisdom of the global citizen is the capacity to perceive the interconnectedness of all life in this sense: not as an object of detached contemplation, but as the understanding that one's actions in the world have normative effects on others and the actions of others have effects on my life.

A significant implication of the concept of *kū* for the cosmopolitan orientation concerns, precisely, the way we conceive the self that is oriented towards the world. The self for Ikeda is not merely feelings, emotions, beliefs, and desires more or less organized around a sense of identity, bounded by the skin. Such conception would see the history of self as a struggle with obstacles in the world towards the attainment of its own private interests. Ikeda refers to this sense of self as "the lesser self (*shoga*), caught up in the snares of egoism" (1996, p. 161). To reject the lesser self as a final conception of self, does not mean we can completely transcend it. For as long as we remain alive, we have desires directed at the preservation of the organism. Relying on Ikeda, I reject literal interpretations of Buddhist talk of "no-self" and "overcoming all desires and attachments." The classic Sanskrit concept of *anatman*, mentioned above, denotes the negation of *atman*, a notion of transcendent soul central to the Brahmanic religious tradition.

The Buddhist concept of no-self, if we are to preserve it at all in our interpretation of *kū*, is not a down right rejection of any sense of ego or individual, personal identity; rather, it simply denies the existence of a metaphysical self, transcendent from and prior to experience, and unchanging. Even scholars from Buddhist schools that place greater emphasis on the concept of *anatman* subscribe to this tame interpretation[23]. In the concluding chapter I will elaborate on the implications of the concept of *kū* when translated from the realm of self, in the concept of *anatman*, to the realm of culture. Simply because self is constituted relationally as a temporary coming together of causes and conditions, it does not mean that self is merely an illusory attachment to be overcome; analogously, simply because cultural traditions are historical, dynamic and porous, it does not mean that they are mere obstacles that get in the way of the cultural and moral flourishing of individuals and communities

One important implication of this discussion on *kū* is that a valid notion of finding a home in the world must involve the refinement and enlargement of the powers of self. The pursuit of complete transcendence of desire and suffering amounts to a desire to flee the world. This impulse moves in a direction opposite to world inhabitance. The ethos of engagement that characterizes Ikeda's conception of cosmopolitanism aligns itself not with transcendence of self or transcendence of local culture, but with an expansive sense of self and an expansive sense of culture. In the next chapter, I develop this idea using John Dewey's concept of *adjustment*.

For Ikeda, the sense of self as attached to self-identity and selfish desires is " [a] function that leads us to believe in the existence of a permanent self…[it] is the source of identity of the self, operating in the name of self-preservation and expansion." (2003, p. 156). This self represents the function of "distinguish[ing] oneself from others, ... [of] establish[ing] a boundary

23 For an interesting discussion from a scientific naturalistic perspective, see Flanagan, 2011.

between self and other. And it is the source of the drive to preserve oneself...[I]t would be difficult for us to function in the real world if we did not have this capacity." (2003, p. 157)

However, he adds, in accordance to the principle of *ke*:

> "In reality, the self is in constant flux, changing moment to moment, as do our bodies and all other phenomena. Because instinctively we are 'attached' to the self...we sense it as somehow constant…Attachment to this fleeting self becomes problematic, however, when we mistake it for a changeless entity." (2003, p. 156)

An idea of world inhabitance structured around an attachment to the fleeting function of the self, can only develop in the direction of a self-defeating drive for fixity, a myopic and relentless pursuit of values conceived in the self-image of fixity and eternity that, Buddhism claims, are nowhere to be found in this world. "Ultimately" Ikeda claims, "this drive or desire causes suffering." (2003, p. 157)

The rejection of a picture of self as neatly bounded and fixed, however, does not make for the impossibility of the cultivation of values for world inhabitance. The vision of the self that Ikeda recommends is grounded in the Mahayana Buddhist idea of the greater self (*taiga*), "fused with the life of the universe through which cause and effect intertwine over the infinite reaches of space and time" (1996, p. 161). For Ikeda, the idea of the greater self is both descriptive and normative. Ikeda writes, "our lives are not limited to what we ordinarily perceive as the self but encompass other people, the world, and even the universe" (2003, p.106). This view of the greater self as extending through the interconnectedness of all life represents the self as a general function of life. The lesser self, by contrast, represents a comparatively more specific function, pertaining only to the preservation of an individual organism. To see the lesser self as anything more than this specific function constitutes, from a Buddhist standpoint, a form of delusion

leading to suffering.[24] Within the theory of the three perceptions, the concept of the greater self finds expression in the third and last principle, the Middle Way (Jp. *Chū*)

III.3.c. The Middle Way (Chū)

One sense of the Middle Way refers to walking a path avoiding extremes. The extremes from which the Middle Way steers clear are, in Swanson's words, "the affirmation of substantial Being on the one hand ('eternalism'), and nihilistic denial of all existence on the other ('annihilationism')" (1989, p. 5). In this sense, the Middle Way embodies the recognition of provisional perception and perception of the latent as containing aspects of truth, and that moral wisdom entails holding these truths simultaneously. This moral middle ground between extremes resembles the Aristotelian idea of virtue, and the Confucian notion of ethical middle way. There is, however, another dimension to the concept of *chū*, articulated in Ikeda's ontological interpretation of *chū* as essential self.25

[24] In his *The Bodhisattva's Brain*, Owen Flanagan (2011) offers a compelling interpretation of Buddhist metaphysics and ethics from the point of view of naturalism. He makes an insightful confession: that he just cannot see how awareness of the impermanence of everything leads, as Buddhists claim, to the desire to lead a more compassionate life. Flanagan's skepticism reveals just how radical it is the way Buddhism sees impermanence as thoroughly interdependent with interconnectedness. To be deeply aware of the way my own self and everything in the world is in constant flux *entails* an awareness of how my own self is deeply interconnected, in fact it exists as continuously arising together, with other things and beings in the world, and the quality of this awareness itself *is* compassion. This statement, however, should be qualified. I do not mean that the moment one recognizes that things are impermanent, that senses of self, values, and deeply rooted habits that bring relative stability and continuity to our existences are not fixed and unchanging, then a *feeling* of loving compassion for others arises spontaneously. What happens, instead, is that the realization of impermanence is gradual. We come against the illusion of fixity time and again, and we experience this as a breakdown of our ways of being in the world. Now this is not even a complete step in the way of a genuine existential realization, it's merely like lifting a foot off the ground without yet moving it forward and landing it on the ground again. The second half of the step requires a response: "How am I to act, to be in the world, now that I see things are impermanent so?" It turns out responsiveness to the demands of the world and concern for others as involved in the same normative world will be an essential aspect of the response that leads to a fuller, deeper appreciation of impermanence. This is, by the way, also a deepening awareness of interconnectedness as well.

25 Ikeda explicitly makes the point of differentiating *chū* from the Confucian ethical middle way: "the term *middle way*...is [sometimes] considered to be even vaguer than *kū*, and superficial students occasionally confuse it with the Confucian idea of the ethical middle way" (Ikeda, 1982, p. 61).

Ikeda writes that *chū* is "the essential entity of life, which supports the physical aspect and the spiritual aspect, *ke* and *kū*, and contains them both" (1982, p. 61). The "essential entity of life" is *chū* as an ontology of the self, in Ikeda's words: "essential self" (p. 61). According to Ikeda, there is an "enduring self" (1996, pp. 119-127) underlying the all pervasive impermanence and non-substantiality of being. He refers to it as a "continuum, [that] preserves … individual being" (1982, p. 61), and as an "unchanging reality" that makes an individual himself and "keeps him from becoming [someone else]" (p. 61).

Ikeda's language, with words like "essential entity," "essential self," and "unchanging reality" can be misconstrued as positing a transcendent, substantial Being of the kind that the concept of *kū* is supposed to deny. However, Ikeda is quick to point out that the three perceptions are "one reality viewed from three different standpoints, not three separate entities" (1982, p. 63). There is no such thing as an "essential self" or an "unchanging reality" as an ontologically separate entity. "The middle way sustains the tangible and the intangible, *ke* and *kū*, but that is not the whole story of the nature of life. The middle way appears in the tangible, and *it exists in the kū*" (p. 63, emphasis added). The continuum of self that is *chū* exists fully integrated with the impermanence and the non-substantiality of life. Put simply, the Middle Way refers to the standpoint from which we can regard things simultaneously as impermanent and non-substantial. That is the point that Chih-i makes in the *The Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sutra* (Ch. Fa hua hsüan i), when he states that "This threefold truth is perfectly integrated; one-in-three and three-in-one." (Swanson 1989, p. 7). In concurrence with Ikeda's interpretation, Swanson's reminds us that *chū*, in its integration with *ke* and *kū*, must not be understood as transcendent, but that the Middle Way is "manifested in and through and is identical with temporal phenomenal reality, which is again in turn empty of an unchanging substance" (1989, p. 6).

What I mean by integration, and the sense in which Swanson uses the term, can be clarified by means of two contrasting metaphors. When making dough, for example, we mix water and flour until they are thoroughly integrated: they become inseparable and no longer distinguishable. This metaphor captures one aspect of the sense of integration intended here: *chū* is like the dough in that it is composed of *ke* and *kū* in a way that they are inseparable and distinguishable only analytically. The limitation of this metaphor, however, lies in its presupposition that there are original separate ingredients that come to be combined into a whole that is derivative, the outcome of a process of integration. The theory of the three perceptions, however, does not make such a presupposition and in fact it explicitly rejects it. The presupposition in the theory of the three perceptions is that *chū* is original and the distinction between temporary existence and latent potential is the result of analysis. We can think of the relationship amongst *ke, kū,* and *chū* in terms of a second metaphor that captures a sense of integration as original. Consider a cone, for example, as the integration of a circle and a triangle. Circle and triangle are not antecedent to the cone. It is not as if we take a triangle and a circle, put them together, and get a cone. The integration of circle and triangle, the cone itself, is all there is originally. Circle and triangle are aspects that emerge from analysis, from regarding the cone from particular points of view.

What Ikeda tries to do with his interpretation of the middle way as an essential self, I believe, is to preserve the notion of a moral center for the self in a world where everything is changing and all life is interconnected. At the same time, by interpreting *chū* as an "unchanging reality" Ikeda emphasizes the sense in which life is relatively stable and harmonious, and that is what he calls the essential self. The key to understand this notion of essential self is in the distinction between what Buddhism calls the "lesser self" and the "greater self." The "'lesser

self,'" Ikeda writes, is a self "caught up in the snares of egoism," while "the 'greater self,' [is] fused with the life of the universe" (1996, p. 161). *Chū* as essential self is the greater self, which is identified with the totality of life. "What is this larger [greater] self?" Ikeda ponders in an essay titled "The Enduring Self," "It is the basic principle of the whole universe" (1996, p. 123). While everything in the universe exists as impermanent and interdependent, the totality of life as such is relatively stable and harmonious, not by means of transcending impermanence and interdependence, but through it. The reason why Ikeda claims that the "unification of the three truths…transcends verbal expression" (1986, p. 93) is that it refers to the life of the universe as a whole, and there is no such thing as standing outside of it to take the necessary distance for conceptual and linguistic articulation. For Ikeda, understanding of the reality of life is one with the attainment of the greater self as "the openness and expansiveness of character that embraces the suffering of all people as one's own" (1996, p. 162). In other words, understanding of the nature of reality is not achieved by means of detached contemplation, but by means of compassionate engagement.

Impermanence and interconnectedness are ontological concepts. But Ikeda reads their significance as primarily epistemological. The effect of considering things as impermanent and interconnected is the realization of a certain unavoidable *aporia* that confronts *theoria*. The contemplative mind of pure reason, oriented towards the apprehension of things eternal and necessarily true, its paradigmatic object being mathematical propositions, is baffled by the realization that things in the world are never unchanging and never pure, never uncontaminated by external influence. And in this bafflement, it easily flips from eternalism to nihilism. The idea of non-substantiality, apprehended theoretically, simply amounts to a wholesale rejection of eternalism, a recognition that the sorts of things pure reason looks for are nowhere to be found in

this world. This is, paradoxically, a truth of pure reason, something that pertains to the function of *theoria*. We can confirm this phenomenologically: if there is anything in the way of satisfaction in nihilism is the pleasure of knowing one thing for certain, that nothing has ultimate meaning, and this pleasure is a theoretical pleasure in the special sense of being a pleasure of the activity of *theoria*. It is phenomenologically akin to the satisfaction of understanding a mathematical proposition that we know to be true, necessarily.

"Essential," in the context of Lotus Sutra Buddhism, means something quite different from the way we use the word in colloquial speech or even many of the technical senses of the word in Western philosophy. By "essential" we usually mean a theoretical entity and its meaning; this is true for both for transcendentalists who posit them as original (Plato) or the conditions for the possibility of experience (Kant) and for existentialist and pragmatists who regard it as emerging from existence (Dewey, Heidegger). The sense in which the term is employed in Buddhism is, precisely, contrasted to the theoretical. While what is called the *theoretical* teaching (Jp. *shakumon*) is described as a conceptual understanding of reality, the *essential* teaching (Jpp. *hommon*) is described as the kind of understanding that comes from embodying principles in conduct, in practice.[26] The essential self of the middle way is not a separate ontological entity posited as transcending impermanence and interconnectedness, but it refers to the sense of self that comes from living in awareness of impermanence and interconnectedness and yet recognizing that the world does not collapse into nothingness just because eternal, unchanging essences do not lie at the foundations of experience. Put differently, the middle way, the essential self, refer to the perspective of engagement in action that integrates

[26] So, the Lotus Sutra, for example, is divided into the theoretical teaching, encompassing chapters 1 through 14, and the essential teaching, spanning chapters 15 through 28.

both awareness of interconnectedness and awareness of impermanence. What we end up having is a picture of the world as impermanent and interconnected that emerges through and in engagement with the concrete circumstances of the human predicament in the world.

We begin to see that the impermanent and interconnected world depicted by the theory of the three perceptions is the world that reveals itself to an engaged agent. We will see, in the coming section, that such is the world of John Dewey's philosophy as well.

III.4. The World as Precarious and Stable

In the West, we find a counterpoint to the Buddhist idea of impermanence or temporary existence in the idea of flux, which flourished in the 20th century under the heading of process metaphysics. This idea regards process as a basic metaphysical category; it claims that everything is in motion, in flux. The more stable —mountains, traditions, deeply rooted beliefs— simply move slower, way slower, than the more precarious—sense impressions, a Z bosom, a thought, a cloud. In Dewey,[27] as in other sophisticated representatives of this idea, it is not the case that all existence is reduced to change. The *distinction* between the stable and the precarious stands, but on the grounds of ontological continuity rather than on a metaphysical dualism, as it is customary in his philosophic method. The dynamism of Dewey's conception of existence resides in a view of experience as unfolding within the continuity and tension between opposites. In *Experience and Nature,* Dewey offers a summary list of polarities:

> "Structure and process, substance and accident, matter and energy, permanence and flux, one and many, continuity and discreteness, order and progress, law and liberty, uniformity and growth, tradition and innovation, rational will and impelling desires, proof and discovery, the actual and the possible, are names

27 Nicholas Rescher's *Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy* (1996), for example, devotes an entire section to Dewey in a chapter on the history of the idea of process.

> given to various phases of their conjunction, and the issue of living depends upon the art with which these things are adjusted to each other." (1981, p. 67.)[28]

In reference to this list, Sidney Hook (1981) notes that few would contest it applies to human experience, but that Dewey claims that the long list of opposites applies to nature as much as it applies to experience, because experience and nature are in fact bound up together. Dewey claims that "the *world* is precarious and perilous" (1981, p. 44).

Dewey's metaphysical picture of the world is one of balance—Gregory Pappas (2008) rightly identifies "balance" as the ideal in Dewey's oeuvre. The second chapter of *Experience and Nature,* for example, is entitled "Existence as Precarious and as Stable," and Dewey's balanced picture of the world places equal weight on the importance of both. The world is precarious and perilous, but it also features all of the relatively stable aspects of the list: "structure…substance…matter...permanence…one…continuity…order…law…uniformity…trad ition…rational will…proof…the actual" (1981, p. 67). The effect of such balanced metaphysical picture, however, is one of emphasis on flux, because it stands in contrast to a history of philosophical ideas that, in Hook's words, Dewey interprets as "attempts to glorify the certain, the fixed, and the eternal, and to degrade the probable, the contingent, and the temporal" (1981, p. xi). The significant distinction, in technical terms, is one between process metaphysics and what is called substance-metaphysics (Seibt, 2012).

For the purpose of our discussion on values, and relying on the naturalistic assumption that establishes an ontological continuity between values and natural phenomena, it is fruitful to

28 Pappas (2008) offers a "family of oppositions" based on an initial list Dewey includes in his Lectures on Ethics 1900-1901 and expanded with additional oppositions that show up in later works, including this list from Experience and Nature. The list Pappas compiles reads: "universal/particular; necessity/contingency; order/spontaneity; permanence/change; stable/precarious; recurrent, dependable, common/unique, novel; work/play; means/ends; relations, instrumental/finalities; cognitive/emotional; actual/ideal; fact/value; product/process; social/individual; interdependence/independence; unity/diversity" (p. 170)

exploit a typical description of physical phenomena in terms of process as metaphor for values. The substance-metaphysics tradition does not deny the reality of events, but it thinks of events in terms of interaction amongst more basic entities of a different nature: substance, self-standing things. So, for example, a substance-metaphysics description of the event of boiling water includes an account of ultimate substantial entities, atoms, which form the water molecules that interact with one another and whose interaction varies as temperature approaches 100º C. Such a picture of natural events provides the material for a metaphor to interpret the dynamics of values in human life. Whatever entity we take as basic, cultural traditions, communities, individuals minds, specific values, they are kinds of substances in that they are self-standing things. Evaluation, bestowing value, responding to values, comparing contending values, etc. are events that occur as self-standing entities interact with one another.

By contrast, process metaphysics inverts the order of explanation. Stable entities like atoms are the result of the interaction of processes. Accounts of the natural world given by quantum physics, for example, are processist in nature (Seibt, 2012). In this account, what we get is a continuum of flux marked by moments of relative stability. While at the sub-atomic level we find phenomena describable primarily in terms of events, all of that activity results in the relatively stable entities of subatomic particles, atoms and water molecules. At the microscopic level of molecules, boiling water presents a picture of significant entropy, so we describe it as an event occurring amongst water molecules. However, at the human scale that is relevant for the purpose of cooking, all of that entropy at the molecular level acquires a reliably stable pattern of motion that constitutes boiling water, which we can maintain under control and treat as a thing, as an ingredient to employ in interaction with other relatively stable things like salt, oil, and pasta. Now, if we take this account of natural phenomena as material for a metaphor of the

nature and dynamics of values, we get a rather different picture. The order of primacy gets inverted: Evaluation, bestowing value, responding to values, comparing contending values, etc. are the basic stuff of our social and political lives; cultural traditions, communities, individuals minds, and specific values are moments of relative stability in the continuum of processes of valuation.

This structure of the relationship between the relatively stable and the precarious in terms of emergence appears everywhere in Dewey. Objects of knowledge and essences constitute secondary experience and arise out of the inchoate flux of primary experience (*Experience and Nature*, *Logic: A Theory of Inquiry*), values as stable entities emerge out of desires and enjoyments (*The Quest for Certainty*, *Theory of Valuation*); beauty, aesthetic qualities, emerge from the inchoate continuum of experience in the narrative structure of *an experience* (*Art as Experience*) and even God emerges from our ongoing coping with problematic situations (*A Common Faith*).

We find a clear illustration of this dimension of Dewey's thought in his account of laws and nature in a lecture delivered at Columbia University in 1908:

> "No, nature is not an unchangeable order, unwinding itself majestically from the reel of law under the control of deified forces. It is an indefinite congeries of changes. Laws are not governmental regulations which limit change, but are convenient formulations of selected portions of change followed through a longer or shorter period of time, and then registered in statistical forms that are amenable to mathematical manipulation… Knowledge of nature...[means] insight into courses of change; an insight which is formulated in "laws," that is, methods of subsequent procedure. (2008a, p. 48)

Whether it is because we partake in a cultural milieu that inherited this tradition that "attempts to glorify the certain, the fixed, and the eternal, and to degrade the probable, the contingent, and the temporal" (Hook, 1981, p. xi), or simply because it is in our nature to seek safety and stability

(and thus we tend to glorify that which provides it or resembles it), many of us cringe at the possibility of a world without certainty, fixity, or eternity. This tendency to which we are inclined finds expression in our creative pursuits of knowledge and value, and the fruit of those pursuits is the institutions, practices and ideas that bring stability to existence; laws are paradigmatic examples. But as Dewey insists, any and all human accomplishments to secure stability can only be, at best, the achievement of relative stability in flux and never perfect certainty, fixity, or eternity transcending flux.

This discussion is relevant to cosmopolitanism precisely because much of the resistance to cosmopolitan ideas seems motivated by conceptions of cultural traditions, communities, personal and social identity, and values as fixed entities generating laws to govern social phenomena. I doubt many people would report to believe that the constraints posed by law-like demands inherent in particular social and political identities, like a constraint against "effeminate behavior" for men posed by a Latin American macho identity, are eternal, fixed, and certain, like the constraints posed by laws of nature. And yet, in practice, beliefs and values are upheld as if governing behavior the way certain, fixed, and eternal laws are supposed to do: setting up an unchangeable order of things and standing beyond any possible criticism or revision. From this perspective, cosmopolitanism certainly represents a threat to values. But a cosmopolitan perspective on values, as I discussed in the previous chapter, highlights the creative possibilities inherent in the encounter with difference. The Deweyan view that values emerge from experience accounts for the possibility of creative responses to situations of encounters with difference.

At the same time, Dewey, like Ikeda and good Buddhists, was a thinker keenly sensitive to life's perils and impermanence. Even when his philosophical project resisted the glorification

of the certain, the fixed, and the eternal, by no means was he dismissive of experiences of suffering that psychologically motivated such glorification. He writes, in dramatic language: "Time is the tooth that gnaws; it is the destroyer; we are born only to die and every day brings us one day nearer death" (2008d, p. 98). In a human world the anthem of impermanence is sung in the key of our mortality. As it nears through menacing signs of danger or illness, as it reaches the ones we love, or even as it presents itself in the form of an idea and an anxiety, the moment of death is the ultimate face of the impermanence of the world. But Dewey insists that positing entities, realms or beings that transcend the destructive teeth of time is not the appropriate response. Instead, we should inhabit the world in all its precariousness and perils in a way that affords us "insight into courses of change…methods of subsequent procedure" (2008a, p. 48). In other words, we ought not to try to escape impermanence, but to understand it in ways that allows us to respond to change intelligently and creatively.

Oftentimes, the exemplar of "insight" that Dewey has in mind is the kind of insight provided by science, "an insight formulated in 'laws'," "convenient formulations of selected portions of change followed through a longer or shorter period of time, and then registered in statistical forms that are amenable to mathematical manipulation" (2008a, p. 48). But we should keep in mind that for Dewey scientific inquiry was an exemplary case of a much broader notion of experimental inquiry whose insights might have nothing to do with "laws," or "mathematical manipulation" (ibid.). In chapter four I will consider Dewey's notion of experimental inquiry in detail. For now it should suffice to simply say that for Dewey, the answer to the predicament that "the world is precarious and perilous" (2008a, p. 44), is neither the positing of transcendent realms of certainty, fixity and eternity, nor a hopeless surrender to "the tooth that gnaws" (2008d, p. 98). The answer for Dewey is intelligence achieved by means of inquiry in engagement with

the world in all its problematic conditions. As philosopher Steve Fishman shows in his eloquent *John Dewey and the Philosophy and Practice of Hope* (2007), co-authored with Lucille McCarthy, Dewey's clearheaded awareness of the brevity and fragility of life came with a philosophically grounded sense of hope, a determination to resist despair. And Dewey's ultimate hope, Fishman tells us, was "hope for this-worldly social reform" (2007, p. 4). For Dewey the creation of meaning and value in life are intimately connected with our capacity to perceive, in reverence and appreciation, the natural and social links we share with lives of the distant past and future, as well as distant places. The impulse here, the movement toward hope, is to confront the radical break that death represents, with a cultivated awareness of an underlying natural and social continuum of life.

III.4.a. Contextualism in Dewey

In *Context and Thought*, Dewey famously asserted that "the most pervasive fallacy of philosophic thinking goes back to neglect of context" (2008c, p. 6). He identifies one specific case of the neglect of context in philosophy in what he calls the analytic fallacy, "found whenever the distinctions or elements that are discriminated are treated as if they were final and self-sufficient" (ibid., p. 8). In the case of values, the analytic fallacy occurs when we treat a value as without a circumstantial context of origination. Dewey is careful to note that in everyday practical activities, it is perfectly legitimate to take context for granted. We do not need to explicitly articulate context when the situation itself provides it ineluctably. When a student stays up late working on a set of math problems, the value of persistence might not only be embodied in her practice, but also consciously in her mind. She might remember words of encouragement by her teacher on the importance of persistence and even explicitly tell herself

not to give up. But as these thoughts cross her mind, she does not need a reminder of context. Context is felt in her sore back and hard surface of the chair, in the taste of instant noodles and warm soda, in the anticipation of the excitement of solving a problem and daydreams of a successful career. That is the fertile ground where the value of persistence lays roots and out of which it grows.

"When context is taken into account," writes Dewey, "it is seen that every generalization occurs under limiting conditions set by the contextual situation" (ibid., p. 9). In terms of value, a particular response to a recurring kind of problematic situation that consistently produces desirable results is not sufficient to constitute a value. In order to think of a particular response, say to the challenges of a demanding curriculum, in terms of the value of, say, persistence, we need to generalize, that is, to abstract an aspect of that experience so that it can be applied to other cases. This is perfectly clear. Dewey's point, however, is that even that moment of generalization takes place under limiting conditions set by the contextual situation. In our example, there are multiple relevant dimensions to the contextual situation: there is a cultural tradition in the anthropological sense of the term in which these study practices take place; there is the context of the students' developmental conditions, and, amongst others, there is the context of their mental and physical health—the value of persistence would look very different applied to the case of a young person recovering from severe depression, of for a five-year old, for example.

Within the limits of the relevant contextual situation, we are entitled to treat values as genuine universals. "[E]very meaning is generic or universal," writes Dewey (1981, p. 148). "For a meaning is a method of action," he explains, "a way of using things as means to a shared consummation, and method is general, though the things to which it is applied are particular"

(ibid.). The nature of a universal is that "[w]henever there is a chance, it is applied," Dewey notes, and "application ceases only when a thing refuses to be treated in this way" (ibid.). The universal validity of a value, as a tool to mediate our actions in concrete situation, meets a limit when it cannot be applied. Situations of encounters across difference, the native domain of cosmopolitanism, is often such a situation. When a situation refuses to be treated as a case of the application of the specific value embodied in our acquired habits it poses the demand of attentiveness to context.

In the encounter with difference we have individuals upholding values originally formed under conditions set by contextual situations potentially different enough from the present situation to the point that warrant a revision of the values themselves. The contrast with the universalist position that proclaims values as universal, fixed, and transcendent, and denies any role of context in the determination of value is evident and already implicit in the whole discussion on contextualism. In *Context and Thought*, Dewey puts it explicitly when he writes that when the influence of context "is passed over or thrown out of court, a principle valid under specifiable conditions is perforce extended without limit" (2008c, p. 9). As mentioned in the previous chapter, critics charge cosmopolitan universalism with the error of confusing the worthy cosmopolitan spirit of extending the sphere of moral concern to the whole world with the forced extension of our particular moral values without limit. But as contemporary philosophical scholarship on cosmopolitanism insists, caring about distant others entails interest in their lives and their values, and sometimes it is difficult to understand, even perceive others' values.29

29 Some cosmopolitan authors like Appiah and Hansen, take the difficulty of understanding others seriously, and interpret the artful work of pursuing understanding across differences as central to their cosmopolitan vision of moral growth and a even a genuine source of joy in life. There are also critics, like Elaine Scarry (2002), who think this challenge simply renders cosmopolitanism inviable.

Universalism about values, as a lens through which to look at the world, is specifically designed to obscure the values of others. Because part of the makeup of the values of others is the context in which they formed and universalism demands abstraction from context. Contextualism, by contrast, is designed to provide a starting point that at least can promise the possibility of perceiving, understanding, and appreciating others' values. We might conduct ourselves guided by the lights of our values for as long as that works, and that would not be in conflict with cosmopolitanism. That is the meaning of Appiah's "cosmopolitan patriots" (2005) and "rooted cosmopolitans" (2006). What a commitment to cosmopolitanism would require is that we remain aware that there is a context of human experience that frames and out of which our particular normative perspective emerges. Dewey employs an elegant metaphor to make this point:

> "The spatial context is the ground through which the road runs and for the sake of which the road exists. It is this setting which gives import to the road and to its consecutive illuminations. The path must be lighted if one is not to lose his way; the remoter territory may be safely left in the dark" (2008c, pp. 14-15).

And the metaphor is apt for our discussion because it provides the elements to account for the moment of encounter that especially concerns cosmopolitanism: not everyone is traversing the space along the lighted road on which we travel, sometimes a deer emerges from the dark and crosses our path, or we might drive through the train tracks. Our interconnected world is one where other perspectives come to intercept us from every direction, all the time. Rather than in an interstate highway running across expansive fields, we are driving through busy city traffic, and while we surely need to keep our attention focused on the particular road we decided to travel, and while we can safely leave remoter territory in the dark, we also keep an eye on what is going on in other streets. We want not only our path lighted, but also the crossing streets, and

if the road we typically take is blocked, we want our GPS navigator to be able to "recalculate" and choose an alternative route.

Dewey's contextualism leads him to understand that the necessarily perspectival condition of experience makes it impossible for any individual to attain a truly universal point of view. The personal experience of the individual is the most immediate context of thought, and "[h]owever widely it [thought] reaches out into the world of things and persons, it is as personal, curtailed, one-sided, distorted" (2008c, pp. 21-22). And here Dewey shows how he would disagree with Nussbaum and stand with Appiah and Hansen on what to do with the clear problem that a "one-sided, distorted" (ibid.) perspective represents, the problem that in cosmopolitan theory is identified with parochialism. "The remedy," Dewey writes, "is not divorce of thought from the intimacies of the direct contacts and intercourses of life, but a supplementation of limitations and a correction of biases through acquaintance with the experience of others, contemporary and as recorded in the history of the race" (ibid., p. 22). When Nussbaum writes about cosmopolitanism as a "kind of exile" (1997c, p.11), she does not mean that we can permanently transcend our particular cultural perspective, but that the moral ideals of a universal human nature can provide a counterweight to the pulling of "the comforts of local truths" (1997c, p.34). Against the grain of Nussbaum's emphasis on critical thinking as a means to question the strong hold of local cultural perspectives on experience, Appiah recommends that we simply learn to become familiar with other ways of being in the world, and that that in itself will loosen the grip of parochial ways of thinking.

Dewey would agree with Appiah. For Dewey, genuine experience of difference in itself is the remedy to parochialism, and it is the latter that in order to survive needs to deliberately negate or distort experience:

> "Dogmatism, adherence to a school, partisanship, class-exclusiveness, desire to show off and to impress, are all of them manifestations of disrespect for experience: for that experience which one makes one's own through sympathetic intercommunication. They are, as it were, deliberate perpetuations of the restrictions and perversions of personal experience" (2008c, p. 22).

The context of thought, the context of values, resides in experience; attention to context must mean attention to experience and that requires openness to different perspectives and the possibility my values come under revision. When Appiah describes cosmopolitanism in terms of the principles of pluralism and fallibilism, he is articulating implications of contextualism.

III.4.b Transactional Realism

"Essence is never existence," states Dewey in *Experience and Nature*, "and yet it is the essence, the distilled import, of existence, the significant thing about it" (1981, p. 145). For Dewey, essences are not antecedent to experience, but emerge from it. Values are a kind of essence, and in the case of values, the metaphor of distillation is felicitous. Significance emerges by separating those aspects of experience that are instrumental in practical action. As people traverse the same route from the town to the river, a trail emerges out of the indistinguishable wholeness of an expansive meadow. A road is created by means of a repeated practical activity. And in light of the shared goal of reaching the river, the path is significant. Dewey writes, "significant things are things actually implicated in situations of shared or social purpose and execution" (ibid., p. 143). Meanings and values emerge from the life of social interaction.

Dewey's position on the emergence of meanings and values from experience can be captured in the idea of *transactional realism*. Human beings, according to this position, are seen not primarily as physical entities in a physical world, as subjects in a world of objects, or as minds in a world of facts and ideas. We are, primarily, as Biesta (2009) puts it: "living

beings...always in interaction—or to use Dewey's term: transaction—with the world" (p. 37). The transaction between individual organism and world is ontologically basic. "Interaction is the primary fact," writes Dewey, "and it constitutes a trans-action." (1984, p. 220). In transaction, there is no gap between mind and world, or no need for knowledge of the world as prerequisite for contact or engagement. "As living beings," Biesta adds, "we are always already acting upon and with the world...Transaction means that we are always already in touch with the world and this connection, in turn, ensures that out knowledge is always knowledge of the world" (2009, p. 37).

Put simply, self, world, and its objects emerge from transactional processes. It is in this sense that it is not just experience, but also nature, the world, that is "precarious and perilous" (1981, p. 44). For Dewey, our knowledge of the world is "knowledge of the possible relationships between our actions and their consequences," Biesta reminds us (2009, p. 37). Different modes of transaction, involving different kinds of action (different methods of action) and their corresponding consequences, bring about different objects of knowledge. The objects that make up the world illuminated by science are different from the objects of an ethical or moral engagement with the world, and different still from the objects that emerge from a transaction with the world for the purpose of sharing expressions of culture and learning across difference. "All such approaches," insists Biesta, "are real encounters with the real world." (ibid.)

Garrison (1997) describes Dewey's "transactional realism" (p.45) in explicit reference to process and context as essential dimensions of experience. He describes it as the idea that "all existence consists of events," and that, "[i]ndividual human existence is an event best recognized by its narrative structure. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end; a plot line; characters; a

setting; and moments of active disclosure" (1997, p. 45). Pappas makes a similar point: "For Dewey, life is neither a homogeneous flux nor a succession of disconnected (atomistic) moments" (2008, p. 88) and he quotes Dewey in a passage evoked by Garrison in his characterization of existence as events: Life, Dewey writes, is ''a thing of histories, each with its own plot, its own inception and movement towards its close'' (1987, p. 43).

"All existence is a mixture of the actual and the potential," Garrison continues, "[w]hen two events interact, the actuality of the one may actualize the potential of the other, and conversely. Both events are transformed." (1997, p.45). The conditions that make the cosmopolitan response possible are the fact that we inhabit the same world and the fact that we share a set of capacities as human beings. This means that the significant differences that constitute the human condition exist, through the lens of a Deweyan transactional realism, in a dynamic of actuality and potentiality. Values actualized in the event that is the life and worldview of an American student, in transaction with the actuality of the event that is the life of the Chinese student bring about the actualization of values previously only existing as potential and vice versa. The knowledge and experience actualized in the event that is the teacher, have the power to activate the potentialities in the event that is the student—when actualized, these potentials might resemble the actual knowledge and experience of the teacher or not, degrees of continuity as well as difference are always present in transactional relations; like in literary narratives, elements of surprise and fulfilled expectation are part of the dynamics. Conversely, the curiosity and thirst for new experiences that constitute the actuality of the life of the young person, can activate potentialities in the life of the experienced adult.

"A new life," writes Dewey, "a life as yet one of potentiality, will signify to man the possibility of a different world until all hope dies from the human breast." (2008b, p. 227). These

two moments of the educational process represent what Hansen eloquently describes as preserving and destabilizing culture. Hansen writes:

> "A cosmopolitan orientation…positions [people] to dwell meaningfully in the tension-laden, often paradoxical realm of being both destabilizers and preservers of culture. Individuals and communities destabilize culture every time they learn something genuinely new and different. But they can preserve the beating heart and the vibrant mind of culture by being self-conscious and critical in that very process" (2009a, p. 206).

Hansen interprets this double edged function of learning as the mark of a cosmopolitan orientation, that the attitude of a global citizen should be one of approaching encounters with difference as, above all, opportunities for teaching and learning, hence the designation of his position as *educational* cosmopolitanism. I bring up Hansen here to highlight that a Deweyan transactional realism is operative in his thinking, but also to stress the point that the dynamics of education are a perfect metaphor for describing the dynamics of life, at least in the accounts of the world that we present here. And this is not incidental. For both Ikeda and Dewey, life is primarily about education, broadly conceived, and education is primarily about life.

III.5. Normative terrains.

In the previous chapter I considered four kinds of cosmopolitanism in relation to the question of values. Beyond their relative strengths and limitations, all four versions of cosmopolitanism considered provide theoretical instruments attuned to the complex dynamics of universality and differences in values. As a matter of fact, the kind of sensitivity to the complexities of our value-laden world that these theories exhibit is a hallmark of cosmopolitanism. It certainly is one of the main characteristics that sets it apart from responses to the world notorious for being normatively simplistic, like counter-cosmopolitan views of the

world, to use Appiah's term, which present the world of values either as a matter of all-pervasive sameness or in thoroughly relativistic lights. And because the picture of the world articulated by cosmopolitanism is complex and demands subtle normative responses, the task of articulating a cosmopolitan position, both in descriptive and normative terms, represents a challenge of complexity and subtlety. Each of the four versions of cosmopolitanism considered in the previous chapter deploys a central metaphor that structures the complex pictures of the world and the educational responses they articulate. For Nussbaum and her *cosmopolitan universalist* proposal is the metaphor of exile; in Todd's *agonistic cosmopolitics*, the guiding metaphor is competition; Appiah's *rooted cosmopolitanism* relies implicitly on the metaphor of a tree, with branches reaching out towards the sky and roots deep into the ground, and in Hansen's *educational cosmopolitanism* it is the metaphor of learning that provides a unifying image to the logic of his argument.[30]

The picture of a world of values articulated here through Ikeda's interpretation of the theory of the three perceptions and Dewey's views on process, context, and transaction, is no less complex. The task of the remainder of the chapter is to develop a metaphor, to help us handle the complexity of the ideas at hand. The strategy is to think of our world of values in terms of the features of the physical world we inhabit as physical beings. I do not mean, however, the physical world as elucidated by the natural sciences, a world measurable and determined by laws

30 In Hansen's cosmopolitanism learning operates both literally and as metaphor. On the one hand, Hansen's theory seeks to emphasize the central place of learning as a particular kind of activity in the lives of individuals and communities. In this sense, learning is central to his vision of cosmopolitanism literally. On the other hand, in Hansen's cosmopolitanism learning also provides the source domain for conceptual metaphors through which we understand aspects of social life that are not necessarily educational in a literal sense (here I use "source domain" and "conceptual metaphor" in the sense Lakoff and Johnson give the terms in their seminal 1980 work *Metaphors We Live By*). The question of how we uphold values, for example, could be understood in terms of a source metaphorical domain of commerce— we think of value commitments as *negotiated* in situations of value conflicts, for instance—, but Hansen understands it in terms of learning—our value commitments are dynamic, always in tension between loyalty to the known and openness to the new, and the dynamics of value commitments resemble the dynamics of learning. Prof. Megan Laverty inspired me to think about this important distinction.

of nature as it presents itself to the detached observer by means of complex theoretical and technical instruments. I mean the physical world we inhabit, which is the source of life and great dangers, the setting and context of our lives as agents. This metaphor is what I call *normative terrains*.

III.5.a. Moving across normative terrains.

Globalization moves us to new geographical, cultural, practical, and virtual spaces. When Grandpa Humberto migrated to Buenos Aires and started working at the factory, he entered a new kind of space, geographically and practically. My friendship with Junko, maintained mainly through virtual communications, takes place in a kind of space different from the college campus where it begun. All of these spaces, in and out of which we move, are penetrated by a normative dimension, which we can describe in terms of universality and difference in values. For example, when Grandpa Humberto started working as a factory carpenter, he moved into a new geographical space. He no longer worked in the outdoors environment of the farm, which he reached by foot from home, and where he spent all day in the company of only three people. Now he shared a bus commute every morning with sixty strangers and worked with more than fifty co-workers in a closed space in the basement of a large building. He also entered a new space of practice as well. The new job required geometry, arithmetic, drawing skills and operating heavy machinery.

For Humberto, this migration into a new space had normative dimensions as well. The values to which he was compelled to respond were different. In Buenos Aires, for example, a legalistic, "by the book" sense of subordination to his supervisor mattered for how his work was evaluated. There were many safety regulations and union rules of which he had to be mindful.

Back in Spain, by contrast, sensitivity to the rhythms of nature was an important value. He and the other farmers could tell if rain was approaching from the way insects and birds behaved, and a heavy rain made a difference to their work routine. At the factory, the weather mattered little, but punctuality was very important: punch card time was nine am. At the farm, the working day started after breakfast. We all know what it is like to transition between spaces that present us with such normatively diverging demands. An experience of migration across continents is not necessary for this. To just go from the office to church is enough—not even that! just go from the water cooler to the conference room and you enter a completely different space of values.

The dynamics of such transitions are not all difference; universality plays its part as well. A sense of work ethics, of doing one's job well, was at stake both in the farm and at the factory for Humberto. Although it took him years and many disputes with union leaders and various mid-level administrators, Humberto came to learn about and inhabit the values of loyalty amongst fellow workers and the important role of inflexible rules in large corporations. He learned about these values because in many ways they were continuous with the values of camaraderie and loyalty operative within the small community of Cerdiñeiro and at the farm in particular. I can maintain a relationship with Junko because certain values of friendship, like trust and loyalty, are continuous across geographic distance and modes of communication.

As anticipated, I refer to these spaces of diverging and continuous values, which we inhabit and across which we move as *normative terrains*.[31] For the purpose of illustration, let us consider a hypothetical example: Zhou is a Chinese young man pursuing graduate studies in the

31 There is at least one use of this term that differs from the sense I intend to give it in these pages. Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel (2006), for example, write about shifting normative terrains in reference to the effects of political institutions. The shifts can be, for example, between humanitarianism (pre-political) and egalitarianism (political). I do not use the term to mean the structuring of morality and justice in terms of social, political and ideological conditions, but rather the experienced world one inhabits and traverses as a world of values.

Unites States.[32] He is bright, determined and, let us imagine, has a good sense of what are the relevant values at play for an undergraduate student in China.[33] By an understanding of the values at play I refer to the capacity to successfully respond to the demands of a value-laden situation. In other words, understand in practice what is appropriate, acceptable, unacceptable, and ideal in each case. Constitutive of this sense of "understanding" the values at play in a situation is the possession of required skills and equipment. This is analogous to the demands a

32 Genuine education in itself constitutes a case of encounters with difference. In that sense, any situation where one individual learns something new we have a case of a person entering a new normative terrain. As we saw in the previous chapter, it is this feature of the educational experience that inspires Hansen (2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2011) to call his theory educational cosmopolitanism. One instance where the educative experience represents a case of the encounter of new normative terrains in bold strokes is the case of study abroad. During the 2010-2011 academic year, the country that hosted the largest percentage of international students was the United States (18%), while the single largest population of international students in that country was from the People's Republic of China (Institute of International Education, 2011). This kind of exchange is particularly significant, because these two countries see themselves as main competitors in a global arena where the stakes for education are high.

33 Much of what I will have to say about normative terrains could be approached by means of the language of identity, but there are important reasons why I do not choose that road. An identity, in this context, is a way of understanding oneself such that certain normative features of a situation rather than others become salient. We could say that, in Cerdiñeiro, Humberto was acting "under a description," as Elizabeth Anscombe (1957) famously put it, adopting the identity of a farmer and the son in law of the patriarch, and that in Buenos Aires he first struggled and finally came to adopt an identity as "immigrant factory craftsman." The concept of identity enjoys great explanatory power for the breaks and continuities in values as a person transitions from one context to another. However, as the term indicates, the focus is on the self, while with cosmopolitanism we are concerned with self *and* world as they stand in relation to each other. As Charles Taylor puts it in his highly influential work, *The Sources of the Self* (1992), "[m]y identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose" (p. 27). And for Taylor, our identities are determined by our orientation to the good, and thus "we must inescapably understand our lives in narrative form, as a 'quest'" (p.51). Notions of what is good in the world and who we are as moral selves are mutually constitutive and are "connected facets of the same reality, inescapable structural requirements of human agency" (p. 52). For Taylor, we construct our self-identities in dialogue with other people's understanding of ourselves and the constraints the world puts on our agency. To put it differently, we pursue the quest towards the good together with other people, and the stories of our individual pursuits of the good are part of a history. We are embedded in communities and traditions, which are largely responsible for providing paths along which our individual quests takes place. The idea of normative terrains developed here makes a different use of the metaphor of a space of values. I employ the image of a normative terrain to describe the ways in which we inhabit a value-laden world, and the idea of *traversing* to describe the ways in which we approach, avoid, pass by, and leave behind specific values as we move through problematic situations. The difference is that, as suggested, the way the spatial metaphor is employed in the language of identity emphasizes the established paths constituted by communities and traditions, and regards values primarily as part of the "furniture of things" (Taylor, 1989, p. 69), already there, recognized by established traditions as the goods towards which we orient ourselves. For cosmopolitanism, however, the emphasis is different. Hansen (2008, 2010a, 2011) captures the distinction when he stresses that cosmopolitanism is not one more identity, but a way of upholding identities—for Hansen, as we saw, it means to fuse reflective loyalty with reflective openness. Cosmopolitanism, moreover, is not a set of values, but a way of holding values—being able to take distance from values without breaking with them (see Hansen et al., 2009). In terms of the spatial metaphor that structures descriptions of the ways in which we inhabit a value-laden world, cosmopolitanism puts the accent on the possibility of taking interest in the landscape that lies beyond—or to the sides—of the established paths of identity, not only on orienting ourselves to the values that are already part of the furniture of things, but also on how we come to furnish the world with values in the first place and on the possibility of re-furnish it. The normative terrain is not only the world of values we inhabit, but a world of values we create.

physical terrain poses on a traveler. Consider a hike through the woods; there will be portions of the terrain where a relaxed stroll without paying much attention where to step would be acceptable, where the demands of the terrain are minimal. It might even be that, depending on the soil, one could even cross the woods barefoot, so not even much equipment would be needed. Then, we might run into a river and depending on conditions, we might need to walk across, swim, or require a bridge. If the obstacle is a lake, the demands of the terrain will depend on whether it is frozen or not. And if frozen, we would need certain knowledge and skills to identify whether it is safe to step on the ice.

A normative terrain works analogously, and in college Zhou was like an expert hiker who knew the terrain well. He knew well, that is, a few specific trails, which were enough to meet the demands of life as a college student. In the classroom, Zhou understood what the situation required, he knew what were the relevant values at play and was able to respond appropriately. The values of diligence, earnestness, and respect for the authority of the professor, amongst others, were very much present in the normative terrain of the classroom, and anyone with the required awareness, like Zhou, could see that.

Zhou was skilled at navigating other moments of the terrain as well. It was relatively easy for him to make friends with students with whom he shared interests and commitments. These college friendships soon grew into a small community of mutual support and creative competition. At the library, for example, they were the group that stayed working through exercises until late at night. The value of discipline to which they responded as they refrained from video games and stuck to their endless lines of code was an almost tangible and shared feature of their experience. In a group of hikers trying to get through a rocky terrain with moldy surfaces, each experiences the quality of the ground being aware the others experience it too, and

they respond to the demands of the situation in awareness that they experience this *together*. On slippery ground, the experienced hiker heightens his awareness of anyone nearby ready to lend a hand or seek support. For Zhou and his friends the experience of the value of discipline in study was the same; they knew that what each experienced subjectively was in fact *intersubjective*.

Their lives as computer science undergraduates had a heartbeat and a rhythm, and Zhou was well aware of it. He understood when it was time to leave the books aside and have fun, and he was sensitive to the values that demanded a response in that kind of situation as well. As a young person with limited life experience Zhou was by no means attuned to the values of any and all situations he could encounter in the context of his cultural milieu. No one ever is in that position.[34] But Zhou did know, as I said, a few trails particularly relevant for the path he was pursuing as a student; he perceived the values at play in the relevant situations and knew how to respond.

Then Zhou moves to the US and, you can guess where the story is going, he enters a new normative terrain with different values at work and a different set of skills and resources required to successfully respond to their demands. It's like the experienced mountaineer venturing into deep waters, not with the proper diving equipment, but with his climbing gear. In the seminar style discussion, for example, Zhou focuses on comprehension of the content and taking notes, as usual, but his American peers ask questions, and generally understand this practice of questioning as central to the learning process. After class, for example, they engage in spirited debates, rather than comparing notes and helping each other understand the contents like Zhou

34 Even an Aristotelian *phronemos*, a Buddha, or Bordieu's cultural virtuoso could, at best, combine an exquisite sensitivity to the normative demands of specific contexts and a kind of wisdom about human experience in general to be able to perceive and respond to the relevant values in most situations, but not all. What is striking about these ethical, moral, and aesthetic heroes is that they often close the gap of uncertainty and indeterminacy between what the situation demands and their capacity to perceive it, by means of a kind of resolve through which they determine the values that are relevant. Their response is genuinely creative in this sense.

used to do with his friends back home. They often take a stance right away, Zhou thinks, without having given themselves the chance to make sure they understood the issues at hand well.

This kind of difference in learning styles and habits between Chinese and American students is precisely what research finds as the norm (Worthley, 1987; Huang, 2009; Wang & Farmer, 2008). More significantly, Zhou notices the questions are not always for the purpose of clarification; oftentimes they are critical, casting doubt on the knowledge and judgment of the professor. Perhaps the main feature of the normative terrain of the learning situation in which Zhou learned to thrive is not there anymore: the unquestionable authority of the professor is missing. Research shows, by the way, that amongst Chinese students, compared to their American peers, there is a pronounced sense of hierarchy between teacher and students in a relationship grounded in respect for the teacher's authority (Yang, Zheng, & Li, 2006; Huang & Brown, 2009; Jaju, Kwak, & Zinkhan, 2002; Pratt, Kelly, & Wong, 1999).

We all are familiar with this kind of normative dissonance. In Zhou's case, differences in values align quite neatly with cultural differences, but this needs not be the case. We encounter normative dissonance across generations within a single family, even when they all identify culturally the same way. We find it across gender differences, and—need I say this?—across religious and ideological boundaries. Any difference, in short, can cause such normative dissonance, and even a single individual can approach the same conditions and respond according to a whole different set of values in two different occasions.

The kind of encounter with difference that is at stake in a situation like Zhou's cannot be reduced to differences of nationality, gender, sexual orientation, political ideology, cultural background, socioeconomic status, or ethnicity. Not even if we extend the list until we exhaust the possible terms that can define what we call identity. As much as market researchers would

like to reduce differences to a relatively short list of terms (to understand, predict, and control behavior), here we are concerned with a more nuanced picture of the dynamics of human experience in a world of values. The idea of a normative terrain is designed to allow for that.

III.5.b. Universality and Difference in Normative Terrains.

The metaphor of normative terrains gives us a useful way of framing the question of universality and difference in values. We can think of universal values in terms of the elements that structure a terrain and extend their influence beyond particular locations. One of the strengths of this metaphor is that it allows for a rich diversity of images through which to think universals. A universal value might be like a river with headwaters in a specific geographical location and flowing through hundreds of miles and diverse landscapes, adapting to the particularities of and gaining richness (minerals, animal life) and pollution from the lands its traverses while at the same time maintaining its nature. This is a universal value that becomes part of the daily lives of people in the local places through which it flows, like the river, shaping and nurturing ways of life. We can think of the value of piety, for example, as expressed in Christian and other religious traditions.

Or, a universal value can be like a towering elevation, grounded in a specific location, but visible from the distance. The image of Mt. Fuji comes to mind, towering over the landscape of central Honshu, it can be seen from several prefectures. We sometimes think of universal values this way, as grounded in a particular historical and geographical context, but reaching beyond its locale to inspire people and demand responses everywhere. Paradoxically, such values acquire their characteristic meaning precisely as they take distance from their context of origin. Mt. Fuji adopts the appearance that artists like Hokusai and Hiroshige made famous as a symbol of Japan

when seen from far. This is the metaphorical structure of the value of democracy, for example, as inspired in the archetype of Ancient Athenian society, or the founding fathers of America.

The metaphor of normative terrains offers even more images to conceive of universality in values. A universal value can be like a cloud, floating over the landscape seemingly disconnected with life on the ground —although, closer examination reveals they are formed by evaporating water from the ground. A universal value can be like a forest, formed by many instances of a particular values, like individual trees, that partake in common features and interconnect in an ecosystem. And we can go on indefinitely. Under the terms of this metaphor, we can easily conceive of universals as issuing in a variety of modes.

Particular, local values also have their place in the normative terrain. We refer to values as local when their guiding influence on our coordinated responses to the world are limited in scope to a bounded domain, a community of people, or a locale. We can speak of a dimension of universality in the value of politeness, for example, as a general sense of concern for avoiding what might cause discomfort to other people, particularly in social situations. But beyond that very general, very "thin" sense of politeness, to employ that useful distinction introduced by Bernard Williams (1985, pp.140-142, pp. 150-152), politeness on the ground is often much "thicker," rooted in actual norms and highly particular social practices, prejudices, taboos, and even intertwined with culturally specific senses of the sacred and the disgusting.[35] In Japanese society, for example, it is impolite to stick your chopsticks in a bowl of rice. It is impolite because it would make people uncomfortable. But the reasons are highly particular: it evokes an aspect of funeral rituals.

35 Williams (1985) puts politeness in the thick ethical concepts, or thick values, column. Here I use the term in a way that emphasizes relative continuities within the distinctions that Williams stresses. So, even for a thick value like politeness, there are thinner and thicker instances of it.

In the terms of the metaphor of normative terrains, we can think of local values as features of the terrain that structure a specific area in unique ways. A river cuts across a forest and only at one particular spot it becomes shallower and wider, and runs through an area of rocks that form a natural bridge. There, and only there, the river is not a barrier to hikers, who can walk across it stepping on the rocks. There, fishing means simply squatting on a flat rock and reaching underwater to grab a fish with your hand. And only there, the waters are too shallow for sailing or swimming. In most terrains we find such conditions particular to a specific locale, which make the ways we inhabit and traverse that space unique. In normative terrains, analogously, we find normative conditions that are highly particular, like table manners in Japan, and that present us with particular, local values demanding specific responses.

These considerations make already clear two implications of this metaphor for a theory of values. On the one hand, it allows for a diversity of conceptions of universality. That is, it provides a plurality of metaphorical terms under which to understand universal values in relation to particular values. On the other hand, it sets the terms in a context of dynamic and interconnected relationships, expressed through the image of the ecosystem that constitutes a terrain. This establishes a continuity between particular and universal values or, to put it in terms already familiar from previous chapters, it establishes universality as an emergent aspect of a continuum of value.

A third theoretical implication results from the metaphorical terms employed here. I mean the idea that normative terrains are partially constituted by human responses, that terrains can be transformed and values can be created and destroyed, made central or irrelevant. I have not exploited this dimension of the metaphor in the illustrations given so far, but what I mean should be clear. The metaphor of normative terrains allows not only for conceptions of values as

things that are simply there before and independently of human experience, like a river running through the woods. The metaphor also allows for a conception of a terrain of values that human beings can modify. We build bridges where the river runs deep and there is no rocks forming a path to cross. Analogously, we create values when we run into a problematic situation that disrupts balance in our lives—when resources are limited and at least momentarily material desires cannot be met, we respond by means of the values of austerity, patience and industry, for example. For the most part, these transformations are effected gradually, but not always. In a matter of weeks we can cut down an entire forest that stood there for centuries, and completely transform a terrain; we can build a dam in a matter of years and leave entire terrains underwater overnight. In a matter of a few generations we can get rid of a long standing value in a community—think, for example, of the state of "chastity" in Western societies. We can, in a matter of a few years, bring about the articulation of a new value around which we reorganize many aspects of our human experience —think, for instance, of the value of "sustainability." I will devote the next chapter to develop in detail this idea of how we come to reshape normative terrains through our responses to the world.

III.6. Values in the World.

I am proposing that we regard our world of values in terms of, and continuous with, the natural and man-made environments, which we inhabit as physical entities. By this I am not saying that we merely impose this structure, which we get from our experience and refined knowledge of the natural world onto the reality of values. I am not saying either that continuity and resemblance with nature are the self-evident make up of values, and that the metaphorical language of normative terrains simply corresponds to the facts. I am saying that our value-laden

world is constituted partially by the way things are independently of us, and in this sense I do claim that the world of values we inhabit is ontologically continuous with the physical world of objects. There is no such thing as a separate realm of values. At the same time, the world of values is partially constituted by us; it is part of our anthropocentric experience of the world. There is no such thing as a separate realm of value-neutral objects either.

This amounts to a kind of naturalism about values, a naturalism which claims that values are in the world, they emerge from the interactions amongst human beings and their circumstances and, as such, they are also subject to the impermanence and interconnectedness that mark the nature of everything else in the world. Values are essences in the Deweyan sense of the term; they constitute refined objects in experience, a human accomplishment of perseverance and creativity. Values, then, cannot be reduced to mere organic phenomena. In this sense we can profit from heeding Moore's (1993) warnings about the dangers of the naturalistic fallacy. At the same time, to elevate this important distinction between values and natural phenomena to the status of a metaphysical dualism of fact and value would be to commit, borrowing Appiah's term, the "naturalistic fallacy's fallacy" (2008b). The naturalism about values developed in this chapter is what Appiah himself defines negatively as a naturalism that "denies that exploration of value must proceed without reference to the phenomena that scientists study, the causal systems of the material world, the framings of our nature" (Appiah, 2008b, p 255 fn 19). It is a naturalism that rejects the "dichotomy of fact and value" (Putnam, 2002), the claim that "considerations proper to science, on the one hand, and considerations of meaning and value, on the other, belong each to separate, nonoverlapping magisterium" (in reference to Stephen Jay Gould's *Nonoverlapping Maqgisteria*, see Appiah, 2008b, p. 255 fn 19).

With all of this we are making gradual progress towards a picture of the world as value-laden, impermanent, interconnected, and the place in which we dwell when we say, with Hansen (2011), that a cosmopolitan orientation entails a way of meaningfully inhabiting the world. I am claiming that this world of values is continuous with the natural world: that it is a world that we share across all kinds of differences, but a world partly constituted by the plurality of normative perspectives through which we respond to the demands of the world. But the picture still requires more precision, particularly in terms of an account of the dynamics of values in the world and how we come to inhabit it. Chapter four on the *creation of value* addresses these questions.

Chapter IV: The Creation of Value

IV.1 Introduction

The last time I saw Grandpa Humberto was in Cerdiñeiro, his home town, almost exactly one year before his passing. At the time, I was leading the busy and austere life of a graduate student in New York City. This meant I could not see my family in Buenos Aires very often, and when I did, it was always in some loud and crowded family event, usually for the occasion of my visit, which prevented me from engaging in lengthy, deep conversations with anyone. I had not had a serious talk with Grandpa Humberto for years, and every time I visited he looked more frail and exhausted. My mother even speculated that since grandma's passing a part of him had simply given up on life. So when aunt Maria told me she was taking grandpa to his hometown, I took on a few free-lance design jobs, saved up money, and flew to Galicia to meet them.

It was my first time in Spain. I had heard many stories about grandpa's youthful years in Cerdiñeiro, and I was excited about the possibility of walking the streets of the old medieval town with him. I was hoping I could get him to retell me some of his legendary stories right there where the events took place. I was hoping the special geographical location would provide a window into hidden corners of his soul.

The first thing I learned as soon as I set foot in Spain was that the habits and traditions that shaped my family life in Argentina came directly from my family in Cerdiñeiro. Great-aunt Elvira was the host in Cerdiñeiro, still living at the house where my father was born, and it felt like being at aunt Maria's in Buenos Aires, where I played with my cousins as a kid. It was an experience that typically embodied one of the central moments of a cosmopolitan education: a

cognitively and affectively rich understanding of meaningful connections across distances[36]. At the kitchen table, for example, the family gathered for two rounds of appetizers, pasta, a main course, dessert and coffee, and drinks and cheese, and conversation after lunch merging into afternoon tea and, if people were in the mood, eventually merging into dinner.

I was there for only three days. The first day, according to family tradition, went by at the kitchen table. The second day, we took a walk around town. We visited all the notable places: the old elementary school, the local church, the corn fields, the beach beyond the road, the windmill. I wanted to hear my grandpa's stories, but Pampín, our host and guide, did all the talking. The last day, grandpa wanted to go back to the beach with me. We spent the afternoon together. Walking down the road he mentioned something about an episode during the war that happened on the other side of a hill visible from where we were. But his narrative was halfhearted; it was not like the colorful stories of Cerdiñeiro he told me when I was growing up. His heart was not in it, as the expression goes. It was as if he sensed my expectations and was telling me the story just to please me.

As we approached the road by the beach, a group of pilgrims passed by along the crossing road—it was the very road that threads through the last few miles of the Camino de Santiago. We stopped in front of them, and grandpa turned to me saying: "They lived their whole lives here, you know? But I went to Argentina, and made a life there, a good life for my wife and my children. They can't understand what that's like, because they have always been here, living their lives here." The words sounded condescending towards his family members in Spain, but I

36 *Geographical* distances were long, but what does that mean when flying across the Atlantic takes only twice as long as the daily commute into Los Angeles on a bad traffic day? The very recent history of immigration in my family made for certain short *cultural* distances, like the family rituals that I immediately recognized, but certain long *cultural* differences had formed—the political position that Spain is a liberal, Catholic country and that muslims should accommodate to that reality in all public manifestations of their faith and culture was openly and unproblematically espoused by virtually everyone in my family there, while for the Argentine side of the family an idea like that was so curious that did not even inspire moral outrage—intolerance came in other forms for us.

understood there was no such sentiment in his intention. He was trying to tell me that the fact that he was from *there,* from Cerdiñeiro, was only part of who he was. He certainly felt at home there, where people talked with the accent he still kept after decades and where the smells transported him back to his happiest memories. Back in Argentina he always was and would always be the Spaniard, the long-term visitor. Who he was, however, was not to be disclosed at some essential point of origin, but it was a life *created* through a personal history. That history included, surely, the very important fact of his birth in Cerdiñeiro, the community where he grew up, the siblings and cousins, the war, Franco, and all the rest. It also included much that had happened far from his birthplace, his career, his wife and children, the workers union, and more. Cerdiñeiro was but one of many sources of meaning in his life, and I think he was worried I would be confused about that. And perhaps his worry was not entirely misplaced.

We let the pilgrims walk by, crossed the road, and reached the beach. We walked on the sand in silence for some time. One benefit of being very old like he was, or being philosophically inclined like I am, is the possibility of comfort in extended silence. When we reached the edge of the water, I wanted to take a photo of both of us. It was a gloomy, cold, and windy day; the pilgrims were long gone, and no one else was around to be the photographer. So I stuck my umbrella four inches deep in the sand and fastened the camera to the umbrella handle through its strap. I set up the timer and we stood side by side facing the camera as the shutter went off. He just loved the ingenuity of my umbrella and camera contraption. The reticence that clouded his demeanor and made him hesitant to talk about the past vanished in a moment. On our walk back to the house he told me all about the time he tied the neighbor to a pear tree when he found him trying to steal fruit—the poor kid spent the evening atop the tree, rope fastened to his wrists, until a passerby heard his cries for help and came to the rescue. Once in a while he would

interrupt his story to make a comment about how much he loved the umbrella and camera contraption; he spent that evening at the dinner table telling everyone about it.

Grandpa Humberto had an intuitive understanding of the spirit of cosmopolitanism. He learned to adopt a cosmopolitan orientation towards the world not by means of formal education in world languages, culture, critical thinking, or morality, but by the force of circumstances, a restless curiosity in people, and a kind of faith in humanity—which seemed to be fueled, rather than crushed, by his experiences as a soldier in the Spanish Civil War. That afternoon at the beach, without the slightest tinge of preachiness, he gave expression to two important aspects of the cosmopolitan orientation that concerns our current discussion: the question of *making* a home in the world, and the question of *creativity*. I have been arguing for a vision of the world as value-laden, and in the previous chapter I suggested the image of normative terrains as a metaphor for how we relate to values in the world, for how we traverse and inhabit a world of values. In this chapter, I explore the question of how we come to *make* that world, of how we *create* the values that come to furnish the normative terrains we inhabit.

IV.2 Making a Home in a World of Changing Values.

Values constitute, in the view here proposed, part of the makeup of a world we share. The metaphor of *normative terrains* introduced in the previous chapter provides a foothold for this idea. Just as in a physical terrain, physical objects enable and constrain possibilities of movement and activity, in a normative terrain values define the normative possibilities and limits of that terrain. A tree, for example, can be an obstacle to build a tennis court or a pillar for a tree-house. The value of loyalty might prevent me from acting on my own desires, or provide a powerful

internal motivation and a redeeming social sanction for valuable actions that otherwise would seem self-oppressive or extreme.

The objective world partially constituted by values, as we saw in the previous chapters, is a world impermanent and interconnected. Moreover, subjectivity and objectivity are not given a priori of experience, but emerge together from transactional relations. Both selves and world are at once temporary (*ke*) and full of potential (*kū*), and they co-arise dependently (*engi*). It follows, then, that engagement with values in practice entails change. In inhabiting a terrain, we change it, in subtle and drastic ways. We create paths through a forest by walking; we tear down trees to build a road. In inhabiting a normative terrain we affect change as well. Sometimes we change values in subtle ways; the practices that sustain a value through time keeping it alive enrich that value by virtue of making it relevant to the predicament of new generations within a relatively stable culture. Sometimes, however, we change values in drastic ways, as when we appeal to traditional values to make sense of radically different circumstances. Patriotic loyalty, for example, is a very different value in the context of warring city-states than in the context of a globalized, deeply interconnected world. Precisely because values are part of an impermanent flux, responding to values always entails a creative moment.

Normative terrains, however, are relatively stable ecosystems of values, and it is usually not until the moment of the encounter with difference that a demand for a creative response becomes apparent. When we enter a new normative terrain, we typically experience tension. The skills and habits we have acquired over time fail to meet the demands of the terrain. What is required is a creative response beyond the routine exercises of well established practices for sustaining relatively stable and flexible value commitments.

In the example we considered in the previous chapter, when Zhou enters the new normative terrain of American higher education, he initially experiences significant difference as normative tension. He is confused because in the new situation he cannot recognize the values that structured the learning experiences to which he knew so well how to respond as a student in China. He is also frustrated because he judges his peers' conduct as violating his value commitments. Initially, for example, he thinks that to be constantly questioning the authority of the professor undermines the very possibility of putting oneself in the position of learning from a more experienced other. However, as he comes to learn the features of the terrain and figures out how to respond, the tensions dissolve. Or, heeding to the important insight of agonism, he manages to make the tensions creative rather than destructive.

Just like we do when we encounter a new physical terrain, when entering a new normative terrain, we gradually learn to perceive its salient features, pick up skills for coping, and become familiar with the modes of conduct other people employ to inhabit the terrain. Experiences of the tension of encountering the strange and growing used to it are of great interest for us because, I argue, it can tell us much about what it is like to be "at home in the world" (Brennan, 1997, *passim*) and "regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors" (Plutarch, *On the Fondations of Alexander,* in Nussbaum 2002a, p. 7), so central to cosmopolitanism.

The picture of the world as thoroughly interconnected and impermanent and the ontological picture of values in terms of continuity and emergence described in the previous chapter find a phenomenological source and an intuition that provides the content to its concepts (in the Kantian sense) in an experience in two moments. First, there is the moment of encounter with difference in terms of tension and dissonance. Then, there is the moment of emerging

familiarity, of turning dissonance into art, of making tension creative. The dynamic between these two moments is that of learning.[37] In this chapter, I consider the phenomenon of value creation in relation to the dynamics of learning as an experience of movement from dissonance to emerging familiarity.

IV.3. Getting Used to One Another

One of the conclusions we reached from our discussion in the first two chapters is that living in a globalized world demands that we learn to respond creatively to encounters with difference, encounters that destabilize established ways of life as sources of meaning and value. We recognize the destabilization of sources of meaning and value as a problem, especially when the differences across which we stand with people near and far generate disruptive tensions at the level of our deepest loyalties. The universalist response is to transcend particular normative differences towards universal values. The rooted cosmopolitan, without denying that there are instances when it is legitimate to frame questions of difference in terms of particular vs. universal values, insists that in most cases the problem of encounters with difference simply dissolves as we get used to one another. The agonistic cosmopolitan, for her part, is suspicious of both appeals to universality *and* the harmonious coexistence that results from familiarity; agonism welcomes social and political practices that render difference visible and maintain tension alive. David Hansen's educational cosmopolitanism sees learning as the guiding metaphor for the cosmopolitan response to encounters with difference, characterized by a

37 Those familiar with Dewey's oeuvre will recognize the themes of learning and growth as central to his philosophy. One relevant example at the heart of the scholarly literature on cosmopolitan education comes from Hansen (2009b) who gives us an eloquent account of the notion of the "space between," the idea that the world we inhabit is a world between the known and the new and it is precisely the experience of learning, of growing, that embodies the sense of being fully present in the world.

dynamic interplay between tension and harmony. In the final section of this chapter I will return to these four proposals, but at this juncture I would like to focus on the rooted cosmopolitan idea of "get[ting] used to one another" (Appiah, 2006, p. 85) as an entry way into the concepts I will develop throughout the chapter.

I find Appiah's idea that much of the tension that comes from encountering difference dissolves as we get used to one another attractive for two reasons. On the one hand, the notion that the tensions of encounter with difference should invariably point in the direction of transcending the particularities of local cultural interpretations of values towards universal values strikes me as heavy handed and stringent. In this sense, I side with many critics of cosmopolitan universalism when they claim that a moral philosophy so demanding is unlikely to succeed in taking hold of people's hearts and conduct (see, for example, Barber, 2002; Bok, 2002; Glazer, 2002; Himmelfarb, 2002; McConnel, 2002; Pinsky, 2002; Putnam, 2002a; Taylor, 2002; Walzer, 2002). But in any case, if it were to succeed, its stringency would demand that in every encounter with difference we direct the powers of critical reflection against local loyalties, preferences, and value commitments, and the result would be a caustic philosophy bound to corrode much of cultural diversity.

On the other hand, the idea that the tensions of difference tend to be overcome by simply getting used to one another resonates with experience. Appiah (2006) appeals to both of these intuitions when he offers a colorful array of illustrations to make his case for "the primacy of practice" (pp. 69-85). He argues that what matters is to be able to coordinate our actions in practice even if we cannot agree in principle, that "[w]e can agree about what to do in most cases, without agreeing about why it is right" (p. 71.). He concludes, then, that "what makes conversation across boundaries worthwhile isn't that we're likely to come to a reasoned

agreement about values" (p. 72), but since what matters is that we come to coordinate our responses in practice rather than in principle, the value of conversation, of exchange across differences, is that "it helps people get used to one another" (p. 85), and this helps us live together in harmony.

Whenever Appiah talks about agreeing about values or about principles, he is making reference to the idea of transcending the particularities of values in the context of practice towards the more abstract articulation of values as universals. He articulates his position in response to cosmopolitan universalists when he writes, for example, that "[c]osmopolitans suppose that all cultures have enough overlap in their vocabulary of values to begin a conversation. But they don't suppose, like some universalists, that we could all come to agreement if only we had the same vocabulary" (2006, p. 57). Part of what he has in mind is the distinction between thick and thin concepts, touched upon in the previous chapter. The reason why Appiah is cautious about the prospects of conceptual agreement about values as grounds for understanding across difference is that, as noted, he is committed to the primacy of practice, and in practice, when "actually at work" (p. 46), even thin concepts like "good," or "right" are "thickly enmeshed in the complications of particular social contexts" (ibid.). Making reference to Michael Walzer (1994), Appiah notes that "morality starts out thick. It's when you're trying to find points of agreement with others, say, that you start to abstract out the thin concepts that may underlie the thick ones" (2006, pp. 46-47).

The examples through which Appiah constructs his narrative of the primacy of practice are diverse and wide ranging: From how people agree on the wrongness of stealing without agreeing on the reasons why, to how changes in practice and values take place, like the introduction of male circumcision amongst the Asante and the end of foot-binding in China, and

how in multicultural societies, from medieval Spain under the Moors to 21st Century liberal democratic United States, communities with theoretically incompatible systems of belief manage to live together in harmony. All of these are examples of how people coordinate their responses to the world practically even when disagreement about values remains. Through arguments and illustrations, Appiah seems to heat up an important insight without ever bringing it to its boiling point: That values are deeply entangled in practice, that they emerge from practice, and that the normative significance of "agree[ing] about practices while disagreeing about their justification" (p. 70), and being able to "live together without agreeing on what the values are that make it good to live together" (p. 71), constitute cases of the creation of emergent new values[38].

IV.4. Different Versions of Familiarity.

The take away lesson from Appiah's discussion on the primacy of practice is that growing familiar, "get[ting] used to one another" (p. 85), is central to learning how to coordinate our responses to the world in practice. The implication is that the center piece of a cosmopolitan education would be to make the conditions available for growing familiarity as central to coordination of responses to the world. The version of cosmopolitanism I recommend here also places the experience of coordinating our responses to the world in practice as central to a cosmopolitan education, but not all such experiences are the same. I want to claim that what makes the difference for a cosmopolitan education is one special kind of experience of growing familiarity: the experience of value creation. We will get to this through Dewey's idea of

38 This might be explained by an apparent commitment on Appiah's part to a rejection of what G.E. Moore called the "naturalistic fallacy," which translates into a rejection of the continuum of natural, organic life and normative experience on which I ground the theory of value creation here proposed. (see, for example, Appiah 2008b pp. 164-204)

adjustment, but leading to it, let us first consider important distinctions amongst different ways in which we use the expression "getting used to one another."

That something which was once strange becomes familiar could mean, for example, that a significant difference has been effaced. "I am getting used to the way people express their feelings here in the U.S.," might say an immigrant from Scandinavia, "I grew up in a culture where reservation about emotions is perceived as a virtue and, naturally, I initially found it rather distasteful to express my feeling openly like we do here." To get used to other people in this case means to become *comfortable with their way of doing things*, and partake in their practices. The Scandinavian immigrant comes to appreciate modes of communication that she first rejected and makes them her own: the tension of the encounter with difference gradually disappears.

By contrast, the idea of getting used to one another could mean something quite different. Chester, an American expatriate is hosting a group of friends visiting from Boston at a restaurant he manages in Buenos Aires. Around two a.m. a police car stops in front of the restaurant. Chester grabs two drinks and an envelope, and heads out to greet them. They chat casually for two minutes and the policemen leave with the booty. "What was that?" his friends ask Chester, "Did you just bribe the police?" Chester shrugs and answers: "I refused to do it at first, you know, on moral grounds. But it became a world of trouble, and soon I learned that that's how things are done here. I got used to it by now." In this case, the initial tension caused by moral outrage and impotence gave way to a way of living together in relative harmony by means of a change in Chester's actions. However, rather than experiencing this change as growth, as an expansion of his normative resources, Chester experiences it as a moral defeat.

Let us consider yet another hypothetical case. Cecile is a graduate student in a pre-service teaching training program. She is student-teaching a seventh grade class in an inner city Harlem

public school, working with an experienced supervising teacher. One day, the supervising teacher calls in sick and Cecile is in charge of the class. Chaos ensues. The next day before class, in clear distress, Cecile describes the situation to her supervising teacher. Listening to the descriptions of disruptive behavior, the experienced teacher nods deeply and says: "I am familiar with that type of behavior." What she means by this is yet a different sense of becoming familiar with the way other people do things: that we come to understand how they work, and we know how to control their behavior.

The point of these illustrations is to show that, even at the level of the mundane and ordinary, "getting used to one another" can take various forms. It can take the form of expanding one's repertoire of responses in thought, feeling, and action to include the ways of the other, and to do it gladly like the Scandinavian immigrant. It could even take the more extreme form of conversion; we only need to imagine our Scandinavian friend not only adding modes of emotional communication picked up in America, but even renouncing forever the kind of self-restraint that characterizes her native culture. Becoming familiar with the other can take the form of a reluctant adoption of modes of conduct without espousing the values underlying it, like the restaurant owner who partakes in police bribery. A growing familiarity can take the form of mastery of the mechanisms that structure a kind of behavior for the purposes of controlling it, disabling it, and even drive it to decay within a culture. The experienced teacher familiarizing herself with the conduct of her students to be able to successfully manage her classroom is one example of this being done with presumable good intentions and arguably for the sake of desirable and moral consequences. We can conceive, however, practices like the systematic study and manipulation of consumer behavior in which the marketing and advertisement

industries engage in markets around the world as couched in this language of growing familiarity. And we can easily imagine even less desirable and less moral examples as well.

IV.5. A Passage from Disturbance into Harmony

We can indeed imagine many kinds of uses of the expression "getting used to one another," but the challenge here is to make the meaningful distinctions that can help us identify what it is about certain experiences of moving from the disruptive tension of encountering difference to the creative tension of making lives of meaning and value together. In his *A Common Faith*, Dewey introduces a distinction amongst three concepts normally employed interchangeably: "accommodation," "adaptation," and "adjustment." This distinction gives us an entry point into Dewey's views on the genesis of values and, I argue, it shall help us identify a sense of growing familiarity of great significance for cosmopolitan education. The idea is that human experience is marked by the struggle of coping with problematic situations. When a problem arises, we experience it as a disruption of equilibrium between organism and environment; coping entails a restoration of equilibrium. *Adjustment*, as a technical term in the sense developed in *A Common Faith*, is a way of coping with problematic situations characterized by a disposition for self and world transformation rather than solely restoration of equilibrium.

The constant flux that marks experience comes in a myriad ways, from the unrelenting birth and decay of molecules in the body, to the rise and tide of thoughts in the mind. In terms of the *normative* quality of experience, however, a particularly significant dimension of flux is the rhythm of how, in Dewey's words, "[t]he live being recurrently loses and reestablishes equilibrium with his surroundings" (1987, p.23). This is particularly significant for the question

of the nature and genesis of values because values emerge from intense experiences of goods, of desired and desirable aspects of experience. "The moment of passage from disturbance into harmony," Dewey writes, "is that of intensest life" (ibid.). Moments of "getting used to one another" (Appiah, 2006, p. 85), of "turning dissonance into legitimate forms of political struggle" (Todd, 2010, p. 216), or "learn[ing] something genuinely new and different" (Hansen, 2009a, p. 206) are cases of this "passage from disturbance into harmony" (Dewey, 1987, p. 23).

"In a finished world," Dewey continues, "sleep and waking could not be distinguished. In one wholly perturbed, conditions could not even be struggled with" (ibid.). Both the views that values are eternal and unchanging and that they are so evanescent that they can only amount to mere feeling are so dangerously removed from the experience of values in the actual world that they require alternative metaphysics to justify them: a realm of platonic Forms or a realm of private language. In a world like ours, in the world of actual experience, "moments of fulfillment punctuate experience with rhythmically enjoyed intervals" (ibid.). Cosmopolitanism is concerned with creating lives of meaning and value in this world of ours. The key is to cultivate ways of life that enable individuals and communities to respond to the normative demands of the world in ways that "moment[s] of passage from disturbance into harmony" take place in "rhythmically enjoyed intervals" (ibid.). And since the world is intensely interconnected and impermanent, making the disruptive function of encounters across difference a general feature of the human condition, a life of meaning and value would entail the capacity to respond to such encounters in a way that a "passage from disruption into harmony" (ibid.) can be secured, and can be secured with confidence and frequently, in "rhythmically enjoyed intervals." (ibid.)

As mentioned above, in *A Common Faith*, Dewey (1986a) introduces an insightful distinction amongst three terms that represent different modes of restoration of equilibrium

between live creature and its surroundings: “adaptation,” “accommodation,” and “adjustment” (p. 11). “All of these terms,” Joas (2000) writes, “imply coming to terms with unalterable circumstances; we always act under given conditions and must always take account of these” (p. 111). The conditions of globalization constitute the “unalterable circumstances” of which cosmopolitanism must take account and to which it must respond.

The term Dewey employs to refer to passive reorientation of behavior according to the demands of circumstances is “accommodation.” Sometimes accommodation provides the most economic and efficient mode of conduct to restore equilibrium to a situation, to cope with a problem in a situation. However, as Joas (2000) reminds us, if accomodation becomes the rule that governs our conduct in general, we call it “fatalistic resignation or submission to circumstances” (p. 112). We remember from our discussion in the introduction that there are responses to globalization that are characterized by the spirit of submission to circumstances. This becomes particularly problematic when individuals and communities accommodate to globalizing trends, unreflectively adopting new ways of life and letting rich cultural traditions decay.

The second term, “adaptation,” refers to the strategic function of transforming environing conditions to meet the needs of the organism. This method seeks restoration of equilibrium between organism and environment by means diametrically opposite to those pursued through accommodation. We witness the self-serving nature of adaptation in the many one-sided reactions to globalization, such as nationalisms and tribalisms that create artificial boundaries separating communities. We also see forms of traditionalism that require drastic interventions to prevent changes in culture, technology, and the economy. Dewey believes that accommodation and adaptation can only provide modes of response that are functionally successful only under

very specific conditions, but prove to be undesirable when employed as a general orientation towards the world. In other words, both accommodation and adaptation fail to sustain critical examination of their equilibrium-restoring function under a wide range of conditions. It is not in these modes of response to the world, then, that we find the model for a value-generative function in human action.

The third term, "adjustment," is Dewey's candidate for an ideal, and it involves an active, reflective, and responsive attitude of the individual towards the world through which both individual and environment are transformed. Consider the example Dewey gives of adjustment. He quotes a writer—he does not mention a name—who says:

> "I broke down from overwork and soon came to the verge of nervous prostration. One morning after a long and sleepless night . . . I resolved to stop drawing upon myself so continuously and begin drawing upon God. I determined to set apart a quiet time every day in which I could relate my life to its Ultimate Source, regain the consciousness that in God I live, move and have my being. That was thirty years ago. Since then I have had literally not one hour of darkness or despair." (1986a, pp. 10-11)

Dewey comments that this is an "impressive record" (p. 11), but not a proof of the existence of God or anything like that. The only thing "proved" by such an experience is "the existence of some complex of conditions that have operated to effect an adjustment in life, an orientation, that brings with it a sense of security and peace" (ibid). The same language of "complex conditions," "adjustment," and "orientation" could be applied to describe experiences like learning the right form for running barefoot, learning the right drumstick grip for playing drums, or any case of growing into the "gentle, nurturing *poiesis*" of mastering a craft, to use the language that Dreyfus and Kelly exploit in their *All Things Shinning* (2011, p. 212). These are examples of cases of adjustment in the sense that they entail a reorientation of the whole attitude towards the task at hand, a reorientation by means of which aspects of the situation that under previous conditions

operated as impediments, now, under adjusted conditions, function as contributing aspects of the task: the hard wood that moved clumsily between wet fingers, tiring hand muscles and deepening blisters now gladly bounces between hand and drum skin, and there is no movement of the drumstick that the hand cannot anticipate; the rugged pavement that hurt skin and joints at every step now provides the feedback the body needs to readjust its posture from toes to shoulders, and running becomes more energizing and less taxing. These examples are certainly less of an "impressive record" (1986a, p.11) compared to the tremendous achievement of thirty years without "one hour of darkness or despair" (ibid.), but their nature is continuous.

The capacity to respond to a new normative terrain also partakes in this form of adjustment. Dewey argues that "experiences having the force of bringing about a better, deeper and enduring adjustment in life" (ibid.), like any case of "gentle, nurturing *poiesis*" (Dreyfus & Kelly, 2012, p. 212), "are not so rare and infrequent as they are commonly supposed to be. They occur frequently in connection with many significant moments of living" (2008,p. 11). The point of his philosophy of religion is to "rescue [this function of adjustment] through emancipation from dependence upon specific types of beliefs and practices" (ibid.). The significance for our discussion is to elucidate the function of adjustment in creative responses to encounters with normative difference.

IV.6 Holistic Transformation

The distinctive mark of adjustment is its holistic character. As Joas (2000) puts it, "our whole person is at issue, and not only individual desires or needs in their relation to environmental conditions" (p. 112). The holistic character of adjustment renders "modifications to our person ... permanent and stabilized against changes in the environmental conditions" (p.

112). Dewey puts it thus, "It is a change *of* will conceived as the organic plenitude of our being, rather than any special change *in* will" (1986a, pp. 12-13). This self that is experienced holistically, "as the organic plenitude of our being" is a function of the creative imagination. "The *whole* self is an ideal, an imaginative projection" (Dewey, 1986a, p.14). Joas (2000) reminds us that for Dewey imaginary does not mean a reduction to a status of illusion, but rather the function that allows for "awareness of all possibilities" (p. 114 fn 35). And it is the source of value. In Buddhist language, we would say it represents the state of *chū,* accounting for both its manifest reality (*ke*), and its imaginative possibilities (*kūu*). When Dewey refers to the imagination, he means imagination as "intervening" in the world rather than "supervening" (a distinction introduced by Santayana). The creative work of the imagination is not to paint a picture of a world beyond reality, but to reveal possibilities in actual conditions and realize them. For Dewey values or ideals are "the product of creative processes in which contingent possibilities are idealized" (Joas, 2000, p. 114)

"[W]hen the imagination idealizes existence by laying hold of the possibilities offered to thought and action," Dewey writes, "[t]he idealizing imagination seizes upon the most precious things found in the climacteric moments of experience and projects them. We need no external criterion and guarantees for their goodness. They are had, they exist as good, and out of them we frame our ideal ends" (1986a, p. 33). But we should remember the process of value creation involves *experimental* inquiry, and in this sense it becomes crucial that the imagination *intervenes* in the world. By "seiz[ing] upon the most precious things found in…experience and project[ing] them" (ibid.), Dewey means not just turning experiences into objects of idle contemplation and admiration, but possessing these goods in as full an understanding as possible

of its causes and conditions so to be able to reproduce them, intensify them, improve them in further experience, and realize them in diverse contexts as much as possible.

The intervention of imagination in actual conditions of experience involves both a kind of self-cultivation, in the sense that Hansen develops in his theory of cosmopolitanism, and a kind of receptiveness to the flows and demands of events, a kind of sensitivity to the "moods" that permeate situations and constitute their normative demands.[39] The metaphor of normative terrains captures both sides as it is, in fact, a collaboration (or a creative struggle, if you will) between conditions in the terrain that offer challenges and possibilities, and the skills and resources of the individual that encounters them.

IV.7. Collapsing the Dualism of Subject and Object

Dewey develops the concept of adjustment in the context of his philosophy of religion, but I am interested in how this idea figures in his philosophy of value[40]. Adjustment represents an ideal mode of coping with problematic situations characterized by an ongoing process where self and world constantly emerge together and where values are created. This view on the nature and origin of values is clearly grounded in the metaphysics of transactional realism described in

39 The theme of mood has been recently explored with exquisite eloquence by Dreyfus and Kelly (2012). The idea of "gentle, nurturing *poiesis*" (p. 212), introduced earlier, entails a mode of response to the "mood" of a situation.

40 Dewey's views on the nature, function, and genesis of values developed over the span of his long career and across a variety of philosophical subjects. Naturally, his works on metaphysics and logic (*Experience and Nature* (1925), *Logic: A Theory of Inquiry* (1938)) feature important moments in the development of his philosophy of values. We also find significant contributions to this strand of his thought in works on moral and political theory (*Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), *The Public and Its Problems* (1927)), education (*Democracy and Education* (1916)), and aesthetics (*Art as Experience* (1934)). Dewey even wrote a short piece explicitly addressing the question of the theory of value, *Theory of Valuation* (1939), originally composed as an entry to the *International Encyclopaedia of Unified Sciences*. A thorough scholarly account of Dewey's philosophy of value would draw extensively from all these sources. The goal of this chapter, however, is to reconstruct a Deweyan conception of value creation for the purpose of the theory of cosmopolitan education. I put the focus of my investigation, then, on Dewey's writings on religion, where his most complete articulation of his views on values is to be found (Joas, 2000, p. 103), and on his theory of inquiry, where the structure of the generation of meanings in general, including values in particular, is most clearly elucidated.

detail in the previous chapter. As one would expect from a theory thus metaphysically grounded, Dewey's ideas on the nature of values develop against the backdrop of a critique of the dualism of subject and object and theories that grow from that dualism: value objectivism and value subjectivism. Objectivisitic and subjectivisitic conceptions, Dewey believed, dominated debates on the nature of values and arguably continue to structure our everyday understanding of values. We tend to think of values either as objective entities beyond the flux of experience, or as thoroughly relative, consisting in mere cultural or subjective preferences.

Under both objectivistic and subjectivistic conceptions of value, however, value creation, the concept with which we are concerned in this chapter, looses traction. It either becomes empty—if values are objective but fixed and beyond experience, their origin must be divorced from any form of intentionality, which leaves out any possibility for a meaningful sense of creativity as involved in the process—or trivial—if values are thoroughly relative and subjective, to say a value is created would be like speaking of a painting created in my mind: for creation to be non-trivial it must involve a struggle of intentionality with the constraints of an objective world.

From an objectivist point of view, values are discovered, not made. From a subjectivist perspective, values are made, or made up, not discovered in the world. When the debate is locked in an objectivist /subjectivist dichotomy, these options are mutually exclusive. To the question of whether values are discovered or made, however, Hilary Putnam offers an avowedly and characteristically Deweyan answer that defies the either/or logic of dualism. "[W]e make ways of dealing with problematic situations," he writes, "and we discover which ones are better and which worse" (2002, p. 97). The answer, in a classic Deweyan move, aims at dismantling the underlying dichotomy. For Dewey, values emerge from the specific existential condition of

coping with problematic situations. And from the perspective of that concrete context, we cannot abstract making from discovery, which are irreducible moments of the experience of creativity, and which Dewey often refers to as "doing and undergoing" (1987, p. 46). We intervene in the world, we *make*, we *do*, and we experience the world (including the effects of our past interventions), we *discover*, we *undergo*.

The important point to stress here is that, in Dewey's view, processes of coping with problematic situations involve not only experimentation and reasoning to discover better ways of dealing with problems according to predetermined ends and values. Putnam (2004) makes it clear that the idea of judging one approach to solving a problem as better than another does not mean that judgment must always be "'instrumental'… in the classical sense" (p. 97), by which he means the type of judgment where a means is considered as to its suitability to achieve a predetermined and fixed end.[41] The process of inquiry, in Putnam's words, "involves incessant reconsideration of both means *and* ends" (ibid.).

For example, in dealing with a problematic situation, we evaluate different means in their capacity to achieve our desired ends, but often in the process our ends come under scrutiny and revision as well. And in the final analysis what we seek is a restoration of equilibrium between a living organism and its environment—the disruption of equilibrium *is* the problematic situation that we seek to resolve. Sometimes we achieve it through securing means to attain predetermined goals, "ends-in-view," to use Dewey's term, and sometimes we achieve it by means of revising the ends we pursue. As Putnam puts it: "changing one's values is not only a legitimate way of solving a problem, but frequently the only way of solving a problem" (p. 98).

41 This is what Hickman (1990) calls "straight-line instrumentalism" (p. 148 and *passim*)

This observation is particularly poignant for our discussion of cosmopolitanism. As we have seen, cosmopolitanism as a coherent philosophical position on values emerges as a response to problematic situations when it is indeed the case that "changing one's values is…the only way of solving a problem" (ibid). Consider the problems of environmental degradation, of the interconnectedness and fragility of the global economy, and of holding value commitments in pluralistic societies where values comes constantly under pressure. As we discussed in the introduction, there is no way to approach these challenges without revising our deepest seated values. To understand Dewey's position on the question of value creation, what matters is to keep in mind and recurrently return to the significant context of coping with problematic situations, which is the inescapable existential condition within which even purely abstract speculation about values takes place.

IV.8. Practical, Iterative, and Social

Another way of reading Dewey's theory of value creation is in terms of three important aspects of his theory of inquiry about values: That inquiry is *practical*, *iterative*, and *social*. Inquiry is practical in the sense that it takes place within the significant context of coping with a problematic situation. Through such coping, meanings and values emerge as outcomes of the process, but also as potential tools, instruments for further coping in eventual problematic situations. Because of its inescapably practical and situational context, inquiry must be experimental, and knowledge must always be limited by the demands of the relevant context. If knowledge is necessarily limited by contextual conditions, it can always be improved upon and expanded: inquiry must also be iterative. Dewey, as a pragmatist, was a deeply committed fallibilist. Finally, inquiry is social; it is carried out by a community of inquiry. Problematic

situations themselves are social in nature —the very concepts that we need to think through a situation to experience it as significantly *problematic* are developed and acquired socially. Inquiry, being contextual and fallible, requires a community to which we can turn for confirmation and correction of the results of experimentation.

IV.8.a. Value Inquiry as Practical: Instrumentalism about Values

Dewey's philosophical project was motivated by practical concerns; he wanted philosophy to address the 'problems of man' (2008e, p. 15) and wanted to provide an account of how it was that ideas intervene in experience and can transform it. "A first rate test of the value of any philosophy," Dewey suggested, would be to ask: "Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful?" (1981, p. 18). Charlene Haddock Seigfried notes that in "making theory answer to practice" (1993, p. 127), Dewey reverses the order of priority set up by Plato and permeating philosophical theory for centuries, one where practice and experience must be made to conform to the ideals determined by theory.

In developing a theory of values, Dewey was, then, chiefly concerned with what he saw as a dominant conception of values as objects of contemplation, as providing inspiration at best, but more often than that, merely offering an escape from reality, an "unwarranted optimism that paralyses action" (Joas, 2000. p. 105). In this sense, we can say that Dewey's philosophy of value represents an "emancipatory move" (Haddock Seigfried, 1993, p. 127).[42] It is against this

42 Haddock Seigfried is particularly interested in how Dewey's philosophy empowers women, whose experiences had historically been particular targets of repression and distortion by philosophical theory.

backdrop, that we read Dewey's theory of values as part of his instrumentalism: values are like tools that we employ to cope with problematic situations, and as such, they are thoroughly embedded in the means-end chain of human action. "*If* ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity," Dewey writes in his 1920 *Reconstruction in Philosophy,* "then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work" (recons Phil. p. 128). And recognizing that this conception of philosophy represented a radical break with the history of Western thought, in the introduction to the 1948 edition of *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Dewey suggests that in order to address "the troubled affairs of the present" (2003, p. vii) what was required was a "reconstruction *of* philosophy" rather than any "reconstruction *in* philosophy" (see Phillips, 2012). We may say that Dewey called for an *adjustment* of the practice of philosophy to the "problems of man." (2008e, p. 15)[43]

For Dewey, means and ends are mutually implicated in a continuum where any means can become an end, and vice versa. Therefore, all values are simultaneously intrinsic and instrumental (Dewey, 1985, p. 251), material and instruments for further creation. Even the most likely candidates for the category of ultimate value, "life," "happiness," "justice," all potentially play an instrumental function in coping with a problematic situation. Leaving cliche misinterpretations of Dewey aside, it is nonetheless true that there is an element of reductionism in Dewey's theory of values. "In his work," writes Joas (2000), "we do indeed find statements bluntly rejecting any talk of 'ultimate finalities,' of ultimate values, absolute validities or inherent qualities" (2000, p. 104). This is a rejection, Joas notes, that does not come just in

43 Notice that Dewey, in speaking of a reconstruction *of* philosophy, as supposed to a reconstruction *in* philosophy, calls for a change *holistic* in nature, employing the same distinction he uses in describing adjustment as a change *of* will rather than a change *in* will.

passing, but is "also announced programmatically and unequivocally" (ibid.). Reductionism in Dewey's theory of values results from his commitments to contextualism and transactional realism: it is precisely because meanings emerge within contexts of significance and as a result of transactions between organism and environment that there can be no "ultimate finality" when it comes to values, because there is always going to be a further context and unexplored contacts that limit the extension of any meaning. The trouble with both objectivism and subjectivism about values is that they both identify values with ends, and divorce them from means and the means-ends continuum.[44] This rejection of ultimate finalities central to Dewey's instrumentalism sets the theory of value creation here presented in tension with theories of value that insist on the importance of a non-instrumental aspect of (some) value(s).

For Dewey, any object of knowledge, including values, can never be merely discovered without that entailing a kind of action which contributes to the constitution of the object itself. "[K]nowing is itself a kind of action," writes Dewey (1984, p.134). It is a kind of action that "progressively and securely clothes natural existence with realized meanings" (ibid.) Meanings in general and values in particular are the results of creative action. Even objects of sensory perception are not "fixed in themselves" (ibid.) but the outcomes of inquiry: "known objects exist as the consequences of directed operations, not because of conformity of thought or observation with something antecedent" (ibid., p.160.). The same applies to values.

Epistemologically, Dewey's conception of inquiry as practical activity in the context of coping with problematic situations, must be understood as related to his rejection of the

44 That is, incidentally, their problematic appeal: that it allows for an unchecked development of instrumentalities as if separate from matters of value. Lord Lionel Robbins famously articulated this dualism of means and ends thus: "If we disagree about ends it is a case of thy blood or mine—or live or let live according to the importance of the difference, or the relative strength of our opponents. But if we disagree about means, then scientific analysis can often help us resolve our differences. If we disagree about the morality of the taking of interest (and we understand what we are talking about), then there is no room for argument." *On the Nature and Significance of Economic Science*. London: MacMillan, 1932 p. 132.) Quoted in Putnam (2004) p. 54.

"spectator theory" of knowledge, which he thought dominated western philosophy. This kind of theory takes objects as independent from the subject, fixed and, Dewey believed, it often comes hand in hand with a "quest for certainty," the search for unquestionable foundations of knowledge. Under Dewey's account of the process of inquiry, by contrast, the individual is not a spectator of a complete world, but an agent partaking in the constant co-creation of an unfinished universe.

For Dewey, knowledge in general and knowledge about values in particular is understood as problem-solving, by contrast to the metaphor of "spectator." Under the spectator metaphor, values are objects of knowledge "fixed in themselves" (1984, p. 134), things to be perceived, recognized, contemplated. Under the problem-solver metaphor, a metaphor that gives primacy to action, values are both things to be employed in action, and the outcomes of creative action.

For example, in the problematic situation of hunger, an organic impulse leads to the desire for food—a desire for Dewey is more than mere organic impulse, it includes a conceptual dimension; in this case, the concept of food or at the very least the means-ends reasoning that allows us to understand that eating food will satiate hunger. Instrumentality "in the classical sense" (Putnam, 2004, p. 97) would apply, for example, to the many physical, technical, and institutional tools that we use to facilitate the securing of food, like the machinery used in agricultural production, the technical knowledge that cooks employ in putting together a meal, the institutions that coordinate the distribution of goods across states, and more. These are instrumentalities that provide means to achieve the pre-established end of satiating hunger (along with countless other ends involved in the act of eating including the aesthetic pleasure of flavors, the partaking in communal rituals, and more). Some of the instrumentalities involved in the process are values. Farmers employ the values of a work ethic, the banks that finance the

technological investments for food production operate under certain values of effectiveness and fairness —however suspect their interpretations might be, and despite deeper, darker values present in the mix—, and the truck driver that brings milk to your local convenience store is motivated by the value of responsibility towards his family, for whose sake he goes to work every day. These and other values are part of the complex of instrumentalities that make it possible for you to successfully pursue your pre-established end of satiating your hunger. All of these cases can be thought of in terms of instrumentality "in the classical sense." (ibid.)

However, in the context of coping with problematic situations, we often employ values as tools in a way that transform our ends and purposes, and this is a sense of instrumentality that the "classical" sense does not capture. It's like the painter who has an image in his mind that he intends to reproduce. He grabs a brush and proceeds to apply paint on the canvas following the contours of the image he has in mind, but his control of the brush is not perfect, and the bristles of the brush do their own little dance, about which there is little he can do. A bristle on the outside bends inward pushing against the others, opening a ditch in the thick patch of oil paint; another bristle bends outward and docilely moves around lumps on the canvas and grainy particles, and in its twists and turns splashes tiny drops of oily color sometimes inches away from the brush. The painter creates a surface of color with an image in mind, an end-in-view. He makes; he does. The results do not match the mental image perfectly, and as he realizes in the act of painting, his mental image is often underdetermined, not specific enough to provide perfectly precise guidance to the task of painting. The emerging image on the canvas has a quality, which the painter experiences as unique and compelling in its own way, as different from the mental image that guided him. He undergoes a visual perceptual experience and identifies value in it. He discovers beauty in it, and proceeds to pursue the particular instance of that value of beauty as it

manifests on the canvas, instead of, or in addition to, the original mental image. He now responds not only to the normative demands of his original vision, but to the normative demands of this object in the real world in front of him as well. The instrument, by virtue of the quality of its intervention in the world, transforms the ends and values for whose sake it was put to use. The function of instrumentality runs through both moments of doing and undergoing; the instrumental value of values is cashed out not only in terms of making, as brush strokes form on the canvas, but also in terms of discovering, as the aesthetic qualities of each stroke inspire the painter and compel him in particular creative directions[45].

Analogously, in coping with the problematic situation of hunger we might resort to a value to help us navigate through the process of restoration of equilibrium. We might, for example, resort to the values of self-restraint and patience to be able to endure the demands of hunger long enough to finish the work day at the office, after which it would be much easier to secure food. But as we employ these values, much like the paint brush, they leave the mark of their own qualities on the face of our purposes and ends. Gradually, what was originally and simply desired —satiation of hunger, satisfaction— acquires nuance. It is no longer a simple, irresistible demand. Satisfaction is still a value, but it can be controlled, which allows us to combine it with other goods, like keeping a work schedule, observing good manners in social situations, or sticking to a dietary regimen. The instrumentality of the values of self-restraint and patience have effectively transformed the ends and purposes of action. And this type of instrumental function is genuinely *value creative*.

45 In Art as Experience (1987), Dewey provides an account of the process of artistic creation in just these terms (see, for example, Chapter 3, "Having an Experience," pp.43-64)

IV.8.b. Value Inquiry as Iterative: The Desired, the Desirable, and Values

A value is the outcome of a iterative process of refinement that originates in an immediately enjoyed good in experience, something *desired*, and culminates in the identification of aspects of experience that are *desirable*. Mere pre-reflective, organic behavior, already includes intentionality in the sense of pursuing satisfaction of the organism's needs in the resources of the environment, and already includes an element of preference for one course of action over others. Joas makes the point that preferences "do not emanate from conscious decisions of choice," but that rather "such decisions only become necessary when the various preferences conflict either with one another or with the conditions prevailing in a given situation" (2000, p.106.). As mentioned already, for Dewey, even desires and interests are more than mere impulse, they already possess an ideational dimension. Desires and interests emerge from consideration of impulses in light of conditions and consequences. Dewey writes, "Vital impulses are doubtless conditions *sine qua non* for the existence of desires and interests. But the latter include foreseen consequences along with ideas in the form of the signs of the measures (involving expenditure of energy) required to bring the ends into existence" (1988a, p. 207)[46]. In other words, desires and interests already possess the qualities that allow us to reflect on their desirability. A value for Dewey is, in Joas' words, "only that which sustains such a reflected character—not the vital impulses in the background" (p.107). Reflective processes of this kind are what determines the difference between the "desired" and the "desirable."

Dewey writes,

46 In *Experience and Education*, Dewey offers the following succinct and poignant articulation of the same idea: "A genuine purpose always starts with an impulse. Obstruction of the immediate execution of an impulse converts it into a desire. Nevertheless neither impulse nor desire is itself a purpose. A purpose is an end-view. That is, it involves foresight of the consequences which will result from acting upon impulse. Foresight of consequences involves the operation of intelligence. It demands, in the first place, observation of objective conditions and circumstances." (1988b, p. 43)

> "The 'desirable,' or the object which *should* be desired (valued), does not descend out of the a priori blue nor descend as an imperative from a moral Mount Sinai. It presents itself because past experiences has shown that hasty action upon uncriticized desire leads to defeat and possibly to catastrophe. The 'desirable' as distinct from the 'desired' does not then designate something at large or a priori. It points to the difference between the operation and consequences of unexamined impulses and those of desires and interests that are the product of investigation of conditions and consequences…the distinction between 'is' in the sense of the object of a casually emerging desire and the 'should be' of a desire framed in relation to actual conditions is a distinction which in any case is bound to offer itself as human beings grow in maturity and part with the childish disposition to 'indulge' every impulse that arises." (1988a, p. 219)

There is nothing mysterious about the reflective process by means of which the desirable emerges from the merely desired; it is part of common every day experience. It is what happens when we say that we learn from experience and, by extension and through social relations and communication, from others people's experiences, education, and culture. The reflected character of values, and the process by means of which values form is the *differentia*, the difference that makes the difference, in Hansen's formula for a cosmopolitan orientation: "reflective openness to the new, combined with reflective loyalty to the known" (2010a, p. 6) . A Deweyan conception of value-formation undergirds Hansen's notion of cultural creativity as central to his cosmopolitanism.

Referring to this distinction between the desired and the desirable, and conveniently adjusting the terms to "valued" and "valuable," Putnam (2004) remarks,

> "However, Dewey does not make the error of supposing that merely being valued, as a matter of experiential fact, suffices to make something valu*able*. Indeed, no distinction is more insistent in Dewey's writing than the distinction between the *valued* and the valu*able*. Dewey's answer to the question, 'What makes something valu*able* as opposed to merely being valued?' in a word, is *criticism*. Objective value arises, not from a special 'sense organ,' but from the *criticism of our valuations*. Valuations are incessant and inseparable from all our activities, including our 'scientific' ones; but it is by intelligent reflection on our valuations, intelligent reflection

> of the kind that Dewey calls 'criticism,' that we conclude that some of them are warranted while others are unwarranted (Philosophy, by the way, is described by Dewey as *criticism of criticism!*)" (p. 103)

The desirable is that in experience which remains desirable after experimental inquiry, in particular after the moment in experimental inquiry concerned directly with scrutiny and reflection on the desirability of the desired: *criticism*. In essence, we find in Dewey's theory of values a compelling account of the process by means of which a relative dimension of value, the subjective experience of something as *desired*, and the objective dimension, the intersubjectively shared notion of something as *desirable*, are conjoined in a continuum. And this continuum supplies the grounds for the possibility of overcoming the opposition of value objectivisim and value subjectivisim (Joas, 2000, p. 103), and opens the door for an account of value creation. For Dewey, then, the starting point of any investigation on the nature and genesis of value is not a subject in an objective world as prior to events, but events themselves from which subjectivity and objectivity emerge. The starting point is action. Or, rather, as we explored at length in the previous chapter, *trans*action.

For Dewey, a mature, responsible, and strong commitment to values must come with an understanding of their relations to means for their attainment. Otherwise, all we have at work is the supervening function of the imagination without means for intervention in experience. As understanding of the dynamics of means and ends in relation to a value commitment deepens, the value commitment itself grows stronger. And such deeper understanding of the dynamics of means and ends comes not only in abstract, cognitive terms, but embedded in habits of action. Here is where contextualism comes into play, for habits are formed in the context of concrete problematic situations —if context did not matter, abstract knowledge of rules of conduct would

suffice, and the whole business of our normative lives could be resolved by means of an algorithm for practical reason[47].

But as I have been insisting, objectivism and subjectivism about values, even with all their shortcomings and contradictions, prove hard to shake off and remain the points of reference for any discussion about values even today. Consider the possibility of a position where we attempt to account for values from two starting points simultaneously: the perspective of a subject, with desires, beliefs, feelings, and emotions (what we call intentional and non-intentional mental states) and the perspective of an objective world with a place for natural events, human practices, norms, and institutions. This seems to be possible only as a compromise between objectivism and subjectivism, but one which fails to overcome the dualism on which the positions are founded (see Joas, 2000. p. 106)—at best we get a perspectival dualism where the compromise comes in the form of a fluctuation between two points of view.

However, as I anticipated earlier in the chapter, Dewey overcomes this dualism his usual way, by digging deeper, and dismantling the underlying dichotomy taken for granted. In this case, it is the dualism of subject and object, of self and environment. Joas calls this Dewey's "decisive crucial idea" (2000, p.106), to question the status of subjectivity and objectivity as givens prior to valuations. "What he has in mind, rather," Joas claims, "is a process of interaction through which subjectivity and objectivity first constitute themselves and where, as part of this process, valuations simultaneously arise" (ibid.). Self, world, and values come into being together. In Buddhist language, we would say, they co-arise dependently.

Joas ultimately argues that the opening of the self—he calls it "shattering intersubjectivity"— constitutes the turning point in the process where adjustment takes place.

47 Perhaps as I write these lines, there are people heroically working to create this impossible algorithm.

What Joas has in mind is intersubjective experiences continuous with the experience of communication, which Dewey famously describe as the "most wonderful" (1981, p.132) in chapter 5 of Experience and Nature. Joas writes: "conversation or dialogue is the place where we are confronted with the values of others, and, when we truly open ourselves up, where we consider our own values anew. At the same time, however, provided that it grants us this experience, conversation produces a value commitment to the consummation of intercommunication itself" (2000, p.118). This is the challenge for cosmopolitan education: to prepare people for the task of dialogue across difference for adjustment. Both as a useful instrumentality for the creation of value, and an immediately enjoyable consummatory experience.

For Dewey, Joas reminds us, the process of value creation translates in a sense of "conviction of the presence of ideals which attract us and govern our conduct" (2000, p.116). This is not because ideals are perceived as supernatural, beyond human experience, but precisely for the opposite reason, because ideals are the accomplishment of human creativity and labor, and it is our partaking in that value-creative, ongoing endeavor that renders their presence real. Dewey writes: "Conviction in the moral sense signifies being conquered, vanquished, in out active nature by an ideal end; it signifies acknowledgement of its rightful claim over our desire and purposes" (1986a, p. 16). We are conquered not in the sense that a more powerful being can subject our bodies to their will, not in the sense of accommodation as submission to conditions. We are conquered in the sense that ourselves get lost and found again in adjustment, in the sense that values have a *rightful* claim over our desires and purposes because we *find* the claim *rightful*, because we experience a change *of* will through which we embrace the desires and purposes commanded by values and ideals. Dewey continues, "The authority of an ideal over

choice and conduct is the authority of an ideal, not of a fact, of a truth guaranteed to intellect, not of the status of the one who propounds the truth." (ibid.). We acknowledge the rightful claim of ideals over our desires and purposes not like a truth has a rightful claim over our beliefs. Dewey determines the nature of this acknowledgement explicitly: "Such acknowledgment is practical, not primarily intellectual" (ibid.). The authority of a fact is expressed in a strict demand for belief. To understand that the fact that there is an apple on this table is true entails to believe the apple is there; to understand that 1+1=2, means to believe it is the case. To believe in this sense means to acknowledge *intellectually* the authority of a fact.

The authority of an ideal, by contrast, is expressed in its function to regulate action. What such regulative function demands, however, is not strict like the intellectual rightful claims of facts over beliefs. The acknowledgement of the *practical* rightful claim of ideals over our desires and purposes is, metaphorically, like the practical acknowledgement of the constraints the physical conditions of a space pose on my physical body and my capacity to move about the space. They represent the limits and possibilities of what can be *done* within those conditions. We are dependent on our environing conditions both in the sense that we are subject to the events that our conditions bring about, and in the sense that it is our environing conditions that provide what we need to realize our purposes: "For our dependence is manifested in those relations to the environment that support our undertakings and aspirations as much as it is in the defeats inflicted upon us" (1986a, p.18). Within the constraints of ideals, like within the constraints of physical conditions, however, there is much room for creative action.

IV.8.c. Value Inquiry as Social: Bringing Relative Stability into a World in Flux.

Dewey wrote in *Art as Experience,*

> "There are two sorts of possible worlds in which esthetic experience would not occur. In a world of mere flux, change would not be cumulative; it would not move towards a close. Stability and rest would have no being. Equally it is true, however, that a world that is finished, ended, would have no traits of suspense and crisis, and would offer no opportunity for resolution" (1987, p. 22)

As we saw in chapter three, Dewey's metaphysics embody an exquisite appreciation of the impermanence and interconnectedness of the world, and of the complexity and precariousness into which they translate in experience. One of the ways in which values function creatively to help us cope with problematic situations is to take that complexity and precariousness of experience, "the rapid and roaring stream of events" (1981, p. 133), as Dewey puts it, and bring relative stability and order to it, where meanings enter "a calm and traversable canal" (ibid.). The point of Deweyan instrumentalism, however, is not to forever abandon "the rapid and roaring stream of events" (ibid). The point is to *use* meanings to transform experience, to "rejoin the main stream, and color, temper and compose its course" (ibid.). It is in this sense that the question of "the genesis of values [is] creative" (Garrison, 1997, p. 79). The distinction between the view of values as objects of contemplation, where subject and object are originally separate and rejoined by the act of cognition, and the view of values as instruments for action in the world, where subjectivity and objectivity arise from action together with values, corresponds to the distinction between supervening and intervening imagination.

Dewey believed that an important instrumental means for achieving relative stability of meaning is communication. "Where communication exists," Dewey writes,

> "things in acquiring meaning, thereby acquire representatives, surrogates, signs and implicates, which are infinitely more amenable to management, more permanent and more accommodating [the state of calm and traversable canal], than events in their first estate [when experienced as rapid and roaring events]." (1981, p. 133).

There is a great difference between thinking of signs as "representatives, surrogates...more amenable to management, more permanent and more accommodating" (ibid.) and thinking of them as representing the unchanging and universal essence of a thing. A Deweyan instrumentalism about values is logically linked to a pragmatist conception of language. A great deal of the conceptual work at the heart of Dewey's instrumentalism takes place at the level of the philosophy of language.

Let us consider a "thing," an event in the world "in the first estate," (ibid.) part of "the rapid and roaring stream of events" (ibid.), and let us consider a case that is normatively charged: a young man expected to inherit a family business wants to pursue a career of his choice and travel the world. The place and function of values is very different under an objectivist view compared to the instrumentalism Dewey recommends. From an objectivist view, the event of an expectation in contradiction with a desire is evaluated in connection to values that exists as objective entities. Under the values of filial piety and responsibility, the parents' expectations appear as absolutely compelling, and the desire to create a life for himself is rendered as irresponsible and undesirable. Under the values of self-expression, self-creation, and freedom, the parents' expectations seem oppressive, and the desire to pursue a life of one's choice shines with the light of a calling. Any sense in which language is employed either in conscious thought to guide behavior— "Forget about these silly dreams! Your family has been in this business for generations, and haven't they all had good lives?" or "Are you going to let them dictate your life to you? How can you go on living not knowing what it could have been like to pursue your dreams?"— or in communication with other people, it performs the function of revealing some truth about the event in question. The stable meaning of the event is already settled in terms of

relevant, objectively true values; the moral task is to discover such values and honor them in conduct.

By contrast, from an instrumentalist perspective, we have an event that is certainly endowed with meaning. As we saw, desires and interests already have a cognitive dimension. The desire for self-creation emerges in this person's psychophysical life as an event, but the meaning is, let us imagine, relatively unstable. At times it is perceived as a good thing, as a desire worth pursuing; at different times, by means of an intuition of the negative social consequences of pursuing those desires, for example, the desired is evaluated as undesirable. Communication, then, is not a quest for the objective normative truth of the event in question, but a means for bringing stability to things, as a way to manage the diverging forces of his desires into a more coherent and fulfilling moral life.

The precariousness of experience is part of our condition, and cosmopolitanism keeps a sharp focus on this problem because globalization has intensified it, destabilizing the meanings and values that cultural traditions had painfully cultivated and preserved for generations. An objectivism about values of the kind that constituted the grounds for cosmopolitan universalism, for example, accounts for the stabilization of meaning and value in terms of transcending the particularities of cultural perspectives. The idea is that universal values are absolutely secure and the source of instability is the passions originating from limited, particular points of view. The objectivist would describe Zhou's case as follows. When Zhou comes to America and finds his commitments to the value of academic excellence challenged, it is because he learns that that value was sitting on unstable grounds all along: the less than universal values of discipline, submission to authority, etc. His options are, either loosen his commitment (downgrade it to the level of mere preference), limit it (make it a conditional that works only in certain cultural or

normative contexts), or give it up entirely (and release himself from the anxiety of responding to unstable values) and find a new value commitment: find a value that is truly universal to support his commitment to academic excellence (the cosmopolitan universalist would perhaps nominate a value featured in the classics, something like *self-cultivation*). And the point is that a loosened or limited value commitment is no commitment at all for a universalist, because the path of moral growth points in the direction of weakening the grip of particular preferences, while strengthening commitments to truly universal values: transcending the particular towards the universal; particular preferences are allowed as "sources of richness," but can never trump a commitment to universal values. The stability of value commitments is structured as a chain, which is as strong as its weakest link.

Dewey's instrumentalism approaches the question of the stabilization of meanings and values quite differently. A Deweyan Zhou would not think of a value as an object of contemplation and source of inspiration, but as a tool serving practical purposes. A stable value commitment is not an objective unchallenged truth, but a seamlessly working tool. As Deweyan Zhou finds one of his values destabilized, he encounters the problem of a process disrupted. In this case, as his commitment to academic excellence loses stability, his own process of learning suffers. The creative response for Zhou, as a Deweyan instrumentalist, is to return to the experience of learning, the practical problematic situation for whose sake the value of academic excellence came to be in the first place. Here is where communication plays an important role. Zhou knows that there is something good, something desirable in his experience of learning. There is a good that he used to stabilize by means of his concepts of academic excellence, discipline, and more. These concepts operate as "representatives, surrogates" (Dewey, 1981, p. 133), affording an expansion of the meanings to which a desirable learning experience can be

connected. This enabled Zhou to communicate, to share this good in learning experience with others. The concept, the sign, could be connected to goods in the experiences of other students and find confirmation from the perspective of the teacher as well. All these are connections with meanings unavailable for the "thing" in its "first estate" (Dewey, 1981, p. 133). So, in the next context, in the new normative terrain, Zhou responds to the destabilization of his values by returning to the quality of his learning experience. In communication with these new contacts, employing the signs and surrogates available in this new situation, he creates value, he employs normative language to communicate the goods in his experience, searching for confirmation and correction from his new contacts to restore stability to his value commitments. And the newly expanded meaning of past learning experiences afford new connections, opening ways to new meaningful experiences, including new learning experiences.

There are two upshots to this view on language and values. First, a value commitment reveals itself not as a commitment to an abstract principle only, but as a commitment to a complex of contacts, signs, and to the quality of experience that grounds it all. A value commitment comprises *all of these dimensions of the experience of value*. The other upshot is that in communication we do not transcend our cultural perspective, but we expand it, taking part in meanings across cultural and experiential differences.

IV.9 Values and Language

The conception of values that I have advanced in these pages intentionally demystifies the concept by means of the metaphors it employs. By contrast, the metaphors that underly much talk about values in education today contribute to the impression that values are mysterious and cognitively evasive. And these metaphors are bound up with the dualism of subject and object

that underlies objectivism and subjectivism about values. Talk of values comes typically through the metaphor of Platonic forms, things out there that in experience we only apprehend imperfectly, but which still exert or should exert a commanding influence over our actions, or through the metaphor of an inner core of self, things buried deep, hidden and operative at the heart of our inner lives, as rational individuals or as cultures. The outcome of both metaphors is similar: values are mysterious and compelling because they are not in plain sight and yet they exert influence. At the same time, because of these same reasons, when tensions emerge as a result of normative difference, conversation about values comes with dim prospects of success. Questions of values approach ineffability. When normative differences are severe, for the objectivist it becomes a matter of recognition: "you either see the truth of these values or you don't." For the subjectivist it becomes a "case of thy blood or mine" over which "there is no room for argument," as Lord Lionel Robbins, a famous proponent of value subjectivism, once famously put it.[48]

Part of Dewey's strategy to overcome the dualism of subject and object is to abandon the spectator theory of knowledge and conceive of meaning, knowledge, and value from the perspective of action, where subject and object are already in *inte*raction with each other or, more precisely, they emerge together from a primary *trans*action. It is in the context of this transactional realist conception of meaning, knowledge, and value that Dewey's instrumentalist about values gains significance. This is what Joas (2000) calls Dewey's "decisive crucial idea" (2000, p.106), as explained earlier. Under the spectator theory of knowledge, values are objects of contemplation; under transactional realism, values mediate action, they are tools. One of the

48 From *On the Nature and Significance of Economic Science*. London: MacMillan, 1932 p. 132. Quoted in Putnam (2004) p. 54. For the full passage, see footnote on page 145.

benefits that the metaphor of tools offers for talk about values is that we can enjoy the benefits of intersubjectivity when discussing about values in the concrete context of action. We can learn about the emergence and development of values in society from how physical tools emerge and develop. Consider the following passage from Dewey's *Experience and Nature*, for example:

> "Spears, urns, baskets, snares may have originated accidentally in some consummatory consequence of natural events. But only repetition through concerted action accounts for their becoming institutionalized as tools, and this concert of action depends upon the use of memoranda and communication. To make another aware of the possibility of a use or objective relationship is to perpetuate what is otherwise an incident as an agency; communication is a condition of consciousness." (1981, p. 148)

The same can be said about the process through which values emerge. A new course of action in pursuit of something desired, tried at random, or as a random variation on a previously partially successful course of action, brings about a "consummatory consequence." That new course of action entailed a normative element that guided action, perhaps initially without a name. Let us imagine that Zhou finds a course of action that is neither based on the value of critical thinking and self assertion nor subordination to the authority of the teacher, but something in between and different. For the normative quality of this course of action to ground a new value, it would need to be shared, communicated for concerted action, and, in the process, it would need to become conscious.

Dewey writes, "Immediacy as such is transient to the point of evanescence, and its flux has to be fixed by some easily recoverable and recurrent act within control of the organism, like gesture and spoken sounds, before things can be intentionally utilized"(1981, p. 147-148). This is why for Dewey, "immediacy of existence is ineffable" (1981, p. 74). Dewey describes the stabilizing function of language and communication for generating meaning and establishing the use of things as instrumentalities:

> "A creature might accidentally warm itself by a fire or use a stick to stir the ground in a way which furthered the growth of food-plants. But the effect of comfort ceases with the fire, existentially; a stick even though once used as a lever would revert to the status of being just a stick, unless the relationship between it and its consequence were distinguished and retained. Only language, or some form of artificial signs, serves to register the relationship and make it fruitful in other contexts of particular existence." (1981, p. 148)

An educational experience can be unsettling, and if it is genuine it must be so at least at some level. It typically involves a wide array of emotions, interplay of influences, displays of power, and, as a result, is unpredictable. But the normative language that we employ to describe the experience, the concepts, values, and institutions to which we appeal in order to make sense of an educational experience, they give the experience relative stability.

The institutions and values that sanction the authority of the teacher and make it possible for the students to accept it, for example, make it possible for the educational experience to maintain its relative stability even through otherwise potentially disruptive experiences of pain on the part of the students subject to the authority of the teacher. Values, then, limit the scope of the experience's dynamics, certain movements will be out of bounds, in conflict with the normative demands of the value of authority, for example. The uncertainty of the experience diminishes through a process that takes place experimentally, iteratively. Normative language is tested gradually against primary experience itself. If the process is successful, that is, it is carried out honestly, artfully, with ethical integrity and thoughtfulness, the values brought into the discourse would stabilize the experience without suffocating it. The dynamics of the experience will be limited according to what is desired and, through criticism and communication, what is desirable. In our example, this would include a normative, descriptive language that would discourage undesirable (desired or not) destabilizing dynamics like disrespect or laziness, while

not censuring desirable (desired or not) unsettling dynamics like serious and thoughtful reflection about important questions in the curriculum.

Concepts, values, institutions in education develop through processes of social experimental inquiry. In the above quoted remarks, Dewey emphasizes the centrality of language in the formation of meaning in general and value in particular. It is language, communication, that allows for the process of experimental inquiry to be *social* and, as it becomes clear, consequently to be systematic, intelligent, and even at all conscious. It is important to emphasize the conceptual dimension of values, the sense in which values are special kinds of meaning communicated in some form of sign, because this is one of the characteristics that distinguish values from mere desires and impulses. At the same time, our insistence on the emerging and dynamic nature of values is an emphasis on the opposite direction: that we should not commit what Dewey called the "philosophic fallacy," to think that these abstract concepts are more real and antecedent to the experiences from which they emerged. In other words, values are not merely conceptual entities, but are partially conceptual instruments that emerge from experience and are constantly mediating and transforming experience as we use them. In that process, values change as well.

Value creation is not contained in the initial disruption of equilibrium—the process is a continuum, so, we speak of any one moment as *initial* heuristically—, nor in the shock of encountering difference. It is not contained in any piecemeal change of behavior seeking to restore balance, not even in the moment of naming a value for the purpose of stabilizing its meaning for further use in diverse contexts. It is not contained in the moment of critical reflection about established values either. Value creation is, in fact, a process extended through

the various moments of experimental value inquiry, it is coextensive with the general mode of response that Dewey describes as "adjustment."

Processes of value creation form a continuum between moments that operate at social and historical scales, involving the stabilization of meaning by means of concepts widely shared as currency for communication and the institutionalization of values as tools, and moments that operate at personal and interpersonal scales, involving the emergence of value commitments from initial impulses, desires, and interests. The idea of an education for value creation, that is, the idea that value creation can constitute a purpose in education in general and a guiding principle in cosmopolitan education in particular is only intelligible if we keep the continuum of the personal and interpersonal with the social and historical in mind. As soon as we lose sight of this continuum and conceive values exclusively from a perspective that only captures them in a social and historical scale, we lose hold of the significance of educative experiences at personal and interpersonal levels for processes of value formation.

IV.10. Universal Values

The vision of the nature and function of values presented here allows us to retain a version of the ideal of universal values as the markers that shape the normative terrain we inhabit as citizens of the world. Under this vision, universal values do not represent a fixed and insuperable condition to which we return as the original seat of our humanity. Universal values are, rather, ideals to which we give shape together, and they are constantly shifting depending on contextual conditions and as a result of an always emerging universality. What Dewey writes about meanings as objects of thought, applies directly to values, as special kinds of meaning: that they are "entitled to be called complete and ultimate only because they are not original but are a

happy outcome of a complex history" (1981, p. 136). Values and meanings are *enactments* and *products* of creation.

A universal value is a special kind of tool designed to perform the function of taking a meaning that brings about something desirable in experience and make it operative in all particular contexts of experience. Its function is instrumental and it is not determined a priori. Like with any tool, the function of values is always a *promise* grounded in past experiences and with a degree of probability to be realized in practice in the context of particular conditions. In a sense, this instrumentalist view of values excludes the possibility of the universality of values because it leaves room for the possibility that in actual or possible new contexts a given value would fail to apply. At the same time, it conceives of values in relation to human nature, as things we humans create to cope with human problematic situations limited in part by the constraints provided by our social conditions and biological endowment. What we call universal values point to the general features of the kinds of problematic situations that are possible for us humans. They are fallible and dynamic, but this does not mean unwarranted. While traditional conceptions of universal values typically assume a universally available epistemic capacity, usually a rational capacity, to access these values, universal values in the instrumentalist sense proposed here is not grounded on assumed powers, but on experienced limitations. Much like the concepts of "black" and "white" point to limitations in our capacity for visual perception (the low and high ends of the amount of light we can perceive), universal values like "justice" and "love" point to certain limitations of our capacity for coping with the world. We are limited in such a way that we come to value the value of justice because it serves an instrumental function in our dealings with the world. Just like flying animals are constituted in a way such that they do not have any use for ladders, we could conceivably be constituted in such a way that we do not

have any use for justice. But we are the way we are and we value justice because we have real practical uses for it.[49]

The sense of universality of values suggested here is one couched in the theory of experimental value inquiry as pragmatic, iterative, and social. Universal values are, in this sense, those normative meanings whose spontaneous advance towards generalization has not met a conclusive resistance[50]. The value of difference for cosmopolitanism is to provide constraints to universality. One of the consequences is that universality, if it is to survive the resistance offered by difference, must be dynamic, flexible, fallible, and in actuality necessarily bounded and only unbounded potentially—any meaning that is not potentially unbounded would not count as universal. It is in this sense that Dewey speaks of a "democratic belief [that is] universal" in *Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us*. (2008d, p. 227)

An instrumentalist conception of universality in values has important implications for cosmopolitanism, because it highlights the importance of communication, the exchange and sharing of signs as tools for meaning, in the creation of value. And the brand of cosmopolitanism that emerges from these pages is one where the cosmos we inhabit, the world of which we are citizens, is a world of value we create as we communicate with one another across differences.

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49 Perhaps something akin to this is what Isaiah Berlin (1998) had in mind when in his last essay he wrote that, "The fact that men are men and women are women and not dogs or cats or tables or chairs is an objective fact; and part of this objective fact is that there are certain values, and only those values, which men, while remaining men, can pursue. If I am a man or a woman with sufficient imagination (and this I do need), I can enter into a value system which is not my own, but which is nevertheless something I can conceive of men pursuing while remaining human, while remaining creatures with whom I can communicate, with whom I have some common values -- for all human beings must have some common values or they cease to be human, and also some different values else they cease to differ, as in fact they do" (p. 53)

50 Dewey writes: "generalization is carried spontaneously as far as it will plausibly go; usually much further than it will actually go. A newly acquired meaning is forced upon everything that does not obviously resist its application, as a child uses a new word whenever he gets a chance or as he plays with a new toy. Meanings are self-moving to new cases. In the end, conditions force a chastening of this spontaneous tendency. The scope and limits of application are ascertained experimentally in the process of application. The history of science, to say nothing of popular beliefs, is sufficient indication of the difficulty found in submitting this irrational generalizing tendency to the discipline of experience. (1981, pp. 148-149)

From a Deweyan perspective, the cosmopolitan vision of humanity as a single moral community does not mean that all human beings come to lead lives under the same set of values and norms. Rather, it points to the idea of a *community of moral inquiry*, or, more generally, a *community of value inquiry,* where "an inquirer in a given special field appeals to the experiences of the community of his fellow workers for confirmation and correction of results" (Dewey, 1986b, p. 484). Especially when it comes to the problems that concerns us all as inhabitants of a shared planet, the moral imperative that we respond creatively points in the direction of establishing such communities of value inquiry. And this includes the development of various pluralistic communities of inquiry formed to address specific normative challenges, from the Earth Summit to local self-governing communes. It also pertains to the emergence of a global imagined community as regulative ideal (in B. R. O. G. Anderson's (1991) sense).

IV.11. Creative Methods for Adjustment to Interconnectedness and Impermanence.

When we consider the readings different theories of cosmopolitanism offer of the situation of encounter with difference we see that each has its own perspective on the question of values with implications for education. Most of this chapter so far has been devoted to developing an instrumentalist, pragmatic conception of value creation. This conception regards values as tools to help us cope with practical, problematic situations, and it describes the complex processes by means of which in coping we create value and in creating value we cope with problems.

We typically regard a highly refined expression of creativity in the fine arts as continuous with and yet distinct from quotidian and mundane cases of aesthetic creativity. There is a continuum between the harmony of color and form in a Tintoretto's masterpiece and a tasteful

matching of garments in a well put together outfit. Similarly, there is a continuum connecting a simple act of consideration—keeping a door open for a person who carries a heavy box with both hands—with an instance of extraordinary kindness that inspires moral courage—a friend in Argentina goes out of his way to help my mother during a difficult time in her life and inspires me to reflect about my selfish lifestyle. There are, at the same time, potentially meaningful distinctions amongst cases along a continuum, whether aesthetic or moral. To determine the distinction by means of a propositional definition is not unproblematic. For our purposes, however, we need not to be concerned with the specific terms in which we determine the distinction. Allowing for the possibility of a meaningful distinction at some point of the spectrum of continuity is sufficient, even if underdetermined or only provisionally determined. The conception of value creation in terms of adjustment developed in this chapter is intentionally designed to allow for both continuity and distinction between the quotidian and special cases of value creation.

Quotidian cases include creatively employing values as tools to cope with a problem; the special cases include the experience of adjustment, when coping with problematic situations becomes holistic transformation of self and circumstances and even the emergence of new values in a historical or sociological sense[51]. Value creation in a special sense of adjustment is the defining feature of the particular version of cosmopolitanism here proposed. Each of the versions of cosmopolitanism considered emphasize *aspects* of the process of value creation. The rest of this chapter develops this claim in the context of experiences of encounters with difference.

51 Hans Joas (2000) identifies four senses of "creation of values:" 1) The original historical promulgation of a value; 2) The defense of this value by a small, but growing, group of disciples; 3) The genesis of a new commitment in individuals (through conversion, for example) to values which are by no means historically new; 4) The resuscitation of values which have lost their drive or sunk into oblivion. All these four senses are sociological/historical.

The specific kind of difference that concerns us in this discussion is *normative* difference. The strategy I have been employing to characterize the encounter with this kind of difference relies on the metaphor of entering a new normative terrain. I insisted in the previous chapter that one of the beneficial features of this metaphor is that it allows us to account for aspects of the experience of encounter with difference that various versions of cosmopolitanism emphasize.

Entering new normative terrains reveals the interconnectedness and impermanence of the world. To regard values, cultural practices, ways of life as radically different from one's own, entails the assumption, often unspoken and unconscious, that one would never find oneself in *that* situation, engaging in *those* cultural practices, partaking in *that* way of life, relying in *those* values as currency and tools for coping. To regard values, cultural practices, and ways of life as radically different entails assuming they belong outside of one's world and, even perhaps thinking of the bounds of one's normative world as partially determined by the bounds of the radically different normative world that must remain outside. It entails an attitude towards values, practices and ways of life as if they were *discontinuous* with one's own.

It should be noted that regarding normative worlds as discontinuous this way is not necessarily incompatible with the cosmopolitan dictum of including all human beings within the sphere of moral concern. It depends on how we regard these beings which we include in our concern. If we regard them as particular instantiations of a universal conception of humanity, individuals with human rights, then I can perfectly include them within the sphere of moral concern without caring for their normative world, the values they espouse. All I am required to do is be concerned for his well-being, his rights, in terms of the values of *my* normative world, within whose terms I understand the meaning of well-being, rights, and even joy and suffering.

Under such a conception of a human being, I can include *them* in *my* moral concerns. Answering to the demands of *their* moral concerns is not a requirement for moral inclusion.

By contrast, if we regard these beings as *persons* constituted transactionally in a normative context that is part of their experiences, then to include *them* in the sphere of *my* moral concerns would demand that I open up my normative world to theirs, because any sense of *moral* concern for *them* must involve concern for the normative dimensions of their lives as well, for the values they cherish. This way of regarding persons renders the cosmopolitan dictum of including all human beings within the sphere of moral concern significantly more demanding. However, as long as we consider the dictum a regulative ideal, the expanded demands are not prohibitive. The difference is that the ideal regulates conduct in a different direction. Rather than thinking of others *only* from the perspective of my values, it encourages me to consider also the values according to which others evaluate their condition.

Entry into a new normative terrain places us existentially in the world of different values, different practices, and different ways of life. Successfully coping with the problematic situation of encountering difference reveals the *continuity* of my values with values across the divide of normative difference. If I can cope with a problematic situation of entering a new normative terrain it means that either the values I bring to bear to the situation are sufficient for coping, or that I can learn and employ the values of the terrain, or that new, functional values can emerge from the experience. All three possibilities establish the *continuity* or *interconnectedness* of the world. And as all three possibilities also depend on some degree of change in values, they reveal the *impermanence* of the world.

IV.11.a. Cosmopolitan Universalism

With respect to interconnectedness, cosmopolitan universalism offers a particular reading with two significant implications. The first implication is that connections that exist amongst particular individuals derive their meaning from the universals under which they stand. Zhou has a myriad points of connection with his American peers. They might share a passion for basketball and a taste for Chinese cuisine, they love their families and pursue personal projects. Disagreement and tension may be central to how they are connected as well; perhaps they have differing views on international politics, table manners, and romantic relationships. The American student consumes Chinese products generating employment for his friend's father. Zhou pays taxes in the U.S. which helps pay for his friends' federal student loans.

All significant points of connection amongst individual beings are value-laden and when we speak of the interconnectedness of the world we are referring to an unfathomably complex web of value-laden relations. For the universalist, the unfathomably complex web of relationships that connects individual human beings to one another are significant above all as "sources of richness" (see Gregoriou 2004, p. 257) that characterizes the universal human nature that individuals share. What matters primarily, is that we are all human beings, and only derivatively that our humanity finds expression in diverse ways, as preferences in sports and food, as particular political allegiances, as roles we each play in the economy.

The second implication is that a cognitive dimension is central to a cosmopolitan mindfulness of the interconnectedness of the world. This is because universals transcend the unfathomable complexity of the world, and, therefore, mere experience of the world in all its diversity is not enough for understanding the nature of its interconnectedness. For the universalist, the interconnectedness of the world is disclosed by the cultivation of rational capacities inherent in universal human nature.

The impermanence of the world acquires a particular aspect by the lights of universalism as well. Because in the view of cosmopolitan universalism, universal values and universal human nature are unchanging, that which fluctuates in the world, analogously to that which is different, belongs primarily to the category of "sources of richness" (see Gregoriou 2004, p. 257). However, similarly to how interconnectedness stands with respect to universals under this view, the meaning of impermanence depends on that which does not change. If Chinese and American students change in the ways they uphold values, in how they see their cultures and world at large as a result of their encounter with one another, the significance of that transformation is revealed only against the background of that which remains: universal human nature and universal values. Perhaps the American student, who used to hold a view on justice steeped in liberal individualistic values comes to learn something from his Chinese friend and the different conception of justice with a greater emphasis on the role of community that he brings from his culture. The universalist would insist that the significance of this transformation becomes intelligible only against that which remains unchanged: that both views constitute in fact dimensions of the idea of justice. Now, the universalist would say, this American student has reached a deeper understanding of justice as a universal value precisely because he now understands that much of what he thought was essential to justice as universal value turns out to be features of a particular conception of justice, and thus not essential for justice as universal. The experience of a different cultural perspective on values forced this student to consider his own cultural perspective critically, but also to adopt a more humble attitude towards his understanding of justice. "If by contact with a different view on justice I have come to see that my previously held views are not universal as I thought," the student might reflect, "perhaps my current conception of justice comes short of the universal too; perhaps I need to put my present

views to the tests of reason and further encounters with difference." But the universalist will insist that if values are no more than culturally particular, relative, and changing, their significance would be deflated to the point that their authority over reason would be lost and all there would be left is a power struggle among particular perspectives. For the universalist, the real significance of impermanence in the ways we hold values comes from the metaphysical permanence of universal values.

In the language of normative terrains, a well-established, functional traditional way of life can be thought of as the life of a community inhabiting and traversing a well-known terrain, a terrain for whose demands the community has the skills, resources, and knowledge necessary. The current conditions of intensified and nearly constant disrupting encounters with difference that constitute the fabric of social life in pluralistic societies could be thought of in terms of the image of traversing a terrain that can never be fully known or mastered, a terrain that constantly presents us with unforeseen and surprising challenges.

The cosmopolitan universalist privileges the cognitive dimension of moral life. A world of values intensely impermanent and interconnected like ours is extremely complex at the cognitive level. The virtually infinite diversity of values and modes of evaluation that are relevant and engaged in any given problematic situation constitutes decisively a cognitive challenge for morality. The universalist's response is, essentially, to pursue clarity by means of reducing complexity. The impulse of the universalist is always to search for values that rise above the changing landscape, values shared, common across diverse normative terrains. So the universalist climbs the high peaks of "justice," "love," "freedom," and from the heights surveys the terrain. From the heights the details get lost and the complexity of particular normatively challenging situations get reduced to map-like views of the landscape, patches of various shades

of green in an aerial photograph. This rising to the heights is the exile of the cosmopolitan universalist. High above the air is lighter and a sense of normative stability is restored: all the myriad variations on values are left behind as negligible, and the values that matter, those which determine the shape of the relevant normative terrain, are only the few, towering universals.

The problem with the universalist's exile onto the heights is that the perspective it provides is limited and relevant only under specific circumstances. It is useful to orient oneself, to find one's position within the terrain in very general terms. So, for example, as a Latin American man, raised in a Spanish family, with traditionally Spanish conceptions of the values of family, friendship, love, etc. when I go to Japan and approach problematic situations of interpersonal contact, I sometimes find certain values of my upbringing strike a dissonant note. From the perspective of universal values, from the heights of a value rising above the landscape, say, friendship, all I can see is that the value of friendship finds expression differently in Japan and Argentina. There is something playful, a bit aggressive, and even flirty in the styles of speech and body language of a male-female friendship between Argentines that is simply not there in analogous friendships in Japan, where a certain proper distance, and even elements of gender hierarchy dominate the terms of the relationship. Sexism thrives in Latin American cultures as well, as is well known. However, it is different from gender hierarchy in Japan. These distinctions get revealed with clarity from the point of view of the universality of friendship, that which is common and shared amongst various different expressions of it. Interestingly, same-sex friendships in Japan can be rather intimate physically in ways that in Latin America would be judged as distastefully homo-erotic. But to navigate the terrain of interpersonal contacts in Japan, the vantage point of universal values is not enough. I need to be on the ground, so to speak; I need to engage the infinitely complex and particular demands of the specific situation. To cope

with the specific demands of a particular terrain, say a section of a thick forest, it might not be very helpful at all to know that the forest extends for a hundred miles North, or that it is flanked by a river on South and East sides; I need to know on what kind of ground I walk, whether there are dangerous animals around and how thick are the bushes.

We could say, perhaps, that the universalist position is characteristic of one important function of philosophical reflection, what Dewey calls *criticism of criticism:* the invaluable function of taking critical distance from things. But as Dewey himself insisted, this function needs the counter movement of the return to experience where we can test, evaluate, and refine the essences generated from a distance. The achilles' heel of cosmopolitan universalism is the seductive pull of exile, the temptation to set camp in the mountain top, and never return to the ground, to the mess and confusion of the world.

The universalist's readiness to always lean back and gaze at the stars, however, comes with an advantage. In situations where people, institutions, and values are locked into myopic concerns with the most immediate only, which is not infrequent, and when that attitude fails to provide the means to cope with the problems at hand, the critical distance of the view from the heights can open up creative possibilities otherwise hidden in the situation.

The creative function of critical thinking and the narrative imagination, the two pillars of the universalist vision for cosmopolitan education, is, essentially, one of refinement. The idea is that we can learn from the stock of human wisdom, the collective achievement of cultivated reason embodied in the great works of literature, religion, and philosophy from across traditions and, presumably, from the social and human sciences. And that this wisdom provides a privileged perspective on values—the view from the heights of human wisdom, so to speak—which we can hold up as a mirror against which to consider our habits, practices, beliefs,

institutions. The creative moment is the work, critical and imaginative, of transforming our cultures as a response.

The value creative project of universal cosmopolitanism, in the language of normative terrains, is to transform local normative landscapes in light of the demands posed by global perspectives. For example, we can conceive of a certain conception of freedom, intimately linked to commitments to political liberalism, individualism, and a lifestyle based on particular practices of production and consumption. Based on this value of freedom we experience wellbeing, frustration, and moral outrage; we make political decisions and life choices. This value constrains our movements in particular ways with its demands and the possibilities for action it makes available. This value is an instrumentality in the Deweyan sense developed earlier in the chapter. Let us now imagine this value of freedom becomes too constraining, that the way of life shaped by a strong commitment to this value is no longer functional, or that it comes at a cost too high.

Consider, for instance, the possibility that the depletion of the Earth's resources comes to a point where the current rate of consumption that allows us to indulge our desires is no longer viable. In such a case, the particular conception of freedom that supports our current practices of consumption would begin to show signs of disfunction: it would configure a normative terrain that would make impossible normative demands on people—it would bring about desires that conflict with actual conditions in the world.[52] That a particular value of freedom is no longer functional means that it fails to do its instrumental work in coping with problematic situations. We will need to rethink the concept of freedom—it is so essential to our sense of meaning in life

52 This is already happening, and it is an important reason for why we need a cosmopolitan education. I present this scenario as a hypothetical because the point here is not to argue that these conditions are in fact the case.

that we could not simply give it up for the sake of the environment. So we ascend to the heights, consider the essence of freedom critically, study its manifestations across time and space. We submit our value of freedom to *criticism*, in the Deweyan sense. And we come to understand that freedom can come hand in hand with austerity and self-control, for example, that it can flourish in ways of life that put less weight on individual choice and satisfaction of individual desire and more weight on communal life and shared experiences. From atop a mountain we might see that people in other parts of the land inhabit terrains configured differently and that based on the demands of the times, we can also come to reshape our normative terrain. The point is that in developing a deeper understanding of freedom, one that is more rational and less clouded by the pathos of attachments to cultural particularities, we have now opened a space for reshaping the practices and institutions, the normative terrain, through which we enact and experience the value of freedom.

It is crucial to understand that the pursuit of universal values that characterizes the cosmopolitan universalist ethos must come about through a process of adjustment. The descriptions of "a kind of exile…from the comfort of local truths, from the warm nestling feeling of local loyalties, from the absorbing drama of pride in oneself and one's own" (Nussbaum, 1997b, p. 11) suggest a sense of holistic transformation. A person who comes to revise a deep seated commitment to a particular conception of freedom and in the process reaches an understanding of freedom that is closer to a universal—a conception of freedom more widely meaningful and functional—and allows this normative transformation to genuinely affect his conduct is a person who effectively reshapes the normative terrains he inhabits in his conduct: both self and environment change. By contrast, to think of the pursuit of universal values in terms of accommodation or adaptation would betray the spirit of cosmopolitanism. A pursuit of

universal values as a kind of accommodation would amount to a case where universal values come imposed externally, and one gives up commitments to local, particular values and embraces universal values by the sheer force of circumstances one cannot resist. Under adaptation, the pursuit of universal values would come in the form of exerting force on conditions so that narrow, particular values become universal. When the critics of cosmopolitan universalism denounce the idea of the pursuit of universal values as a kind of concealed cultural imperialism, they are thinking of the pursuit of universal values in terms of adaptation (on the side of the colonizer) and accommodation (on the side of the colonized). Any attempt to pursue universal values in such terms must be deeply un-cosmopolitan in spirit. What I am interested in preserving for the purpose of my own vision of cosmopolitan education, is the sense of a *pursuit* of the universality of values in terms of adjustment as instrumentality for value creation.

IV.11.b. Agonistic Cosmopolitanism.

The agonistic cosmopolitan would see matters differently. That the encounter with difference puts Zhou and his American peers in a position to question their own values is not an opportunity to shed away parochial attachments to particular ways of holding values and get closer to a true understanding of universals. Rather, the agonistic cosmopolitan would insist, it becomes an opportunity for the particular perspectives in tension to be refined, better articulated, modified, improved in light of the other and the demands of their shared context of encounter. But this dynamics takes place in the form of a genuine struggle and, like in sports, the force of critical thought is directed both at one's position—for the athlete this would be the moment of training— and against the adversary— competition proper. However, ultimately, the direction of intentionality is against the opponent, and in this sense he becomes an ally, in that it allows us to

improve ourselves. So, for the agonistic cosmopolitan, even if the American student learns much from his Chinese friend, what we have is not a person on his way to transcend his commitments to, say, a liberal understanding of justice, but a person who has put his commitments in creative rather than destructive tension with difference.

By contrast to the universalist, the agonistic cosmopolitan regards the impermanence of the world as essential, precisely because as all possible particular perspectives stand in tension and struggle, change becomes a demand of the very conditions that make struggle possible. A virtue of the agonistic cosmopolitan with respect to impermanence is, as I see it, its sensitivity to the importance of stability. The agonistic cosmopolitan recognizes that when we hold a set of beliefs and commitments that face challenges from outside, we do want to protect them, we do want to fight our adversaries. It also recognizes that impermanence is inevitable and inherent to the plural nature of social life, but we relate to impermanence by means of a certain resistance, and the creative tension that agonistic cosmopolitanism seeks to establish in relations across differences emerges as the result of employing creativity to the task of a resistance to change that cannot ultimately prevail. From the agonistic cosmopolitan point of view, the universalist all-too-eager readiness to change, to leave behind the "comfort of local truths" (Nussbaum, 1997c, p. 34) and go into "exile" to the heights of uprooted universality constitutes a failure to perceive the centrality of the political in human experience. In short, for the agonistic cosmopolitan, the impermanence and interconnectedness of the world are painted in the hues of the ubiquitous tension of political struggle in human experience.

The agonistic cosmopolitan is less concerned than the universalist about how things look from the perspective of universal values. Unlike the universalist, the agonistic cosmopolitan is deeply suspicious about the possibility of such point of view. She is concerned with how value

positions emerge from conditions on the ground. Rather than seeing well established, widely shared values —universal values— as *a priori*, conditions for the possibility of evaluation and value commitments in the first place, she sees them as contextually bounded, historically and culturally conditioned *outcomes* of political processes marked by struggle. From an agonistic point of view, the salient characteristic of a situation of encounter with difference is the struggle for shaping the normative terrain in a particular way in opposition to competing visions, either attempts to maintain a status quo, or alternative visions for shaping the normative terrain. The work of value creation, then, happens in and through agonistic struggle, and the normative terrain that emerges is not a manifestation of any single coherent normative vision, but the result of agonistic processes.

The metaphor of normative terrains is designed, in part, to capture certain nuances of a position on the ontology of values. On the one hand, values are a function of human experience in the world, which is necessarily perspectival. On the other hand, values are in the world, are part of the environment we share. To think of values as objective, fixed, and eternal blinds us to the subtle ways in which the particular perspectives that each tradition, community, and individual brings to the work of evaluation affect values. To think of values in relativistic, solipsistic terms, as if they belonged confined to the realm of private minds, would fail to capture how the particular perspectives we bring to bear on evaluation affect values not just for me, but for others as well; that our relation to values is a relation to a world we share with others—a relationship where self, world, and other emerge together in dependent co-arising.

Agonistic cosmopolitanism responds well to this nuanced dynamic of values between particular perspectives and shared normative spaces. An example to embody the agonistic position would involve different groups of people responding to a single normative terrain

through a different set of values. Sharon Todd examines, for example, the controversy over the ban on hijab in French schools. The normative terrain is the world of values in which the people involved are situated, this includes the secular liberal values invoked by members of French society, traditional Muslim values pertaining to female identity, dignity, and more, and the values the girls themselves engage as Muslim youth in a Western liberal democracy. Perspectives matter, because it means that some people will respond to the situation in terms of certain values rather than others, but the fact of a shared normative space matters too, because it highlights that the situation is shared and complex.

If all there was to a situation like the controversy over the wearing of hijab in French schools was a set of competing political positions over a shared normative space whose only possible outcome is the victory of one or some over others, we would have antagonism, perhaps, at best, agonism, but not necessarily cosmopolitanism. What makes the idea of agonistic cosmopolitanism intelligible is the possibility that something new and unique arises from agonistic struggle, that individuals and groups come together across differences—come together in struggle, not collaboration—and create values that were not necessarily part of the initial configuration. The value creative moment in agonistic cosmopolitanism comes when agonistic struggle reshapes the normative terrain. Todd's insistence on the creative dimension of agonistic struggle is what renders ers agonism *cosmopolitan*. Putting it in terms of the conceptual framework developed in this chapter, cosmopolitan agonistic struggle becomes values creative when it proceeds through the method of adjustment.

IV.11.c. Rooted Cosmopolitanism

As Zhou struggles with the demands of a new normative terrain, we might notice the

dynamics of tension between conflicting values and differing ways of holding values. We might also consider the paths through which Zhou and his American classmates might change as the result of their encounter. The description a rooted cosmopolitan perspective could offer might include a reference to universal values, a recognition of what we share with other humans *qua* humans—Appiah discusses these questions in chapter 6 of his *Cosmopolitanism*. But the focus of the rooted cosmopolitan description would be on what happens to Zhou and his American peers when "trying to get things done *together*" (Appiah, 2006, p.28, emphasis added), because that is the proper context of our appeals to values. Earlier in the chapter we considered some of the implications of "the primacy of practice" for how we hold and revise value commitments. "Our language of values is one of the central ways we coordinate our lives with one another," writes Appiah (2006, p. 28), and an important part of this coordination of lives is our sharing of deep, personal interest and stories. For the rooted cosmopolitan, the point where the interconnectedness and impermanence of the world find clearest expression in experience is not the moment of conflicts across differences or moments when we transcend the particularities of our cultural perspectives. Rather, it is in the gradual, sometimes imperceptible changes that come from living together, from "getting used to one another" (Appiah, 2006, p. 85), and coordinating our responses to shared circumstances.

After two years of graduate school, Zhou, if pressed on the contentious issues of justice, politics, and morals that set him apart from his American peers, might still adopt a defensive attitude and react like he did soon after he first arrived in the US. But in the context of the activities that he shared with his American friends on a daily basis, much transformation will have taken place, and much common ground will have been revealed to, and created by, him and his peers beyond their differences. Perhaps Zhou learned to partially accommodate his learning

stye to the demands of American higher education, perhaps he helped a few of his American peers recognize the value of a more reflective, more cautious and less assertive attitude in learning. But such descriptions of the ways in which Zhou and his American peers adjust their beliefs and practices come only in a moment of theorizing and this need not happen to them to truly embody a cosmopolitan spirit. For the rooted cosmopolitan, what matters is that they do learn to live together. Not merely tolerate each other, but enter each other's ethical lives. Entering each other's ethical lives includes coming to respect, praise, and blame the other based on the ways in which they respond to the values that furnish the world they share. In other words, learning to coordinate their responses to values across cultural differences. The rooted cosmopolitan insists that this coordination, more often than not, can be done without giving up special ethical and moral commitments.

For the rooted cosmopolitan, the creation of value is grounded on the cosmopolitan double commitment to fallibilism and pluralism, as I noted in my discussion of these concepts in chapter two. Fallibilism opens a space for critical reflection about one's own value commitments, pluralism invites us to look beyond one's own normative tradition for resources to respond creatively to the challenges of the world. These two moments of the cosmopolitan orientation, a recognition of the limits of one's normative world and a recognition of other ways of life as normatively legitimate and generative, constitute creative resources that we may employ in response to normative challenges. I may inhabit the normative terrain where we deal with the problem of the scope of individual freedom, for example, by means of self-imposed moral and spiritual discipline, and I choose not to change my ways even when I am aware of, and value the fact that, there is a different way of responding—individual freedom is bounded primarily by means of rules and laws. But even if as a result of being aware of diverse modes of

responding to a problematic situation, I do not directly change my own particular response, the awareness itself makes a difference: my response is one amongst others; I address the world rooted in one way of life, but with a broadened sense of possibilities.

The roots of the rooted cosmopolitan are not, however, the roots of the staunch traditionalist. When Appiah talks about "cosmopolitan patriots" (2002, *passim*), for example, he means a kind of patriotism open to the transformative influence of contacts with cultures beyond national boundaries. He does not mean that these contacts should demand that we give up our commitments, including patriotic commitments, but he does mean that those commitments would be transformed in subtle and not so subtle ways through these contacts. So when I say I will not change my way of dealing with the problem of the scope of individual freedom, I mean I am sticking to my value commitments. However, and this is the moment of cosmopolitan value creation, these commitments *will be transformed* through exchanges across difference. The rooted cosmopolitan commitments to fallibilism and pluralism constitute the grounds for the possibility and desirability of such creative, normative transformations. Perhaps I chose to stick to my commitment to self-discipline as a way to respond to the problem of too much freedom, but I may come to learn that certain rules for social control can make self-discipline more stable, more meaningful, and more widely shared. As with the pursuit of universal values and agonistic struggle, I am interested in the rooted cosmopolitan methods of getting used to one another, and coordinating our responses to the world across differences mainly in the sense that they can constitute particular kinds of Deweyan adjustment to the interconnectedness and impermanence of the world.

IV.11.d. Educational Cosmopolitanism

Hansen's educational cosmopolitanism would offer its own reading as well. From an educational cosmopolitan perspective, we can describe Zhou as traversing an intellectual, aesthetic, political and moral space between loyalty to values learned at home and openness to values he encounters in new environments, between people that pull his commitments in different directions, between different senses of personal identity and struggling to maintain a sense of meaning in his life through all the normative challenges he must confront. Hansen would say that the experience itself, learning to dwell in that space of tension, patiently, reflectively, resisting the temptation to either recoil into a defensive traditionalism or give in entirely to the pressure of new influences, *that* in itself embodies a cosmopolitan orientation. Dwelling in the space between the known and the new *is* inhabiting the interconnectedness and impermanence of the world.

David Hansen's educational cosmopolitanism highlights the centrality of learning in how we form, hold, and revise our values. Values are instrumentalities to endow our normative lives with much needed relative stability and meaning. Even when individuals participate creatively in the formation of values and we can talk legitimately about value creative actions, values develop as a result of processes social and historical in scope. For these reasons, we tend to experience values and the cultural traditions where they take roots as stable beyond the influence of our individual and collective agency. However, despite the aura of timeless endurance reminiscent of great museum halls and ancient monuments, values are preserved through, and exist in, education. They are transmitted beyond the fragility and brevity of individual human lives by means of processes of teaching and learning. The existence of apparently timeless monuments and imposing museums attest to this fact. The paradox is that the experience of learning is marked by relative instability; that education is, by necessity, a destabilizing process.

A theory of cosmopolitanism that emphasizes the educational dimension of experience is, by virtue of its focus of interest, well positioned to appreciate the dynamic nature of culture. As Samuel Scheffler puts it, in words Hansen himself quotes, the cosmopolitan orientation manifests "the very capacities that make it possible for human beings to create culture in the first place, and they enrich humanity as a whole by renewing the stock of cultural resources on which others may draw" (2001, p. 113, in Hansen 2010a p. 19). Precisely because in the experience of learning we stand on unstable grounds, we leave the comfort of the known and venture into the new. And in learning from the new, grounded in what we already know, we engage the "capacities that make it possible for human beings to create culture in the first place" (ibid.). We often do this guided by the more experienced, and there is a level of stability that comes from placing trust in the people from whom we learn and in the process itself. But if learning is genuine, the experience is marked by relative instability. A culture, if vibrant and alive, is marked by relative stability as well because it was created in the first place and finds renewal by means of people engaging in processes of learning. An insight already suggested when considering the other three versions of cosmopolitanism comes in sharp focus under Hansen: experiences of learning from encounters with difference reshape the normative terrains we inhabit and traverse. Learning across differences is value creative.

From an educational cosmopolitan perspective, the challenge is to resist the tendency to regard a normative terrain as simply given and natural. Whether it is the terrain of values where one has created a life and formed a sense of personal identity or a new terrain whose encounter we experience in terms of normative dissonance, normative terrains are complex, delicate, and dynamic ecosystems of values created, sustained, and reshaped by means of practices of teaching and learning. But to keep this in mind requires work, a kind of discipline. When Hansen speaks

of a "reflective openness to the new fused with reflective loyalty to the known" (2011, p. 62), he means not only that we subject our values, practices, and way of life to critical scrutiny, but also that we cultivate awareness of the known and the new as products of histories of cultural practices. The key is that culturally generative practices, especially educative practices, which in the first place gave rise to both the known and the new, can be employed to make meaning and create value across differences.

In the example I have been exploiting, on the question of the scope of individual freedom, each of the versions of cosmopolitanism considered offers a specific approach to value creation. In each case, value creation involved some type of response to the encounter with difference and a reshaping of the terrain as a result. From an educational cosmopolitan perspective, the response involves reflection about ongoing practices and values that constitute the known normative terrain and reflection about the practices and values that form the new terrain, as well as the creation of a new terrain in the space between the known and the new.

The new normative terrain of the space between does not need to be anchored by precisely defined articulations of alternative values. In learning to appreciate, employ, and embody a new conception of freedom, I take a familiar conception of freedom as starting point, but it is not the case that half-way through the process I arrive securely at a resting point where I find a perfectly well-defined conception of freedom that is some kind of hybrid between my already familiar conception and the new conception I am on my way to learning. The space between is by nature much more fluid than that, and the cosmopolitan orientation that Hansen recommends entails cultivating the capacity to dwell in such fluid spaces where meanings and values are not securely anchored.

In encountering a new normative terrain, I discover a new conception of freedom, and I do this by noticing that when trying to coordinate my normative responses to the world with other people, they respond differently. As Hansen puts it, we move "closer and closer apart" (2011, p. 119 and *passim*) as in sharing experiences we learn about our differences. At the same time, we move "further and further together" (ibid.) in that we come to "acknowledge, understand, and appreciate those very differences" (ibid.). These transformations, in their subtlety, lack the intensity of the cosmopolitan universalist's "exile"—he demands conversion to cosmopolitanism, away from local loyalties. They are, however, significant transformations of one's orientation towards the world, and as such, they reshape normative terrains and create value. What we have, as a result, is a normative terrain *in transition* (see Hansen, 2011, p. 76). We may imagine an educational response to the normative challenge of the scope of freedom shapes a terrain that is eclectic and dynamic, where the normative toolkit to respond to the demands of the world is expanded (different conceptions of freedom are available for use). And very significantly for Hansen, these transformations must take place gradually and reflectively, supported by appropriate institutional arrangements, to protect moral and cultural integrity.

IV.12. Conclusion

Different versions of cosmopolitanism come with different conceptions of the place and nature of values in a world intensely interconnected and impermanent. The four versions considered in these pages illuminate and emphasize different aspects of what we call a cosmopolitan orientation as a response to the world. What we get from this diverse array of cosmopolitan responses to encounters with difference is a repertoire of resources for value creation. In a world intensely interconnected and impermanent where traditional ways of life and

sources of meaning and value appear fragile and unsettled, cosmopolitanism proposes value creative responses that reshape the normative terrains we inhabit and traverse in encounters with difference. The pursuit of universal values, the agonistic effort for creative tension in political struggle, the gentle work of getting used to one another living together, the challenge of inhabiting the space between the known and the new as we learn from one another, these are all artful methods for the creation of value. The humble and yet enabling insight that the explorations in these pages might yield is that values function not only as the vast ocean and towering mountain ranges, dominating the landscape of our normative lives, but they also work like umbrella and camera contraptions, products of human creativity that transform and give meaning to experience.

Chapter V: Conclusion

V.1. Strong Poets and Carpenters.

A quarter of a century ago, in his *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (1989), Richard Rorty articulated a vision of a liberal society that resonates, at many levels, with the cosmopolitan picture I present in these pages. In the book, Rorty argues that language is contingent and the vocabularies we employ to describe the world come to be formed by the gradual introduction of new metaphors. When new metaphors enter a language, Rorty claims, they are not endowed with stable literal meaning. "[T]ossing a metaphor into a conversation," writes Rorty, "is like suddenly breaking off the conversation long enough to make a face, or pulling a photograph out of our pocket and displaying it, or pointing at a feature of the surroundings, or slapping the interlocutor's in the face, or kissing him" (p. 18). Literal meaning is emergent, not yet formed. As new metaphors get habitually used in the language, they acquire fully formed literal meanings, they earn their place in a language game—the meaning of a word is its use, say pragmatist about language from Dewey, to Wittgenstein, to Rorty. As they become literalized, metaphors die and join the ranks of words in an established vocabulary, which forms the basis and background for new metaphors to emerge. Language and culture, then, are like coral reef. Old metaphors are constantly dying off into literalness, constituting established vocabularies, and providing a platform and foil for new metaphors.

Normative terrains develop following the same structure. We never create new values out of nothing, *ex nihilo*. New values come from the layering of new ways of valuing (new kinds of normative responses, new ways of describing the world, new attitudes, new value-laden associations) on top of layers of established values in a culture. Or they come from encounters

across difference (the clash of tectonic plates!) and new normative responses that emerge from that encounter. And just as with the introduction of new metaphors into established vocabularies, as new values enter an existing normative terrain they come without a stable literal meaning. They come, we may say, with the afterglow of the actions that brought them into existence; they carry the mythical significance of founding acts. The stable meaning of a value within a normative terrain comes, eventually, with repeated use, as people time and again respond to similar challenges in terms of the same values. Values are, in this sense, contingent like language. Their contingency is a function of the ontological continuum they share with a natural world that is impermanent and interconnected.

Rorty develops his view of language as contingent by contrast to a view of language as representing an external, objective world. This latter, representational view of language, assumes that there is a way in which the world is, and the task of knowledge production is to get the world right, to get to the truth. Transformations in the ways we talk about the world are accounted for in terms of correction and refinement of knowledge. Rorty calls this way of conceiving language and knowledge, "metaphysics." Logically connected and consistent with the metaphysical idea of a real objective world to be discovered and represented, are the ideas of true self, to be discovered and expressed, and a notion of human nature, to serve as the moral foundation and social glue of communities. Rorty rejects all three and claims language, self, and community are all contingent. Rorty's own philosophical position that responds to these three contingencies, he calls *ironism*.[53]

[53] Rorty lists three conditions that an ironist must fulfill: "(1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that arguments phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, that it is in touch with a power not herself" (1989, p.73). A final vocabulary is the set of beliefs that we take for granted and whose contingency we tend to ignore.

Rorty's ironist hero is Harold Bloom's (1997) "strong poet" who brings new metaphors into a language. For Rorty, language is instrumental; concepts are tools for coping with the problems of the world. The strong poet is a hero because in re-describing the world she expands the universe of what is possible; she makes available new ways of thinking about and being in the world, she presents us with new tools to respond to problematic situations when the old tools start getting rusty and lose functionality. This is a vision of culture driven forward by vocabulary-makers. And it makes sense for Rorty because for him literary traditions constitute the life and blood of cultures. He sees ideas, writings, discourse, concepts emerging from science, philosophy, literature, and religion, as aspects of literary traditions and not neatly divided into disciplinary domains. Strong poets can come from science (Einstein, Darwin), religion (Christ), philosophy (Hegel), or literature (Shakespeare). The point is meaningful, successful re-descriptions of the world.

Rorty's vision resonates with mine at the level of instrumentalism. If we consider values as especial kinds of concepts, as explicitly normatively charged words in the vocabularies of particular traditions, then one important aspect of the task of value creation is a special kind of re-description. The creator of value is a kind of poet in the sense that a key moment in the history of the introduction of a new value into the world is the moment of linguistic articulation, which for Rorty, and I think he is absolutely right about this, will always come in the form of a new metaphor. But the vision of value creation I propose here places less emphasis on this moment of new ways of describing the world and underscores the continuum between the creative contributions of a strong poet and the typically unnoticed moments of creativity in our daily

dealings with problems.[54] The world of values we inhabit is not just a realm of language, it is not just the realm of descriptions and re-descriptions, it is not jus the ongoing conversation of humanity. That is only one part of it, but it is a world coextensive with human experience in general.

I want, then, to take the moment of linguistic articulation out of the special place Rorty gives to it and locate it on a par with other moments in the continuous process of meaning (value) creation. Values can be brought about in very real ways without the introduction of new ways of talking about things; although whenever values are created meanings are transformed, even if the vocabulary remains more or less the same. We might have new ways of perceiving the world, and new ways of acting yet unmatched by corresponding new vocabularies, and we might have there the case of emergent values. How we describe values is important because values are social entities and as such they must be amenable to conceptual manipulation and communication. But in my view, the introduction of new ways of describing things is not the paradigmatic moment of value creation. I want my hero to be not only the strong poet who names a new value in the world and is so rhetorically influential that gets others, many others, to use her metaphors.[55] I want my hero to be the ordinary person who responds creatively to the

[54] Language, communication, is so central to Rorty's conception of persons and cultures that he goes to the extent of claiming that "persons and cultures are, for us [ironists], incarnate vocabularies" (80). That the best way to resolve or assuage doubts about our own character and culture is to get to know people across differences, and, contra Appiah, that the "easiest way of doing that is to read books, and so ironists spend more of their time placing books than in placing real live people" (80), and perhaps more shockingly, more counterintuitively, he claims that ironists take literary critics as "moral advisers, simply because such critics have an exceptionally large range of acquaintance" (80). By this he means acquaintance with books. He adds that literary critics are "moral advisers not because they have special access to moral truth but because they have been around" (80).

[55] Rorty's ironism has been a target of spirited criticism, particularly on charges of elitism, some of which he anticipates in the very pages of *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. The idea that ironism does not have a tight connection to liberalism, that it cannot provide a strong foundation for it, is what "makes people distrust ironism in philosophy and aestheticsm in literature as 'elitist'" (Rorty, 1989, p. 89). Ultimately, Rorty's response hinges on the separation of the private and the public. The idea is basically that the ironist values self-creation, and that project engages her in the more or less conscious shaping of a final vocabulary that functions, the ironist acknowledges this fact, at a private level: the final vocabulary is part of the resources the ironist employs to describe herself in ways that render her life meaningful and aid her in pursuing her goals and responding to the values and people that matter

demands of the world even when her ways of describing her condition remain rooted in old vocabularies, even when no one notices that through her responses to world she is creating new values. A genuine enactment of moral courage or a sincere expression of compassion can resuscitate dead metaphors and the most cliche words like "sacrifice" and "love" can be enunciated in light and freshness as if uttered for the first time.[56]

Transactional realism, interconnectedness in the strong form of dependent co-arising (*engi*) reveal that the self emerges transactionally from encounters with the world, and processes of self-creation and self-transformation are inseparable from the reshaping of normative terrains. The picture of the value creator that emerges from these pages is not a strong Nietzschean picture of self-creation. Occasionally, we might find cases of value creation, of the reshaping of normative terrains, that come in the form of self-assertion and courage. However, even as individuals pursue projects of self-creation with their particular narratives of self and world description, values are often co-created and normative terrains co-constructed at the level of encounters across differences, at the level of *adjustment* between self and world. The story of value creation at a global scale presented here, then, the story of the formation of the normative infrastructures on which we must rely to cope with global challenges in times of globalization, is a story that reads less like story of Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Mark Zuckerberg, and reads more like

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to her. But in the public sphere, we encounter people with different final vocabularies, and if we use our final vocabulary to re-describe them, we are likely to humiliate them. The metaphysician's solution to this dilemma is to establish *one* final vocabulary under which we can all describe ourselves and others, and the values inscribed in this final vocabulary will constitute the social glue of the community. This final vocabulary need not be given a priori; it can be formed collaboratively, by means of what Jürgen Habermas call "communicative rationality," for example. See, for example, Peter Dews, ed. *Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas*, London: Verso, 1986. Referenced in Rorty, 1989, p. 92 footnote 10. For Rorty, by contrast, at a private level, the liberal ironist can, as ironist, re-describe other people in the terms that suit her project of self-creation, that is, in terms of her final vocabulary. For public purposes, the liberal ironist must, as liberal, re-describe others in ways that are sensitive to the demands of *their* final vocabularies; she must be aware and careful that in re-describing others one can cause humiliation. On the basis of this separation of private and public, the ironist has a right to self-creation at a private level, but at the public level, the liberal ironist is sincerely committed to respecting others, acknowledging their final vocabularies and doing whatever she can to avoid causing suffering and preventing cruelty.

[56] Just like a striking act of brutality can resuscitate the dead metaphor of "evil" and make it shine with a new glow.

the story of the thousands of anonymous coders who contribute every week to the building of open source software like Linux or Wordpress.

The point of conceiving of processes of coping with the challenges of normative tension and adjustment in terms of the metaphor of normative terrains is to shift from a way of thinking about values merely as words or concepts, and towards a conception of values as grounded in organic life, in impulses, desires, and interests, as emerging from our transactions with the world. The word that we use to name a certain value embodies only one particular, and important, moment in the life of a value. And even when we can separate our private and public lives in terms how we describe things, processes of self-creation (self-transformation) and value creation take place, I argue, in a continuum of active engagement much of which takes place at levels that are non-linguistic. Normative terrains are shaped by the presence or absence of people; they are shaped by body language, by touch, by aesthetic quality in the tone of voice, and much more.

Put differently, the principle of dependent co-arising (*engi*) functions as a reminder of an implication of the kind of naturalism about values espoused here: that values emerge from complex processes of experimental value inquiry that are practical, iterative, and social. And in the various moments of that process, the introduction of new descriptions that stick and have a strong impact at the level of culture is important, but not more important than the creativity exhibited by normal people trying to cope with problems in their daily lives. If I were to establish, not a hierarchy, but an order of priority for appreciation, I would put the ordinary individual at the center, and imagine the strong poet to the side.

My predilection for a view that puts the kind of value creativity exhibited on a daily basis in the actions of ordinary persons at the center might be a matter of temperament, in the sense that Iris Murdoch identifies temperament as determinant for certain choices in philosophical

positions.[57] I want to bring this treatise to its consummation by elevating the discussion to that register of the ordinary person as "global citizen," as the embodiment of the cosmopolitan orientation, as value creative adjustment incarnate. I want the culminating note to be a return to the ground, in the spirit of the Deweyan pragmatist and Mahayana Buddhist traditions that provide the framework for my ideas, and in the direction that, as I have shown, contemporary research on cosmopolitan education points. I want to emphasize that value creative adjustment, like "a kind of exile…from the comfort of local truths" (Nussbaum, 1997b, p. 11), like a "reflective openness to the new fused with reflective loyalty to the known" (Hansen, 2011, p. 62), like the spirit of the bodhisattva, is something ordinary people do. A regular farmer turned carpenter like Grandpa Humberto can exhibit a disposition towards value creative adjustment, just as a strong poet like Diogenes or Tagore.

V.2. Artful Methods

Commitments to contextualism and transactional realism, embedded in the very method I employ here, while allowing significant determination of ideals like "value creative adjustment," forbid full determination of the means by which ideals are realized. The very notion of creativity presupposes responsiveness to actual, particular conditions, in such a way that no specific method for the realization of an ideal can be provided without prior determination of actual conditions. This limitation, however, does not prevent us from articulating general principles of method, loosely defined in the way they inform the work of artists. What I mean is the way in which principles of method work not in service of a *procedure*, but in service of a *style*.

[57] Iris Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good* (2001). Oxford: Taylor & Francis Group.

There is a procedure for handling materials in a chemistry laboratory, for filing immigration paperwork, and for performing physical therapy on an injured muscle. The principles of method operative in those cases are fully determined a priori of implementation in practice. By contrast, the style that governs the way a painter creates a work of art, the way an exquisite dresser puts together an outfit, and the way a expert teacher delivers a lesson also depends on principles of method—this painter always starts by drawing the eyes; that fashionista limits her wardrobe to four colors; this teacher always starts her class by playing a song—but these principles of *artful* method are underdetermined compared to the case of *procedural* method. In fact, in the kinds of artful practices that require creative responses, principles function as shorthands for what experimental inquiry has shown to work, but the creative spirit always awaits the exception with enthusiasm. It is a sensibility, moral, aesthetic, or whatever[58] that determines the judgment of what counts as good, or fitting the context, as *what counts as an appropriate response to the situation*. Principles provide a way to get started, put something on the table to pass the test of sensitivity. In the case of *procedural* method, by contrast, principles are the final arbiter of what counts as appropriate.

The nature of value creative adjustment as a disposition to be cultivated is such that, as for almost everything in education, all that can be provided in the way of principles is *artful* methods. Procedural methods will not only prove ineffective, but positively damaging to the cultivation of a disposition marked by suppleness, generosity, and responsiveness. To begin bringing this treatise to a conclusion, I want to offer three short sketches of artful methods for

[58] All sensitivity is about qualities, and thus always at bottom aesthetic. Dewey was right that all experiences, moral, cognitive, etc. are, *qua* experiences, aesthetics at a most basic level.

value creative adjustment. 1) Return to the quality of Experience; 2) Endurance of adjustment; 3) The extension of values.

V.2.a. Return to the Quality of Experience

My reading of the extant literature on cosmopolitan education identifies the main insight of cosmopolitan universalism with an important function of philosophical reflection, what Dewey calls *criticism of criticism:* the invaluable function of taking critical distance from things. But as Dewey himself insisted, this function needs the counter movement of the return to experience where we can test, evaluate, and refine the essences generated from a distance. As we saw in previous chapters, the weak point of cosmopolitan universalism is the temptation to set camp in the mountain top, and never return to the ground, to the mess and confusion of the world. For a cosmopolitanism based on creative responsiveness to normative terrains, the capacity to always return to the quality of experience is particularly important.

The ineffable quality of the problematic situation, as Pierce would put it, its *firstness*,[59] is basic. Values, by contrast, are refined essences. As values emerge from the quality of experience, returning to that basic quality can help us find channels to connect values that otherwise, taken as essences complete and without history or origin, appear segregated and even in conflict. The task of education becomes, then, to help perceive the quality of the problematic situation that gives rise to values, to particular normative perspectives that are familiar, and then help see how different normative perspectives emerge from similar or continuous problematic situations—that *is* to perceive the interconnectedness of values.

59 Charles S. Peirce (1868). "On a New List of Categories" P*roceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 7*, pp. 287-298. Presented to the Academy May 14, 1867

V.2.a.a. The Difficulty of Going Back to the Quality of Experience.

In many contexts, we do not have the means to return to the quality of a problematic situation that serves as the grounds for the values we intend to examine critically: we cannot experience it again, or we deem it undesirable to experience it again—values are often grounded in suffering, sometimes intense to the point of approaching unbearableness.[60] And sometimes no amount or intensity of directly experienced qualities or work of the imagination and critical thought are enough to bracket out the concepts that mediate our experience of problematic situations—sometimes we cannot loosen the grip concepts have on our judgments of value. But we need neither a complete return to an original quality, nor to leave our normative world behind. For the purpose of seeing that there is a bedrock of qualitative experience that connects my normative perspective, my values, with other perspectives, with other values, often a shift in perspective, just a shake to destabilize the values I take for granted, is enough.

The artful method of returning to the quality of experience goes hand in hand with the capacity to endure a particular kind of pain that is characteristic of experiences of value creative adjustment: the pain of approaching the limits of values. Both of these artful methods in turn are related to a third artful method that I call the extension of values, and it entails a playful but critically experimental attitude towards the scope of the values we employ in our dealigns with the world. The practice of extending values works both as a response to facing the limits of values as well as a way to maintain an awareness of the dynamic nature of values and concepts in

60 In his novels *Austerlitz*, *The Rings of Saturn*, and *The Emigrants,* W. G. Sebald explores the challenges of unearthing the experiences of his parents' generation, the Nazi generation in Germany. These are the experiences in which the normative terrains of the author's life in post-war West Germany find a point of origin. One of the themes that recurs in the novels is the search for the memories of his parents' generation abroad, in testimonies by emigrants, because for those who stayed in Germany, the memories are too painful and shameful.

general, and thus hopefully loosening the grip they tend to hold in our thinking. I will explore these connections further in the coming sections.

The particular quality of a problematic situation is not easily divorced from the conceptual schemes, including values, through which the quality acquires its significant meaning. The return to the quality of experience can only be accomplished partially—various versions of this method that emerged at different times and places in the history of ideas tend to agree on this limitation, from Mahayana Buddhism's *observation of the mind* (Jp. *kanjin*), to Dewey's *cultivated naïveté,* through Schopenhauer's *aesthetic experience,* and Husserl's *epoché*. This is in part because our responses to the quality of experience by means of concepts and values, and even the act of employing a method to return to the quality of experience, already transform the quality in question. The return to the quality of experience involves not a kind of turning back of time to an original position, but a *re-turn* to the qualitative, a second turn (the first one being from the qualitative to the conceptual).[61] It involves recognizing how particular normative responses to a problematic situation in fact exert a qualitative transformation in experience itself.

V.2.a.b. Quality of Experience and Normative Possibilities.

The transformation that normative responses exert on the quality of experience operates perhaps analogously to the way yellow turns to green when mixed with blue. An experienced painter who has developed a refined sensibility to the process of mixing colors, can imaginatively perceive yellow in green, as he can imaginatively perceive an orange (rather than a

61 Dewey insisted that experience was like a circuit running from qualitative primary experience, through conceptual secondary experience, back to primary, and so forth.

green) as the result of adding red (rather than blue) to the same yellow. Analogously, by cultivating a sensibility to the ways in which the quality of problematic situations is transformed through our normative responses we can return to the quality of experience, and imaginatively, even experimentally, conceive how that quality could be transformed if we changed our normative responses. Paying attention to the quality of problematic situations and the function values play in shaping that quality allows us to reveal common ground and subtlety to situations of conflicting normative responses.

Consider the following example taken from Nancy Carlsson-Paige's and Linda Lantieri's (2005) qualitative research on "perspective-taking" skills (p. 107) as central to an education for global awareness (see also Berman, 1997). To illustrate how teacher and students use the skill of perspective-taking[62] the authors tell the story of Raymond, a student at Central Part East High School in East Harlem. One cold winter day, Raymond arrives without a jacket and deeply upset. He was robbed outside the subway station on his way to school. I quote at length from the transcripts:

> *"Teacher:* Raymond, I know you are very upset. Could you tell us what happened?
>
> *Raymond:* I was getting off the subway stop right here in East Harlem and all of a sudden I was surrounded by three guys who told me that I better give them my sheepskin coat. One of the guys had his hand in his pocket and I thought maybe it could be a knife there. I don't know. (pause)
>
> *Teacher:* Go on, Raymond. We're right here listening to you and all of us care a lot about you and what happened.
>
> *Raymond:* Well, before I could even think, I started to unzip my coat, and I said to the guy who I thought had the knife, "This is incredible. I was just getting ready to do that"—you know, give him my coat. I said, "Who should I give it to?" One of the guys snatched

62 The authors use this example to illustrate other skills also explored in the same article: effective communication, seeing problems as shared by the group, and finding solutions that work for everyone.

the coat and all of them started to run off as fast as they could. Them, of course, I wanted to pick up some rocks and throw them at them, but I didn't.

Student: I can't believe you did that. I think you saved your life. How come you didn't try to say "no" or fight back? I think that's what I would have done.

Raymond: I don't know. It just came to me, but now I feel so angry and humiliated and I can't believe I don't have my coat. It's twenty degrees out there today and I walked three blocks without a coat.

Teacher: What do you think was happening for you, Raymond? How were you able to respond in this way and—I would agree with Marie—probably save your life? Remember, just last week this same thing happened in Queens and the young man didn't give up his coat and was shot to death.

Raymond: Well, I was actually thinking of what we were talking about last week of what makes violence even worse and that's more violence. I also remember you saying, "Remember, you are not your coat" last week when we were talking about what happened in Queens to that guy. So I guess I decided to do something that would deescalate the conflict and not give back more violence, and so that's what I did.

Student: Raymond, I think it was more courageous to not fight back and use your skills, but I don't know if I would have been able to do that either. And I feel angry too, about your coat. No one has a right to take something that is yours. No one!" (pp. 117-118)

Raymond's response to the robbers embodies emergent values that he initially cannot articulate. He acted based on an intuition to protect his life, "before I could think." Although later he clearly resorts to language he learned through the conflict resolution program in which they are involved: "deescalate the conflict and not give back more violence." At the same time, he feels "angry and humiliated" for losing the jacket and, without expressing it explicitly, for failing to respond to the demands of a particular version of the value of courage, which in his cultural context is perceived as one of the main values structuring the normative terrain of the situations.[63] The other student picks up on this, pointing out that what she would have done is try

63 The value of courage is relevant in both the situation of the robbery and the situation of recounting the events of the robbery to his peers. The particular version of courage to which his frustration makes implicit reference would demand that he fights back in the situation of the robbery and that he displays shame in the situation of telling others that he did not fight back.

to fight back, acknowledging how he, Raymond, must have felt. Then, together with the teacher and reflecting about similar past cases (the young man in Queens) and making use of concepts they studied in their conflict resolution class they begin to articulate a different notion of courage— "I think it was more courageous to not fight back," says the student. And they make sure to connect the new value to the emotional quality of the experience—the student confirms to Raymond that his feelings of anger are not misplaced, that they belong with this different kind of courage as well: "And I feel angry too, about your coat. No one has a right to take something that is yours. No one!" (ibid.).

The perspective-taking skills that the students exhibit is not merely a shift between two points of view characterized by a commitment to different sets of values. The poignancy of the example is that it shows how the process of creating value together involves a return to the *quality* of problematic situations (it shows a snapshot, but we get an idea of the ongoing process beyond the specific situation recorded). We notice how Raymond, his fellow students, and the teacher keep going back to how Raymond felt, the *quality* of the situation: violence, fear, a sense of injustice, cold. And as they coordinate their responses, they make sure to attend not only to the quality of Raymond's experience, but also to the quality of *that* situation they experience together, the situation of a community coping with the challenge of an act of violence and injustice perpetrated against one of its members. The emerging values they are creating together are shaped in relation to the experienced quality of the situation: they reflect about how these values render the experience, making it a source of meaning and moral growth for the community, rather than merely a source of anger and shame.

Learning the art of returning to the quality of experience can be a powerful method for value creative adjustment. As already mentioned, it is a method that brings us closer to the limits

of values, just as Raymond and his classmates stumbled upon the limitations of the concept of courage they upheld, and this can be painful. A second method, then, becomes instrumental: the art of enduring the pains of adjustment.

V.2.b. Endurance of Adjustment.

Contemporary versions of cosmopolitanism tend to take distance from the cosmopolitan caricature of the free-wheeling world traveler who enjoys the gifts of cultures the world over without the burden of assuming any responsibility for, or making any real contributions to, the communities that provide for his cultural voracity. Contemporary cosmopolitanisms reject the idea of being in the world as a tension free affair. They, in fact, insist on the opposite: to be a global citizen is a "kind of exile" (Nussbaum, 2002a), is inhabiting a "space of tension" (Hansen, 2011) that requires "endurance of dissonance" (Todd, 2010). Our value-laden world is shot through with normative tension, and to inhabit it meaningfully we must learn how to deal with this tension and the pain that comes with it.

My version of cosmopolitanism is characterized by a specific kind of response to the normative tension of the world: value creative adjustment. With Dewey, we saw that adjustment entails a holistic transformation of self and, we argued, that comes with the reshaping of the configuration of values in the contexts where the self is situated. These transformations are existentially intense, they come with their own share of pains. The second artful method introduced here addresses this aspect of value creation directly: the art of enduring the pains of value creative adjustment. For convenience, I will refer to it as endurance of adjustment.[64]

64 In *A Common Faith*, Dewey employs the key term *enduring adjustment* to refer to a kind of life marked by adjustment as defining characteristic. The term Dewey uses bears such close resemblance to the expression I choose to describe the artful method presented in this section, that it inspired some hesitation. I decided to keep it because

V.2.b.a. Creating and Sustaining Values.

The dichotomy of creation and sustenance has deep roots in our culture. Through our daily activities, professional, social, political, and cultural, we contribute to the ongoing life of traditions that make up our cultural lives. We respond to events in terms of specific values both in relation to the unique quality of the event and to a cultural history in the background. What allows us to designate the meaning of any given event in terms of this or that *value*—this hamburger is *good*— is the continuum between a value as that which emerges at every moment and a value as a meaning shared with others in the context of a culture, a history, and a language. This continuum was established by means of an ontology of values as impermanent and interconnected in earlier chapters. One characteristic of this ontology is that it dissolves the dualism between creation and sustenance, between movement and stability, between change and permanence. Whatever acts we perform to sustain values involve, necessarily, an element of creativity. Whenever we create value, we partake in a normative and cultural history; we are, to a degree, sustaining already existing values.[65] To establish this continuity is important for the question of enduring a certain kind of pain that is characteristic of adjustment: the pain of approaching the limits of a value. I want to suggest that the continuum between creation and sustenance runs along a scale of the proximity to the limits of a value. If the end of beauty is far,

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the capacity here described is central for what Dewey means by *enduring adjustment*, so any potential confusion that the resemblance might cause should also point in the direction of a meaningful conceptual link.

[65] We can, however, conceive of a critic responding to our assertion of continuity with a slippery slope argument: that the continuum between sustenance and creation entails the dissolution of the *distinction* between the terms. Values decay, the critic might claim, and for that reason cultures, communities, and individuals engage in various practices to sustain them. In the encounter with difference certain tensions emerge in response to which values must be invoked (and thus sustained) and other values can be ignored (and thus let decay). Creativity need not enter the picture, the critic would insist; after all, if the notion is indistinguishable from sustenance, why introduce it in the first place and complicate matters? The question is, however, that the collapse of the sustenance/creativity dualism does not entail dissolution of the distinction—our critic's slippery slope argument is fallacious. All the stakes of my thesis rest on the significance of this distinction and its centrality for the ethos of cosmopolitanism.

so to speak, the things I do to make things beautiful can be thought of as part of the work of *sustaining* beauty. When we approach the limits of beauty, because no beautiful things are in sight or because the value itself has come to decay, banalities and vulgarities have come to be regarded as beautiful, then the work of making beautiful things can be thought of as a work of *creating* beauty.

Let us consider the question of the distinction and continuity between sustenance and creation through an example. The government of Japan has a program known as "Living National Treasures."[66] These are artists working on various disciplines of traditional Japanese performing arts and crafts. They do what they do the same way it has been done for centuries. They offer little in the way of innovation; they introduce little novelty into the world. And yet, they are not merely reproducing things created in the past. Each new piece of pottery, each new performance of a classic Edo-period Kabuki play, each new sheet of indigo died cloth a master makes is different from anything that existed before in subtle ways. Each is an expression of subtle creativity of the highest order. And yet, creativity is not in the fact of the uniqueness of each piece of pottery —I am pretty sure I just put down a cup of coffee next to my computer on this particular table in an arrangement that is strictly unprecedented in this world, and neither you nor I would call it creative. We regard the work of such artists as truly creative because they work at the cutting edge of values. They set the standards of elegance, harmony, and beauty within their particular traditions, which requires a refinement from previous standards, a constant

66 Living National Treasures (人間国宝 *Ningen Kokuhō*) is a Japanese popular term for those individuals certified as Preservers of Important Intangible Cultural Properties (重要無形文化財保持者 *Jūyō Mukei Bunkazai Hojisha*) by the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology as based on Japan's Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties (文化財保護法 *Bunkazai Hogōhō*). The skills masters possess in traditional performance arts (Gagaku, Noh, Bunraku, Kabuki, Kumi Odori, Music, Dance, and Drama) and crafts (Ceramics, Textiles, Lacquerware, Metalworking, Dollmaking, Woodworking, Papermaking) are considered by the law as "Intangible Cultural Properties" and a program of certification, support, and grants is in place to ensure the continuation of these skills.

pushing of limits. And this type of work entails a kind of pain to which these masters are well accustomed. It is a particular kind of pain that is characteristic of creative work. All the while, their work is genuinely a work of sustenance. They would not be considered "Living National Treasures" if they worked in a style that radically breaks from tradition.

The task of cultivating capacities for the creation of values to which a cosmopolitan curriculum ought to attend must be grounded in one or more cultural traditions and practices through which values are sustained. We could take Hansen's insight that genuine learning always involves both preservation and creation of culture (2010, p. 206) and recast it as the following principle for a cosmopolitan curriculum: to reveal (make intelligible, relevant, and available for use) and nurture (cultivate the practices and habits that enable individuals to partake in) the *creative function* operating within the practices and traditions through which cultures sustain values. Great masters in a tradition, like the "Living National Treasures" of Japan, are perfect example of the continuity between sustenance and creation, of the creative function within the work of keeping culture alive.

The norm in our societies, however, is to regard creative work as exceptional and separate from the daily activities through which we sustain the life of cultures and traditions. Creative work is for "creative people," the rest of us just (re)produce, use, and consume what they create. These separations are obstacles for a cosmopolitan education in general and for the method of endurance of adjustment in particular. As we saw earlier, value creative adjustment is logically linked to processes of cultural creativity, the kind that are normally thought of as exceptional and separate from every day activities of work and learning. The connection that

both forms of creativity share—it can be perhaps accounted for in terms of *resemblance*[67]—makes engagement in culturally creative activities an effective preparation for experiences of value creative adjustment, including endurance of the pains involved. Now if these creative activities are exceptional and reserved for a special class of people,[68] occasions for learning about certain qualities of creative experience becomes limited for most. By contrast, overcoming the dichotomy of sustenance and creation, encouraging students to think of what they do, whatever it might be, as activities that belong to the domain of creativity, would generate opportunities to foster a sensibility to the creative dimension of experience. These would be, at the same time, opportunities to cultivate endurance of adjustment.

V.2.b.b. The Fight for Values

What value does an accomplished Noh performance by a great master bestow on the world? A new sense of beauty begins to emerge, perhaps? A variation on the meaning of artistic courage? A new understanding of harmony, one that would reach beyond its meaning in theater to enter the worlds of music, painting, cinema, political theory, and more? By the lights of our theory of values, the answer should be that infinitely many values can and do emerge from creative interventions in the world. But whatever value emerges from it, it is clear that it would be possible only because values are, by virtue of their own logical constitution, limited in

67 Perhaps we can speak of familiarizing oneself with the *shape* of a kind of experience. This relation of two experiences connected by a shared shape, and the educational significance of that similarity, is exploited by Plato in the idea that familiarizing young people with certain aesthetic forms (certain kinds of music that embody harmony) can be conducive to their later development of reason.

68 Robert Florida has popularized the expression *creative class*.

extension. Beauty is a value at all because it is not universally present in experience.[69] There is plenty of ugliness around for everyone, and it is in fact overwhelming.

One of the great pioneers of modern design, Massimo Vignelli, famous for his designs for the New York Subway System, amongst other projects, said "[t]he life of a designer is a life of fight: fight against the ugliness" (see Hustwit, 2007). Because beauty is limited and fragile, we value it, and we fight to create it. The same goes for courage, harmony, and all values. This truth would be trivial if its implications were not so momentous.[70]

The values we value are precious because they are finite, their absence, and even the approach of their limit are truly undesirable experiences. A prospect against which one must fight, a fight worth dedicating a life. Values are also *temporally* finite, like anything in the

[69] Here I mean a limited *extension* for any conceivable value. Beauty is a conceivable value because it is not coextensive with existence: there is lack of beauty, there is ugliness in existence, and this makes beauty intelligible. We could argue, as a separate point, for a limited *number* of values, as Berlin argues in his last essay cited earlier (note page 166 and footnote 50). When we regard values as conceptual generalizations—the historico-sociological sense of the term—it makes sense to think of values as limited in number. It is an empirical, anthropological fact that we are capable of meaningfully accounting for the infinite multiplicity of particular experiences of value in terms of limited value concepts. Without this capacity, thinking and meaning would be impossible. In this sense, we can safely claim that there is a limited number of human values. We cannot, however, ever come to the point of closing the list definitely. We can say the list is not infinite, but we can't, having counted, say, 122 values, reject the possibility of a 123rd value to be added at some point. Even though this argument might seem to open the door to infinity, there is always also the possibility and likelihood that values get collapsed and the almost guaranteed eventual end of the human species as a limit of growth for the list of values.

[70] In the previous chapter, we explored Dewey's ideas on values and value creation. We learned that for Dewey the creation of value is a practical, social, and iterative process of coping with problematic situations guided by intelligence. We saw that his theory of value creation is grounded in a fundamental rejection of the dualism of subject and object, and that the highest (most refined, most intelligent, etc.) expression of the process by means of which values, together with objectivity and subjectivity, emerge is *adjustment*. A key moment in the theoretical account of this concept occurs when in the process of pursuing desired ends (ends-in-view), we come to recognize that our ends are not realizable, or not genuinely desirable, so creativity applied to the process of value inquiry yields not only new means towards the attainment of ends, but also truly new ends. This flexibility in Dewey's conception of values is an expectable target for criticism. The critic would complain that as long as we remain open to give up value commitments because we discover them to be unrealizable, we are not truly committed to values. In the eye of the critic, a Deweyan about values would be no better than a crude opportunist, who easily gives up a commitment the moment a serious obstacle comes his way. And this is a charge that should worry especially someone who tried to incorporate a Deweyan concept of value creation into a theory of cosmopolitanism precisely because it is a charge particularly sensitive to cosmopolitanism. If the charge was legitimate, we would be providing the critic with free ammunition. The critic would just need to add the last logical step: cosmopolitanism is nothing but value opportunism mapped onto global geographical coordinates. But none of these charges are legitimate, and the finitude of value is the key. Enduring adjustment is not achieved opportunistically. The mark of opportunism is a disposition to mold one's commitments to suit the opportunities that environing conditions make available. But as we saw in the previous chapter, adjustment entails growth; it entails an expansion of self by means of the creation of new value. And growth is a good because values are limited.

natural world: they are impermanent, they exist in *ke*. The fight, then, will only produce values that are imperfect, limited to specific contexts, and fragile: the fight must be ongoing. We do not need the refined aesthetic sensitivity of a Massimo Vignelli to recognize the ugliness that surrounds us. Every day, people everywhere recognize the limits of values and work hard to extend values beyond their present limits. The rational and elegant design of the subway system signs and maps, with its recognizable color-coded icons and harmoniously spaced characters set in Helvetica Bold typeface succeed in creating beauty, just as a mother who tells a bedtime story to a daughter who had a difficult day at school succeeds in keeping the ugliness of the world contained. And yet, Vignelli's elegant designs grace a subway platform decorated with vulgar and manipulative advertisement posters for some reality TV show, while the girder that runs above the rails hasn't been cleaned in this century and on the trails rats run around puddles of black water and garbage. And bullies in school will continue harassing the little girl by day while the nurturing mother continues to give love and encouragement by night.

Both Vignelli's and the mother's "fight against the ugliness" are uphill battles. And it is precisely because beauty is finite and ugliness so undesirable that the fight is worth it. Value creation is always like this. For the teacher who values the cultivation of intellectual virtues, the value she creates in the educational experiences of her students stand out in a sea of ignorance. When Buddhists emphasize the redemptive function of acts of compassion and kindness they do it not out of a naively optimistic view of human nature or because kindness might lead to material retribution or salvation in the afterlife. Buddhists emphasize acts of compassion and kindness because such acts shine with the light of value against a background of "the ocean of suffering" (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1993, p. 49, or a "sea of suffering" Nichiren, p.WND I, p. 33) that constitutes the human condition.

Cultivating the capacity to endure the pains of value creative adjustment includes that we understand that the work of value creation demands we confront the limits of values, and this in turn demands an embattled spirit in response. Moreover, it is crucial to understand that the outcome of value creative processes, the things that bestow value on the world, cannot be neatly dissected from the process of its creation. The idea that we can separate values from the embattled processes of their creation translates into the illusion that we can obtain values without work.[71] One essential element in the cultivation of the capacity to endure the pains of adjustment would be to give students opportunities to experience what it takes to create value, the meaning of thoroughness, and direct exposure to exemplars of value.

V.2.b.c. The Value of Pain, Directly Experienced.

Part of the potential meaning of undergoing an experience of suffering is that in it I approach sources of value. The idea that the torments of the soul nurture creative inspiration can be banal, especially when used as an exculpation for self pity and cowardice. But a kernel of insight is contained in it. After all, let us remember that in the pragmatic, instrumentalist account of value formation developed in the last two chapters, values emerge from the tension between directly experienced goods, blocked impulses, and frustrated desires. In other words, values emerge from suffering. That means experiences of suffering, when rendered meaningful, give us

[71] One can in fact bestow beauty to one's life, for example, by simply buying beautiful clothes, beautiful art, and a beautiful house—some people who are very wealthy also manage to create conditions for themselves where they surround themselves by beautiful people, and buy cosmetic products and procedures to make themselves beautiful as well. One can even bypass the creative work of curation and hire a personal shopper, an art dealer, and an interior designer to make all the relevant decisions. For the consumer, the effort is minimal. The temptation would be to believe that in such a way we are acquiring value without the painful fight. Analogously, some believe they can buy wisdom by hiring a life coach, compassion by attending a seminar with the Dalai Lama, health in the form of multivitamins, or joy through Prozac. Value can, in fact, be bestowed on experience by means of the work of others. But this approach amounts to a case of adaptation; changes are relatively unstable, superficial (qualitatively less intense), and piecemeal compared to the work of value creation that is like "a fight."

access to—in the sense of understanding of and direct partaking in— the sources of the values a community cherishes. The task of rendering experiences of suffering meaningful is performed by means of communication, in particular by means of that special kind of communication that we call education—communication systematically organized around the subject matters that a society deems most valuable. The ethos of value creative adjustment does not romanticize suffering, nor does it merely aim at maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. Rather, it seeks to cultivate the human capacities to render both joy and suffering, as inescapable factors in the equation of life, more meaningful and more generative.

V.2.c. The Extension of Values.

Descriptions of the dynamics of normative terrains offered in previous chapters constitute no more than an account of how practices of valuation are self-transformative and value creative. There is nothing particularly cosmopolitan about normative terrains per se, other than the way it accounts for values in the world lends itself to (because emerges from) a picture of the world as value-laden, impermanent, and interconnected. As I have shown, the features of the world that this picture highlights are what concerns cosmopolitanism. Besides that, however, we can speak of characteristically cosmopolitan attitudes towards values, as a way of holding values, as Hansen puts it.

By means of the slow-moving argument running from chapter two through chapter four, we arrived at a conception of values as tools employed for coping with particular problematic situations. As we make use of values, we discussed, normative terrains are formed and transformed. We considered how values configure normative terrains in different ways, demarcating the range of possible normative responses to various kinds of situations. One way

values function within a normative terrain is by establishing a normative connection with people in distant places and times. We can think of such normative connections as bridges, paths, or highways connecting two or more locales. American exceptionalism, as a set of values that configure certain kinds of normative terrains as they enter specific situations, for example, relies on a normative connection to a lineage of people who inhabited this land over time, in particular to people who lived here during the founding years of the nation. The normative terrains that structure the practice of scientific research at a particular university department, as a different example, feature normative connections with researchers across spatial and temporal distances. It is hard to imagine a normative terrain without features of that kind. Even in cliques where values are formed around very local and very particular practices and loyalties—the petty world of my middle school friends and I comes to mind—there is always a link to people, values, and cultural expressions far away—in the limited world of our concerns, we saw ourselves connected to young people of a similar age, in similar circumstances of feeling oppressed by our parents and school, in other parts of the world, especially in the U.K. and the U.S., from where our heroes came.

When such normative connections are well established within a terrain, we can think of them as bridges, paths, or highways. There are cases, however, when no solid history of normative connection is there, and people nevertheless employ values to *make* a connection. The Buddhist tradition, for example, emphasizes the cultivation of feelings of compassion as a way to create moral connections with people. The practice of lovingkindness meditation popularized in recent years by Sharon Salzberg (1995, 1999, 2010) and Matthieu Ricard (2006, 2012) recommends the practice of seeing the strangers we encounter every day walking down the

street from the imaginative standpoint of their parents, as a supremely precious being.[72] This is a practice whose roots can be traced to Buddhaghosa's 5th-century CE Pāli exegetical text, the *Path to Purification* (*Visuddhimagga*), Chapter IX[73], which instructs to engage in successive stages of meditation for progressively cultivating loving-kindness towards: 1) oneself, 2) a good friend, 3) a "neutral" person, 4) a difficult person, 5) all four of the above equally, 6) and then gradually the entire universe. The point is to take the value of love, which has a well-established place with "oneself" and "a good friend" as objects, and extend it universally. A value so extended works like an arm that reaches out of the bounds of my normative world, grabs this individual person, and drags him into the sphere of my moral concerns.[74] This kind of gesture is what Martha Nussbaum refers to when she speaks of "making all human beings more like our fellow city dwellers" (1997c, p. 33), and what Ikeda elegantly describes as "imaginative empathy" (2010, p. 111).[75]

When I make use of values to create meaningful connections with people normatively distant, it is as if I toss a throw line with an anchor up a tree. The anchor grabs onto a distant branch, beyond the bounds of the space I have personally experienced so far, and I pull the weight of my body up, closing the gap between myself and that distant point. This is always tentative and risky. Well-trained, experienced climbers, however, do not rely exclusively on one

[72] The Buddhist tradition is also notorious for the imaginative use of values to do precisely the opposite: establish a normative distance between people. Famously, Buddhist monks, particularly in the Theravada tradition, would be encouraged to imagine the person that was the object of their sexual desires as a rotting corpse. This imaginative practice way meant to curb sexual desire, when deemed an undesirable feeling.

[73] Buddhaghosa (1999), pp. 288-306.

[74] Values are always connections amongst things valued: I value this flower, I value this face, I value this sentence, and the value of beauty allows me to hold these three things in mutual relation even when there is little in the way of concrete commonalities that these things share.

[75] I consider Ikeda on imaginative empathy in detail in Obelleiro (2006) "Imaginative Empathy in Daisaku Ikeda's Philosophy of Education."

throw line. They make sure to maintain a solid grip on the tree itself and sometimes use more than one rope.

As I reach towards people far away, I am securely fastened to something within the bounds of the established normative terrain I inhabit, because the extension of my values to include someone in radically different circumstances might fail, the anchor may no find a branch onto which to grab. I may proclaim in good will that my fellow citizens of the world, agricultural workers in Venezuela for example, have the right to organize in unions and enjoy some of the political and economic freedoms I enjoy. In such a gesture, I extend my values to include these people in the sphere of my concerns, and in extending this value I reshape the normative terrain of my political activities to include them. And yet, the political reality of their condition might be such that the gesture falls flat: even as I reach out in communication with them and express my intentions of solidarity, they reject my diagnosis of their political situation and find my way of talking about their situation offensive and ignorant. The extension of values always carries such a risk. Because of that, I do not stake the core of my political convictions in such gestures; I do not gamble the constellation of value commitments that make up my political identity on the chance that the anchor grabs onto the branch—I do not heroically attempt to make a kind of self out of a political gesture of solidarity with people struggling in a place far away. I still keep value commitments well grounded in practice at home, where my valuations of matters of labor politics, for example, have passed the test of criticism in light of certain liberal commitments at the heart of the communities of practice to which I belong. The creation of value is iterative and progress is based on what has worked in the past. In this sense, as we remain experimental and creative in matters of value in a cosmopolitan spirit, as we seek to extend values to reach out and include people far away, we do this grounded in what works at the local level, and this is always

necessarily limiting. In this sense, the value creative cosmopolitanism I recommend here must always be well grounded in the principle of fallibilism, and keep in mind the ever present possibility that the extension of values always has reasonable chances of failing.

The gesture of extending our values, though, is a genuinely cosmopolitan gesture. And within a cosmopolitan framework that prices and celebrates values creation and experimental value inquiry, the fact that the gesture is risky and it often fails is not a weakness. The cosmopolitan spirit demands the *courage* to take the risk without guarantee that the extension of a value will work. But it also demands that we balance courage with intelligence, that we remain critical of our attempts to extend values to connect to people, that we scrutinize the outcomes of those attempts and decide whether the extension works, whether meaningful, generative connections were made, and we evaluate this not only from our own perspective, but also from the perspective of the distant other involved. The true value of failure in extending our values is the possibility of learning from others across differences. As Ikeda (2010) perspicaciously notes, learning across differences requires courage (p.111), because in reaching out across differences we always attempt to extend our values and there is always the risk of stumbling upon the limits of value, and directly experience the pain described in the previous section.

The impulse in cosmopolitanism is to confront social breaks with a cultivated awareness of an underlying natural and social continuum of life. This impulse contains a seed of hope, a characteristically cosmopolitan kind of hope: that in the interconnectedness we share with other human beings and life in general there are possibilities for meaningful, fulfilling connections across differences, and that normative instruments like values and cultures and institutions like education can be reconstructed to foster such connections, rather than to erect walls to separate us from one another. But with this hope that barriers can be broken down and meaningful

connections can be made comes a risk, the risk of overextending our values over others: That in thinking that we are creating value together across differences we are simply silencing the others' voice and suppressing plurality of perspectives.

This risk is real, precisely because the tendency of values is towards extension without limit. And, as we saw in chapter three, here is when contextualism plays an important role in the ways in which we uphold values, as a corrective to the ambition of universality that is the natural tendency of values and general meanings. The two pedagogical strategies of returning to the quality of experience and enduring the pains of adjustment are intended to keep the contextualist spirit fastened securely at the helm of value creation. The point is that when I encounter you across differences, and we confront the demands of the world and create value together as we try to adjust to conditions of interconnectedness and impermanence, I can remain mindful of context and resist the push to overextend my values over your experience.

V.3. Experiments with Tools.

Different tools do different things. Cosmopolitanism as a philosophy is a set of tools, and cosmopolitan education is the process of learning how to use these tools and master the arts that pertain to the use of these tools. The toolkit of cosmopolitanism has been historically used to get over walls (nationality, religion, cultural traditions) we erect to separate people from people and people from nature. In helping individuals and communities traverse such separations, the tools of cosmopolitanism have been used to make it possible to create a sense of self and a sense of belonging to the world grounded in more than one cultural tradition. This is very important and relevant in times of intensified impermanence and interconnectedness, as we saw in previous chapters. And it has been instrumental for developing a sense of justice that reaches beyond the

bounds of established communities. It has been instrumental towards the building of more inclusive moral communities towards a sense of a global moral community.

Sometimes, however, interesting things happen when tools are used for purposes other than their originally intended. A sculptor molds clay not with the modeling tools designed for that purpose but with rusty pieces of metal rescued from the trash; a poet resorts to words like "rectangular" or "well-aligned" instead of words like "introverted" or "sincere" to describe a person's character; a social scientist attacks a sociological question using the tools of economics.[76] Surprising, sometimes rewarding outcomes result from such experiments in instrumentality.

A lot of what goes on in contemporary cosmopolitan theory are cases of interesting uses of tools to address the questions that traditionally concerned cosmopolitanism. Agonists ask, "what if for the purpose of finding effective ways of coordinating our responses to the world across differences we use the tool of agonistic struggle, rather than the tool of harmonious cooperation that for so long has been the preferred choice amongst cosmopolitans?" Rooted cosmopolitans wonder, "why can't we use to the rich resources of patriotic sentiment and deep interests in particular cultural traditions as tools to foster connections across difference, rather than the traditional cosmopolitan method of leaving patriotism and particular loyalties behind?"

Within a traditional, universalist conception of cosmopolitanism we have individuals with histories, cultural backgrounds, communities to which they belong, and an impulse against locating their cultural identity and moral commitments within the bounds of the history, cultural background, and community from which they come. This "impulse," this "ambition" as Borges

[76] This strategy has come to be known as *economic imperialism*, famously championed by Prof. Gary Becker at the University of Chicago.

puts it, relies on certain instrumentalities the philosophy of cosmopolitanism offers to accomplish a way of being in the world that responds to the cultural and moral demands of this "ambition:" the concept of universal human nature (grounded in some fundamental rational capacity) is what makes it possible for a cosmopolitan universalist to identify with humanity as a whole rather than with a particular culture, history, and community. Of all the things I have in me, I regard my humanity which I share with all people, as the core of myself, as the one thing that above all contributes what essentially makes me what I am. And in seeing myself this way, the universalist reasons, I extend the sphere of my moral concern to the whole of humanity.

The cosmopolitan vision I offer here is one that responds to the same impulse, to the same ambition, but with different tools. The shared condition that connects my self and my fate to people near and far is not some higher rational nature, but a basic existential condition of coping with problems in the world, and a moral interest in learning from other people, both because meaningful connections with people bring out unrealized potential to cope with problems, and because relations are good in themselves, directly enjoyed. With the tools and artful methods we have here we get at the issues raised by cosmopolitanism from a particular angle. The issues are the problems of global justice and creating lives of meaning in a world rapidly changing and interconnected, the challenges of living in a world at risk of ecological disaster and nuclear devastation, and the question of securing peace, economic stability and human rights in a world overcrowded and ever more pushed to fierce competition. The angle is a cosmopolitan orientation that entails a kind of humanism because it places human experience, in its basic quality, with its pains, struggles, and hopes for a better world, at the center. This is a humanism of a humble kind, not one grounded in an abstract, lofty sense of human nature, but

one based on our basic limitations and our capacity to cope with the problems of the world by means of collaboration, hard work, and creative ingenuity.

V.4. Conclusion

The purpose of this project has been to elucidate the process by means of which we adjust to the demands of the world, both in the constraints of actual conditions and the pull of ideals, and how along the way we come to transform ourselves and create value. One of the main claims that I sought to advance has been the idea that an education centered on the development of the capacity for what I call *value creative adjustment* is an education that we can characterize as *cosmopolitan*. The criteria for this identification is that world inhabitance, the idea of finding or making a home in the world both in terms of taking responsibility for the world and in terms of socially functioning in diverse cultural contexts, is a capacity central to cosmopolitan education and is precisely the kind of capacity that value creative adjustment enables.

This talk about value creative adjustment might feel unsettling. It is a notion that approaches the limits of language. Feeling the ground move beneath our feet is appropriate in this case, for the very concept of "global citizenship" enjoys a long history of unsettling meanings. When first put into circulation as a fresh metaphor introduced by Diogenes, the philosopher provocateur, its function was to disrupt the hardened vocabularies of citizenship of his time. Now "global citizenship" has become literalized and its meaning pulled to the center of our conversations on culture, politics, ethics, and morality in the 21st century. What I want for a conception of cosmopolitan education is to reach for images at the edge of language, and in that gesture point to the limits of language, the limits of meaning and value. With these limits within

sight, while aware that we will surely not transcend them (or at least I am not sure what that would mean), we can at least respond creatively by reshaping the normative terrains we inhabit.

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